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INTRODUCTION
I. SHAW V. RENO LIMITS THE STATES' OPTIONS FOR CREATING
MINORITY DISTRICTS
Legislators in jurisdictions with even modest minority popula-
tions will find adopting a challenge-resistant redistricting plan to
be more difficult than ever before. The problem is how much con-
sideration to give to race. Too little consideration may produce a
plan subject to challenge under the Voting Rights Act (the "Act").'
Too much consideration may produce a plan subject to challenge
on constitutional grounds.
The present seemingly irreconcilable pressures on the district-
ing process can, I maintain, be traced to advice peddled to legisla-
tors on the eve of the last round of redistrictings by an odd coali-
tion of civil rights groups and the Republican National Com-
mittee, whose message was reinforced by the Voting Section of
the Department of Justice. The advice, which was wishful think-
ing at best and cynically self-serving at worst, was taken will-
ingly by the nation's legislators, some of whom were under-
standably perplexed by the law, and others who saw following the
advice as an opportunity to further their own political agendas.
While the packaging may have been more subtle, the underly-
ing message to the legislators was that "the Voting Rights Act re-
quires you to create as many minority controlled districts as
physically possible." Following this widely disseminated advice,
legislators across the country declared themselves "legally bound"
to subjugate, even abandon, all race-neutral districting stan-
dards, save population equality, in the pursuit of minority dis-
tricts.2 The quest for the correct number of ideal minority dis-
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973, 1973c (1994).
2. States by law or custom follow certain standards in creating election districts.
Districting standards are needed to encourage legislators to create sensible units for po-
litical participation by voters and candidates, and to quell their natural tendencies to en-
gage in gerrymandering for personal and partisan advantage. Most states include within
their districting standards provisions for the creation of compact districts, with easily rec-
ognized boundaries, made up solely of contiguous territory. Other typical standards call
for creating districts that respect political subdivision boundaries, retain the cores of exist-
ing districts, avoid placing more than one incumbent in a district, and accommodate com-
munities of interest. For comprehensive, state-by-state information on redistricting prin-
ciples, see Center for Voting and Democracy, Mapping Our Future: A Public Interest Guide
to Redistricting, at http://www.fairvote.org/redistricting/reports/remanual/frames.htm
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tricts became the Holy Grail of redistricters in 1990, much the
way "one-person, one-vote" did some three decades earlier.3
In an earlier era, the impact of this advice would have been
limited. Prior to the 1990 Census, neither the racial population
data nor the technology was available to separate minority popu-
lation concentrations from the surrounding general population for
aggregation into minority districts. The 1990 Census, however,
reported population-by-race data for every closed polygon in
America. This meant that, with the help of modern software, leg-
islators could literally sit at a computer screen and aggregate mi-
nority population concentrations as needed to create their notions
of ideal minority districts.
The results of this legislative, computer-aided artistry were the
now infamous districts that were drawn down interstates or re-
sembled Rorschach Ink Blots or Modigliani paintings. Those of us
who were shocked that the blatant use of race as a significant ba-
sis for state action was so earnestly advocated and so willingly
embraced were not surprised when, in Shaw v. Reno,4 the Su-
preme Court declared that, absent a compelling state interest,
race-based assignment of voters to districts was prohibited by the
same Fourteenth Amendment that prohibited states from using
race to assign children to schools. Under certain circumstances,
the state's interest in complying with the Voting Rights Act could
justify its use of race, but only to the extent that the state "nar-
rowly tailored" its race-based efforts to those necessary to satisfy
the Act. Despite a series of subsequent cases addressing the is-
sue, the Court has not clarified the exact limitations on the
state's use of race.5 Nor has it endorsed a precise use of race that
(last modified Nov. 17, 2001).
3. See generally Robert G. Dixon, Jr., The Warren Court Crusade for the Holy Grail
of"One Man-One Vote," 1969 SUP. CT. REV. 219.
4. 509 U.S. 630(1993).
5. See Hunt v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234 (2001) [hereinafter Cromartie IIl; Abrams v.
Johnson, 521 U.S. 74 (1997); Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899 (1996) [hereinafter Shaw III;
Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952 (1996); United States v. Hays, 515 U.S. 737 (1995); Miller v.
Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995).
This article makes several references to Hunt v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234 (2001). The
Preliminary Print of the United States Reports indicates that, pursuant to Supreme Court
Rule 35.3, Governor Michael F. Easley was substituted as a party for former Governor
James B. Hunt, and thus, the style of the case officially has changed to Easley v. Cromar-
tie. Because, however, the case has already been widely cited as Hunt v. Cromartie, it will
be referenced throughout as such.
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is both "necessary" to comply with the Voting Rights Act and suf-
ficiently "narrowly tailored" to avoid offending the Constitution.
As legislators confront conforming districts to the 2000 Census,
Shaw remains the law of the land-but precariously so. Notwith-
standing the views of those of us who believe that Shaw was con-
sistent with every Supreme Court decision on the state's use of
race post-Brown v. Board of Education,6 it was a five-four deci-
sion.' The Shaw progeny decisions have also been decided by a
five Justice majority, with the four Justices in the minority re-
taining to their original dissenting views. Retirement of a single
Shaw majority Justice would raise the possibility that Shaw
could be significantly modified or even reversed.' Moreover, in-
terpretation of some of the more critical of the Shaw holdings de-
pends on the views of Justice O'Connor-meaning that line draw-
ers must tailor their actions to her positions.9 Thus, legislators
can be justifiably anxious that they will be "damned by the Con-
stitution" if they consider race and "damned by the Voting Rights
Act" if they do not. Moreover, even if they endeavor to carefully
navigate the precarious course between the Constitution and the
Act, their best efforts may yet be undone by the change of a single
vote on the Court.
6. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
7. Justice White filed a dissenting opinion in which Justices Blackmun and Stevens
joined, and Justices Blackmun, Souter, and Stevens each wrote separately in dissent. A
clear majority of those joining the debate generated by the Shaw line of decisions agreed
with the views of the dissenting Justices. For a sample of opinions, see the views ex-
pressed in the following symposium issues: Symposium, Defining Democracy for the Next
Century, 50 VAN]). L. REV. 277 (1997); Symposium, The Future of Voting Rights After
Shaw v. Reno, 92 MICH. L. REV. 483 (1993); Symposium, Law and the Political Process, 50
STAN. L. REV. 605 (1998); Symposium, Local Government Law, 27 STETSON L. REV. 777
(1998); Symposium, Voting Rights After Shaw v. Reno, 26 RUTGERS L.J. 517 (1995).
8. Conventional wisdom no doubt is that, with a Republican in the White House, ap-
pointees to the Court in the near future will be ideologically in tune with the Shaw major-
ity. Appointees' future positions, however, are not fully predictable. Justice Souter, ap-
pointed by George H. W. Bush, is one of Shaw's most adamant detractors. See Shaw, 509
U.S. at 679-87 (1993) (Souter, J., dissenting); see also Vera, 517 U.S. at 1045-77 (Souter,
J., dissenting).
9. Just last term, Justice O'Connor joined the Shaw dissenters in upholding North
Carolina's redrawn Twelfth Congressional District-a district that was less bizarre than
its predecessor, which had been the subject of the original Shaw decision, but that never-
theless was significantly gerrymandered. Cromartie 11, 532 U.S. 234, reh'g denied, 121 S.
Ct. 2239 (2001). Cromartie II technically held that the plaintiffs had failed to prove that
race, rather than politics, was responsible for the district's deviation from traditional dis-
tricting standards. Id. at 257-58. Practically, however, Cromartie II means that legisla-
tors so inclined can evade Shaw if they employ just the right tactics to satisfy Justice
O'Connor-not necessarily an easy task.
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The highly polemical literature generated by Shaw quite prop-
erly debated the merits of the majority's view, contemplated the
impact of the decision on minority voting power, protested the
awful dilemma it forced legislators to face, and proposed alterna-
tives to race-based districts. Important though they are, I will not
revisit those issues here. It is time for concrete proposals to deal
with the redistricting task confronting legislators now. As inter-
esting, politically sound, and racially fair as non-majoritarian
representational schemes proposed by Shaw detractors may be,
as a practical matter, few jurisdictions are likely to abandon their
geographically based, single-member-district electoral schemes
now in place. Thus, a major objective of Part One of this article
will be to clarify Shaw's impact on districting options.
II. PRODUCTION OF A FAIR AND LAWFUL DISTRICTING PLAN
REQUIRES MORE THAN COMPLIANCE WITH SHAW
Avoiding Shaw problems clearly is the most perplexing of the
obstacles to a lawful districting plan, but there are others. First
and foremost, of course, districts must conform to the Constitu-
tion's population equality requirements-the so-called "one-
person, one-vote" mandate. The Constitution also prohibits the
political party in power from intentionally diluting the minority
party's voting strength. The Supreme Court's recognition of po-
litical gerrymandering claims will no doubt encourage challenges,
but problems of proof mean that few actually will be successful.
Shaw notwithstanding, jurisdictions must in some circum-
stances take race-based steps to comply with the Voting Rights
Act. The problem with the steps legislators took in the 1990s was
that they went beyond anything actually required by the Act.
Section 2 of the Act prohibits dilution of minority voting strength.
All jurisdictions with even modest minority populations must
consider whether steps are necessary to avoid subsequent section
2 liability. Section 5 of the Act, which applies in only a limited
number of jurisdictions-primarily the states of the old Confed-
eracy-requires covered jurisdictions to obtain a determination
from federal authorities in advance of implementing a redistrict-
ing plan that such plan will not discriminate against minorities.
Understanding both of these unfortunately complicated provi-
sions is essential, not only because they impose genuine limita-
tions on the line drawers' options, but also because race-based
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steps actually necessary to comply with them will not run afoul of
Shaw.
Thus, my objective in Part One of this article is to provide a
small treatise analyzing and clarifying all aspects of federal law
affecting redistricting. The information and analysis in Part One
will help legislators, their would-be challengers, and courts called
upon to act in the legislature's stead to understand their redis-
tricting obligations and options. Part One also provides the back-
ground necessary to evaluate the districting guidelines and pro-
cedures I suggest in Part Two.
Lest the reader believe that my only concern here is to help leg-
islators successfully negotiate the obstacles federal law places in
the path of their districting efforts, I note that legislators them-
selves are almost always the greatest threat to fair districting
plans. With all the debate in recent years focused on the merits
and demerits of affirmative -racial gerrymandering, one can lose
sight of the fact that, throughout history, incumbency protection
and partisan advancement have been the chief forces behind the
creation of most election districts.' ° It is the traditional standards
supplied by state law that must keep these historic forces from
undercutting the creation of fair and functional districting plans.
While the Court's Shaw decisions prohibit violating traditional
districting standards for predominantly racial reasons, they also
emphasize that violations for political reasons generally do not
raise federal issues." Unfortunately, there are signs that legisla-
tors may take the absence of federal constraints as a green light
to engage in outrageous political gerrymandering, creating dis-
tricts whose ugly shapes will rival the notorious districts of the
1990s. Options available under state law to enforce traditional
districting standards are beyond the scope of this article. How-
ever, in Part Two I extol the benefits of following these standards,
which also are incorporated into the proposed guidelines.
Over the past two decades, governing bodies from state legisla-
tures to small town councils have abandoned long-utilized multi-
member districts and at-large elections, usually in response to ac-
10. In the 1990s, these forces almost certainly interacted with those calling for minor-
ity districts to produce districts that were more bizarre than they would have been had
they been driven only by racial concerns.
11. See, e.g., Cromartie II, 532 U.S. 234.
2002]
146 UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 36:137
tual or perceived threats of racial vote dilution litigation. Most
have adopted electoral systems made exclusively or predomi-
nantly of single-member districts. Consequently, the largest
number of jurisdictions in history must, in light of the 2000 Cen-
sus, adjust their district lines to conform with the requirements
of "one-person, one-vote." While nothing can insulate their redis-
tricting products from judicial challenge, this article provides
guidance that, if heeded, will produce a plan that should survive
any challenge largely intact--even if my predictions as to the
resolution of open Shaw issues prove to be incorrect.
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PART ONE: A SMALL TREATISE ON FEDERAL LAW
AFFECTING REDISTRICTING
I. FEDERAL LIMITATIONS ON REDISTRICTING, OTHER THAN THOSE
BASED ON SHAW V. RENO
Despite a longstanding recognition that reapportionment is a
matter generally left to the states, legislators' choices must be
guided by, and often are driven by, limitations imposed by federal
law. Indeed, it was the perception that the Voting Rights Act
trumped all state standards that encouraged many legislators in
1991 to engage in rampant gerrymandering contrary to their
states' own districting guidelines. The Constitution and the Vot-
ing Rights Act do impose limits on the states' line drawing op-
tions, but seldom must a state actually ignore its traditional dis-
tricting standards to comply with federal law.
Jurisdictions with even modest percentages of minority voters
are likely to find that their most difficult districting task, both po-
litically and legally, will be to comply with Shaw's limitations on
the use of racial data to create districts. This, coupled with the
fact that Shaw-related issues dominated redistricting litigation in
the 1990s, dictates that Shaw and its progeny be a major focus of
this article. Shaw's mandate, however, is better understood in the
context of the requirements that the Voting Rights Act imposes
on the districting process. Accordingly, limitations imposed by the
Voting Rights Act, by the constitutional requirement of "one-
person, one-vote," and by the modest constitutional restraints on
partisan gerrymandering are the subjects of this section. Shaw's
impact on the process is considered in the section that follows.
A. The Constitution Requires Districts to Be of Equal Population
A new era of federal involvement in state and local redistrict-
ing began in 1962 when, in Baker v. Carr,"2 the Court removed
malapportionment cases from the restrictions of the political
question doctrine." In Baker, the Court held that federal courts
have jurisdiction over claims that state legislative apportion-
12. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
13. Id. at 209.
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ments violate the Fourteenth Amendment, that such claims are
justiciable despite the political question doctrine, and that resi-
dents of malapportioned districts have standing to sue. 14 In Gray
v. Sanders,'5 the first of the plethora of post-Baker cases to reach
the Court on the merits, Justice Douglas declared that "all who
participate in the election are to have an equal vote." 6 Further,
"political equality.., can mean only one thing-one-person, one-
vote." 7 The rationale for the rule is that, unless districts contain
roughly equal populations, the votes of residents of overpopulated
districts are diluted relative to citizens in underpopulated dis-
tricts. 8
Subsequent decisions extended the one-person, one-vote ra-
tionale to legislative elections of virtually every ilk. In Reynolds
v. Sims, 9 the Court refused to recognize an exception for the "lit-
tle federal" legislative system-lower house elected based on
population, upper house elected on the basis of counties, often
"one senator per county" regardless of population-holding that
the Fourteenth Amendment mandates equally populated districts
for both houses of a bicameral state legislature.2 ° Other cases ex-
tended the rule to local governing bodies.2' The only elected bod-
ies exempt from the requirement are judicial offices22 and special
limited-purpose bodies, such as water districts.23
14. Id. at 186.
15. 372 U.S. 368 (1963).
16. Id. at 379.
17. Id. at 381.
18. Id. at 380-81. For example, within the same city, a voter in a city council district
of 1000 has less chance to influence the outcome of the election in his district than does a
voter in a neighboring district of 500. The voter in the 1000-person district also must
share access to his representative with more people.
19. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
20. Id. at 561-63, 568.
21. See Hadley v. Junior Coll. Dist., 397 U.S. 50, 56-57 (1970) (school board districts);
Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474, 481-85 (1968) (County Commissioners districts).
22. See, e.g., Wells v. Edwards, 409 U.S. 1095, 1095 (1973). Interestingly, judicial
elections are covered under both section 2 and section 5 of the Voting Rights Act. See Chi-
som v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 390 (1991); Houston Lawyers' Ass'n. v. Texas, 501 U.S. 419
(1991).
23. See Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist., 410 U.S. 719,
730-32 (1973) (exempting water district officials); Sailors v. Bd. of Educ., 387 U.S. 105,
108 (1967) (exempting appointed administrative officials). In Board of Estimate v. Morris,
489 U.S. 688 (1989), the exemption for appointed offices was found not applicable to the
most powerful of New York City's governing bodies. The Board of Estimate consisted of
eight members, three of whom were elected at-large. The remaining five members were
the presidents of the city's five boroughs and were elected by only their borough's voters.
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The Court has made clear, however, that its rule does not
mean that single-member districts are mandatory under the
Fourteenth Amendment. Multimember districts and at-large
elections do not raise "one-person, one-vote" issues.' Moreover,
multimember districts and floterial districts' can be combined
with single-member districts within a common legislative election
plan, so long as the proper population-to-representative balance
is maintained.26
1. Permissible Deviation from Population Equality in
Congressional Districts
The equal population requirement for congressional districts
comes not from the Fourteenth Amendment, but from Article I,
The Court concluded that even though the presidents of the boroughs served ex officio on
the board, they were "elected" and performed general governmental functions; therefore,
the one-person, one-vote principles applied. Id. at 689. Because the boroughs differed
widely in population (Brooklyn, the city's most populous borough, had a population of over
two million at the time, while Staten Island's population was only about 350,000), the
board could not continue to exist as a governing body with the borough presidents as
members.
24. See Lucas v. Colo. Gen. Assembly, 377 U.S. 713, 731-32 (1964).
25. A "floterial district" is one created by combining two or more districts whose com-
bined electorates then elect some number of additional representatives. See Davis v.
Mann, 377 U.S. 678, 686-87 n.2 (1964). Typically, this system is used when none of the
included districts has sufficient population to be entitled to additional seats but their
combined populations entitle the entire area to another seat.
26. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 576-77, 579 (1964). The notion of "equally popu-
lated districts" is misleading in that it implies that all districts must contain the same
population, which would suggest that a mixture of multimember, floterial, and single-
member districts would not be acceptable. More accurately, each representative must rep-
resent roughly the same number of total people. Id. at 562-63. It would have been a natu-
ral extension of the "one-person, one-vote" rule to conclude that all voters must be given
the opportunity to vote for the same number of representatives to a legislative body. How-
ever, in Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124 (1971), the Court upheld the constitutionality of
a districting plan that combined multimember districts and single-member districts. Id. at
146-47. In Whitcomb, which is better known as an early racial vote dilution case, voters in
single-member districts argued that voters in multimember districts had greater repre-
sentation than those in single-member districts because each multimember district voter
was able to vote for more than one representative. Id. at 128-29. The Court disagreed,
concluding, essentially, that the appropriate comparison was "representatives to voters."
Id. at 141. Thus, a multimember district with a population of 5000 electing five represen-
tatives, was comparable to a single-member district with a population of 1000 electing one
representative.
"Floterial districts" would be evaluated using the same rationale. For example, consider
a county of 10,000 that elects ten council members, for a ratio of one councilman per 1000
persons. The county could be divided into nine single-member districts and one floterial
district. Seven single-member districts would contain 1000 persons, two would contain
1500. The two more populous districts would be combined to form a floterial district elect-
ing one additional representative.
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section 2 of the Constitution, which mandates that representa-
tives to Congress be chosen "by the People of the several
States."27 While the Court recognized in Wesberry v. Sanders2"
that mathematical precision in drawing congressional districts
might not be possible,29 it nevertheless held that the Constitution
requires that "as nearly as is practicable one man's vote in a con-
gressional election is to be worth as much as another's." ° "As
nearly as practicable" was subsequently interpreted in Kirk-
patrick v. Preisler3 ' to require "a good-faith effort to achieve pre-
cise mathematical equality."32 Thus it appeared that the failure to
comply with mathematical precision was justifiable only if preci-
sion was not possible.33
In Karcher v. Daggett,34 the Court rejected New Jersey's argu-
ment that its 1980 congressional redistricting plan should be re-
garded per se as the product of a good faith effort to achieve popu-
lation equality because the deviation among districts was smaller
than the predictable undercount in available census data (less
than one percent).35 The Court went on to say, however, that
slight deviations are allowed if supported by "[any number of
consistently applied legislative policies,"36 which could include
"making districts compact, respecting municipal boundaries, pre-
27. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1.
28. 376 U.S. 1 (1964).
29. Id. at 18.
30. Id. at 7-8.
31. 394 U.S. 526 (1969).
32. Id. at 530-31; see also id. at 537 (Fortas, J., concurring).
33. Id. at 531. The Court in Kirkpatrick rejected all of the following "justifications" for
the plan's 5.97% population variance: (1) to avoid fragmenting communities of interest;
(2) to allow for political compromise; (3) to avoid fragmenting political subdivisions and
thereby to limit partisan gerrymandering, and (4) to create geographically compact dis-
tricts. Id. at 533-36.
34. 462 U.S. 725 (1983).
35. Id. at 735-37. In the language of "one-person, one-vote," population deviation
means the percentage by which an individual district is "over" or "under" populated rela-
tive to the ideal. The "ideal" is absolute equality, so that for a city with a population of
5000, divided into five districts, the "ideal" district population would be 1000. A district
that contained a population of 950 would have a deviation of-5%, while one that contained
1025 people would have a deviation of +2.5%. For constitutional purposes, it is a plan's
"overall" or "total" deviation that is significant. See id. at 99. This figure is the difference
between the most populous and the least populous districts. If the most populous district
has a deviation of +5% and the least populous has a deviation of -5%, the "total deviation"
equals 10% (+5% - (-5%) = 10%). See Abrams v. Johnson, 521 U.S. 74, 98-100 (1997) (dis-
cussing and applying population deviation principles).
36. Karcher, 462 U.S. at 740.
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serving the cores of prior districts, and avoiding contests between
incumbent[s]."' The upshot of Karcher is that no avoidable devia-
tion from population equality will be viewed as de minimis, and
consequently, any avoidable deviation from absolute equality
must be justified."
In Abrams v. Johnson,9 a 1997 case involving a congressional
districting plan produced by a federal court after Georgia was
unable to produce one, the Court accepted the justification offered
for the plan's very small deviation.4 ° Abrams, however, provides
only slight relief from the "absolute equality" straightjacket. The
Court reiterated that "'absolute population equality [is] the
paramount objective" in congressional redistricting.4' The popu-
lation deviation at issue in Abrams was exceedingly slight, 0.35%,
almost certainly less than the error in the census itself.42 Yet, the
Court gave full consideration to whether the justification offered
by the court was adequate and ultimately concluded that it was,
based largely on the futility of making minor adjustments to the
plan at issue six years after the census in "one of the fastest-
growing States."43
Because computers and more detailed census data make it pos-
sible to avoid virtually all deviation,' future debate is likely to
involve how much deviation can be justified; what state interests
will provide a justification; and, as a factual matter, whether an
alternative plan can be produced that satisfies the state interest
with a lower deviation than the challenged plan. One interest
that no doubt was offered to justify deviations prior to Shaw, was
37. Id.
38. Karcher set up a two part test for determining the legal significance of a popula-
tion deviation. First, the challenger must demonstrate that the deviation could be elimi-
nated altogether by "a good-faith effort to draw districts of equal population." Id. at 730. If
this showing is made, the burden shifts to the state to demonstrate that "each significant
variance between districts was necessary to achieve some legitimate goal." Id. at 731.
39. 521 U.S. 74 (1997).
40. Id. at 101. The deviation was justified by the state's preference for not splitting
counties and precincts.
41. Id. at 98 (quoting Karcher, 462 U.S. at 732).
42. Id. at 99-100.
43. Id. at 100.
44. In one challenge to a congressional districting plan, the greatest deviation from
the ideal population in any district was seven persons. Anne Arundel County Republican
Cent. Comm. v. State Admin. Bd. of Election Laws, 781 F. Supp. 394, 401-02 (D. Md.
1991), affd, 504 U.S. 938 (1992), reh'g denied, 505 U.S. 1231 (1992).
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to permit the creation of a majority-minority district.45 After
Shaw, this justification may not be as readily accepted.46
2. Permissible Deviation from Population Equality in Legislative
Districts
The mandate for equally populated legislative districts comes
from the Fourteenth Amendment,47 which the Court has con-
cluded permits greater flexibility in deviation from population
equality than Article I, section 2 of the Constitution permits in
congressional districts.48 If based on legitimate considerations,
the state may deviate from exact population equality in its legis-
lative plans to: (1) make provisions for compact districts; (2)
maintain (to a degree) the integrity of various political subdivi-
sions; and (3) employ multimember or floterial districts.49 The
Court has emphasized, however, that no interests are sufficient
to justify deviation from population as the basis for representa-
tion.5° Furthermore, the equal population rule applies to both
houses of a bicameral state legislature, and the constitutional in-
firmity of a non-population-based representative plan cannot be
avoided by the fact that a non-judicial, political remedy, such as
initiative and referendum, caused the adoption of the plan and is
available to change it. 5
Note, moreover, that it is total population-not voting age
population, citizen population, or registered voters-that must be
approximately equal.52 In certain circumstances, basing districts
45. See, e.g., Karcher, 462 U.S. at 742.
46. See discussion, infra Part One, II.B.
47. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2.
48. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 577-81 (1964).
49. Id. at 578-79.
50. Id. at 579-80. Among the reasons found insufficient to justify a deviation from
population-based representation by Reynolds and its companion cases were: (1) to accord
recognition to a state's heterogeneous characteristics; (2) to balance power between urban
and rural areas in a legislature; (3) to insure effective representation of sparsely settled
areas; (4) to protect insular minorities; (5) to insure accessibility of representatives to their
constituents by preventing overly large districts; (6) to secure representation for economic
or other group interests; (7) to take either geographic or topographic factors into consid-
eration; (8) to grant greater representation to permanent rather than temporary military,
or related personnel, or adhere to history or tradition. Annotation, Inequalities in Popula-
tion of Election Districts or Voting Units as Rendering Apportionment Unconstitutional-
Federal Cases, 12 L. Ed. 2d 1282, 1286 (1965).
51. Lucas v. Forty-Fourth Gen. Assembly, 377 U.S. 713, 734-39 (1964) (rejecting a
plan that had been approved by a majority of Colorado's voters in a popular referendum).
52. See Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 579.
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on total population seems inconsistent with the underlying ra-
tionale that each voter's vote have roughly the' same impact on
the outcome of elections. Individual voters in an election district
that contains a large non-voting population-imprisoned felons,
non-citizens, the military, or students53 -often will have a greater
opportunity to influence the electoral outcome than voters in ju-
risdictions without these populations." Legislators can use the
presence of large non-voting populations to accomplish goals that
might not otherwise be possible within the stricture of "one-
person, one-vote"--particularly if the non-voting population is
geographically concentrated. For example, it may be possible to
create a district in which African-Americans will be a majority of
the electorate by combining one of these population concentra-
tions with an African-American community that otherwise would
be too small to be a majority of a district.
The Court has thus far refused to provide specific parameters
for acceptable deviation from precise equality, stating instead
that what is marginally permissible in one state may be unsatis-
factory in another, and therefore, apportionment plans must be
judged on a case-by-case basis. Nevertheless, in Brown v. Thom-
son,55 Justice Brennan gleaned from earlier decisions a four step
test for evaluating deviation in apportionment plans."
53. If they satisfy the residence requirement, members of the military and students
are eligible to vote on the same basis as other residents. See Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S.
330, 336-39 (1972) (striking down a durational residence requirement for Tennessee vot-
ers as unconstitutionally restricting the fundamental rights to vote and travel). As a prac-
tical matter, however, most transients elect to retain a permanent, and therefore voting,
residency elsewhere. In many jurisdictions, persons convicted of felonies lose their right to
vote, at least while incarcerated. Richardson v. Ramirez, 412 U.S. 24, 54 (1974) (noting
that the exclusion of felons from the vote is affirmatively sanctioned in section 2 of the
Fourteenth Amendment). Even when felons are not automatically disfranchised, most in-
mates will not be residents for voting purposes of the county in which they are incarcer-
ated. Id.
54. For example, suppose the ideal population for a county council district is 1000. A
population of 1000 might contain, say, 600 persons of voting age. If half the district's popu-
lation are not citizens, the 500 total citizen population might translate to only 250 voting
age citizens. Thus, in a district with few non-citizens, an individual vote is 1/600th of the
potential vote, whereas in the district with a substantial non-citizen population, it is
1/250th of the potential vote. Put another way, a citizen in the district with fewer actual
voters has to share his representative with significantly fewer other voters than a citizen
in other districts.
55. 462 U.S. 835 (1983).
56. Id. at 852 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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First, the plaintiff must show deviation sufficient to make out a
prima facie case. 5 Deviations below ten percent ordinarily will be
considered de minimis. However, legislators should not be
tempted by the "de minimis" rule to aim for a ten percent devia-
tion, because their obligation is to make "an honest and good
faith effort to construct districts... as nearly of equal population
as is practicable."59 Were a state to set "ten percent deviation" as
a goal, this in and of itself may provide sufficient additional evi-
dence of invidious discrimination to constitute a prima facie case
of unconstitutionality. Otherwise, if the deviation is less than ten
percent, a challenger must establish that the legislature did not
make "a good faith effort" to achieve population equality. ° Sec-
ond, the state must advance a legitimate reason for any deviation
above ten percent. 6' Third, the state must show that the policy
behind the deviation is indeed furthered by the plan.62 Fourth,
even if the deviation is justified, a court must nevertheless de-
termine "whether [it is] small enough to be constitutionally toler-
able."63
The Court has not established an absolute ceiling on the devia-
tion that is constitutionally tolerable. In Mahan v. Howell,' the
Commonwealth of Virginia was able to justify a deviation of at
least 16.4% by establishing that this was the minimum deviation
possible while keeping political subdivisions intact.65 The Court
indicated that a deviation of this magnitude "may well approach
tolerable limits."66 Presumably, the general parameters applica-
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 577 (1964).
60. Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315, 324-25 (1973).
61. Brown, 462 U.S. at 852-53 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The state interest most often
offered in support of deviations in excess often percent is the policy of preserving political
subdivision boundaries (most typically those of counties). See id. at 839-40; Mahan, 410
U.S. at 315; Abate v. Mundt, 403 U.S. 182, 185-87 (1971).
62. See Brown, 462 U.S. at 852 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
63. Id.
64. 410 U.S. 315 (1973).
65. Id. at 329.
66. Id. In Brown, the Supreme Court examined the Wyoming reapportionment plan,
which had a total deviation of eighty-nine percent. Brown, 462 U.S. at 839. The narrow
issue before the Court, however, concerned only the marginal unequalizing effect produced
by the plan's provision for one representative to be elected by the state's least populous
county even though the county would not be entitled to a representative under Wyoming's
statutory formula. Id. at 839-41. For unexplained reasons, the plaintiffs had not chal-
lenged the overall constitutionality of the plan. Id. at 846. The Court concluded that the
REDISTRICTING IN A POST-SHAW ERA
ble to deviations in state legislative plans also apply to districting
plans for local governmental bodies.67
B. Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act Prohibits Districting Plans
that Dilute Minority Voting Strength"
When Congress adopted the Voting Rights Act in 1965, its most
pressing concern was to put in place a comprehensive scheme to
address massive state-sponsored disfranchisement of black voters
in the South.69 Of the two Voting Rights Act provisions of conse-
quence to redistricting today, the first, section 2,7° was not part of
the original Act, and the second, section 5,1 received very little
attention until the problem of disfranchisement had been largely
addressed.
additional deviations caused by adding a representative were minimal. Id. at 847. The
outcome in the case should be seen as strictly limited to the unique facts and posture of
the case, and not as reopening the issue of acceptable deviation from population equality.
Id.
67. See Abate v. Mundt, 403 U.S. 182, 184-85 (1971) (holding that an 11.9% maxi-
mum deviation in a county legislative apportionment plan was justified by the county's
desire to respect town boundaries).
68. Section 2 has a long history in terms of the number of decided cases, if not in ac-
tual years, since its amendment in 1982. A Westlaw query limited to "Section 2," "Voting
Rights Act," and "dilution" produced 475 cases which, while over-inclusive of actual cases
in which the provision was outcome determinative, demonstrates the difficulty of provid-
ing general statements of the law beyond the issues directly addressed by the Supreme
Court. Twenty years ago, I noted that lower courts applied a "Chinese menu" approach to
conclude whether dilution was present which resulted in differences in outcomes that
were not easily reconciled by differences in the facts. Katharine I. Butler, Constitutional
and Statutory Challenges to Elections Structures: Dilution and the Value of the Right to
Vote, 42 LA. L. REv. 851, 888 (1982). Today, guidance from the Supreme Court has pro-
duced somewhat greater consistency, but many issues remain open and outcomes continue
to differ across federal appellate circuits and sometimes within circuits, depending upon
the predisposition of the trial courts. On the issue of inter-circuit difference, compare
Goosby u. Hempstead Town Bd., 180 F.3d 476 (2d Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1138
(2000) (affirming trial court's finding of dilution that gave virtually no weight to the politi-
cal explanations for why black Democrats lost in a heavily Republican town), with League
of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Clements, 999 F.2d 831 (5th Cir. 1993) (en banc), cert. de-
nied, 510 U.S. 1071 (1994) (concluding that racial vote dilution is not present when diver-
gent voting patterns are best explained by partisan preferences). Here, my objective is to
provide only such background and detail as necessary to permit a legislative body to
evaluate its redistricting options, including those I propose later for avoiding section 2 li-
ability.
69. See generally STEPHEN F. LAWSON, BLACK BALLOTS, VOTING RIGHTS IN THE
SOUTH 1944-1969 (1976); Armand Derfner, Racial Discrimination and the Right to Vote,
26 VAND. L. REV. 523 (1973).
70. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1994).
7L Id. § 1973c.
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In jurisdictions where it applies, section 5 is the more burden-
some of the Act's two provisions for line drawers because it pre-
vents implementation of a new districting plan until the state or
political subdivision has established to the satisfaction of federal
authorities that the plan is not discriminatory in purpose or ef-
fect.7
2
Section 2 potentially influences more redistricting decisions
than section 5 because it applies nationwide. However, it is less
burdensome to legislators because those claiming that a district-
ing plan violates its provisions must take the initiative to insti-
tute a judicial challenge and prove their case. It was a misunder-
standing of section 2 that prompted some jurisdictions,
particularly those not subject to section 5, to distort traditional
districting standards in order to create majority-minority dis-
tricts. While, technically, a legislative body is free to ignore sec-
tion 2, leaving it up to would-be challengers to establish that its
districting plan violates section 2, such a course would be ill-
advised.7 ' That said, deciding what, if any, steps to take to avoid
potential section 2 liability is difficult. As Shaw makes clear, if
the precautions take the form of "race-based" districting, the leg-
islature must first be certain that it is at risk for section 2 liabil-
ity and second, must be certain that it does not make a greater
use of race than is necessary to avoid potential liability.74 Thus,
the redistricter must understand section 2's prohibitions.
1. Vote Dilution Prior to 1982
Congress adopted the present version of section 2 in 1982 in
response to the Supreme Court's decision in City of Mobile v.
Bolden,7" which held that racial vote dilution was actionable un-
der the Constitution only if the dilutive election scheme had been
72. See discussion infra Part One, I.E.7.
73. Obviously, legislators could elect to ignore all districting criteria, leaving it up to
challengers to compel compliance. However, a federal court will promptly enjoin imple-
mentation of a districting plan that has not obtained section 5 preclearance, or one that is
constitutionally malapportioned because few facts will be in dispute, and the challengers'
right to prevail is clear. Section 2 is different in that the burden on the challenger is more
onerous, the standards for a violation are much more subjective than those for "one-
person, one-vote" and section 5, and the relevant facts are more numerous and more likely
to be in dispute.
74. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 655-58 (1993). See discussion infra Part One, H.B.
75. 446 U.S. 55 (1980).
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adopted or maintained for the purpose of discriminating against
minorities.76 Prior to Bolden, plaintiffs were entitled to relief if
they established that, under the "totality-of-the-circumstances," a
challenged election device resulted in minorities having less op-
portunity than others in the electorate to participate in the politi-
cal process and to elect candidates of their choice-a standard
based on two Supreme Court decisions from the early 1970s,
Whitcomb v. Chavis7 7 and White v. Regester.78 Both cases involved
challenges to multimember state legislative districts-the
method of election, which along with its local government coun-
terpart, at-large elections, was the most common target of vote di-
lution litigation.79
In Whitcomb, the Court recognized that multimember election
districts would be unconstitutional if, in combination with past
and present discrimination, they permitted a bloc-voting white
majority to fence the minority group out of the political process.8 °
The Whitcomb plaintiffs were unsuccessful, however, because the
Court concluded that it was politics, not race, that resulted in the
defeat of the electoral choice of a black ghetto area in Indianapo-
lis.81
By emphasizing distinctions between Texas and Indiana, the
plaintiffs in White were successful. They convinced the lower
court that Texas's long history of discrimination against minori-
ties (including that directed toward the exercise of their right to
vote), its peculiar form of multimember district elections (which
included a post requirement and a majority vote requirement),
and the present racist attitude of the electorate (which bloc-voted
against minority candidates and which white candidates ex-
ploited through racist campaign tactics) deprived them of equal
76. Id. at 75-80.
77. 403 U.S. 124 (1971).
78. 412 U.S. 755 (1973).
79. A multimember district is a district in a legislative plan from which more than
one representative is elected. Often, as was true in Whitcomb, an entire county is desig-
nated a single election district from which enough representatives are elected to comply
with one-person, one-vote requirements. Members of a state legislative body often are
elected from a combination of multimember and single-member districts. A multimember
district thus differs from "at-large" elections where all of a jurisdiction's voters elect all of
the representatives to the governing body. The at-large method of election is used com-
monly by local government entities, such as counties, cities, and school boards.
80. Whitcomb, 403 U.S. at 141-44.
81. Id. at 153.
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access to the political process.82 The Supreme Court affirmed,
concluding that the lower court's factual findings were sufficient
to support the conclusion that the minority groups had been de-
nied an equal opportunity to participate in the political process. 3
Whitcomb and White predated the Court's landmark decision in
Washington v. Davis,' which held that proof of a discriminatory
purpose was an essential element in an Equal Protection chal-
lenge to facially neutral state action.8" Rather than viewing vote
dilution as an infringement of the right to vote-a right protected
without regard to discriminatory purpose-the Bolden Court con-
cluded that it was indistinguishable from other disparate impact
cases; thus, the mandate of Washington applied.86 Although
plaintiffs had enjoyed only mixed success under Whitcomb-
White's vague, highly subjective, totality-of-the-circumstances
test for discriminatory results, most saw the addition of an "in-
tent" requirement as a virtual death knell for racial vote dilution
claims.
2. Vote Dilution Under Amended Section 2
Bolden was decided on the eve of congressional hearings on the
extension of certain key provisions of the Voting Rights Act. Civil
rights organizations used the occasion to mount a lobbying effort
to "overrule" Bolden by providing an alternative statutory basis
for the racial vote dilution claim, which would be based on "dis-
criminatory results" alone. 7 It is likely that proponents of the
amendment actually wanted something akin to a guarantee of
proportional representation, but knew better than to ask for it.
Opponents argued that abandoning the intent requirement would
in fact result in proportional representation-a "fair share" being
substituted for a "fair shake."88
82. See Graves v. Barnes, 343 F. Supp. 704, 725-31 (W.D. Tex. 1972), aftd sub nom.
White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973).
83. White, 412 U.S. at 769-70.
84. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
85. Id. at 239.
86. City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 70 (1980).
87. See generally Thomas M. Boyd & Stephen J. Markman, The 1982 Amendments to
the Voting Rights Act: A Legislative History, 40 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1347 (1983).
88. 1 Voting Rights Act: Hearings on S. 53, S. 1761, S. 1975, S. 1992, and H.R. 3112
Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong.
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In the end, Congress compromised, giving proponents what
they said they wanted-a return to the Whitcomb-White totality-
of-the-circumstances test-instead of the proportional represen-
tation they privately wished for, and tried to appease opponents
by including a disclaimer of any right to proportional representa-
tion.89 Amended section 2 prohibits voting practices that result
"in a denial or abridgement of the right of any citizen.., to vote
on account of race or color, [or language minority status]."9" The
statutory standard tracks the language from Whitcomb-White:
A violation... is established if, based on the totality of circum-
stances, it is shown that the political processes leading to nomina-
tion or election... are not equally open to participation by [minori-
ties] in that [they] have less opportunity than other members of the
electorate to participate in the political process and to elect repre-
sentatives of their choice.
9 1
To aid interpretation of the Act's vague language, Congress did
little more than refer the courts to the pre-Bolden cases.92 Long
after passage of section 2 was already assured, the Senate Judici-
ary Committee issued a report, which was influential in early
court interpretations of the new amendment.93 The report set out
a laundry list of factors gleaned from White and other pre-Bolden
cases, which became popularly known as the "Senate Report fac-
tors."94
1340 (1983) (testimony of Prof. James F. Blumstein).
89. See Boyd & Markman, supra note 87, at 1413-28.
90. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a) (1994).
91. Id. § 1973(b).
92. The report of the Senate Judiciary Committee states, "In adopting the 'result
standard' as articulated in White v. Regester, the Committee has codified the basic princi-
ple in that case as it was applied prior to the Mobile litigation." S. REP. No. 97-417, at 28
(1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 205 [hereinafter SENATE REPORT].
93. Id. Boyd and Markman observed that the report "seemed to be directed, not to-
ward Senators, but toward federal judges who almost certainly would be called upon... to
interpret... the new proposal." Boyd & Markman, supra note 87, at 1420.
94. The factors include: (1) a past history of discrimination affecting voting, (2) the
presence of racially polarized elections; (3) the use of election devices that enhance the op-
portunities for discrimination against minorities; (4) denial of minority access to a candi-
date slating process, if one existed in the jurisdiction; (5) the degree to which minorities
still bear the effects of discrimination hindering their participation in the political process;
(6) the presence of racial appeals in campaigns; and (7) the extent to which minorities
have been elected to public office in the jurisdiction. SENATE REPORT, supra note 92, at
206-07. Unresponsiveness of elected officials to minority concerns and the presence of un-
usually large election districts could in some circumstances be relevant. Id.
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The impact of the amendment of section 2 would have been
slight if it had resulted merely in reviving the Whitcomb-White
totality-of-the-circumstances test since that test had not resulted
in wholesale invalidation of multimember districts even in an era
when minority voters had considerably less success in electing
candidates of their choice than they had in 1982. However, judg-
ing from the subsequent disproportionate plaintiff success rate,
the courts saw the amendment as an indication that Congress in-
tended a more lenient standard. Relying largely on the Senate
Report factors, the lower courts found dilution much more com-
monly than they had before Bolden."
3. Thornburg v. Gingles Results in a Significant Increase in
Majority-Minority Single-Member Districts
Thornburg v. Gingles, 6 the Supreme Court's first major deci-
sion interpreting amended section 2, gave a major boost to efforts
to force jurisdictions to adopt some number of single-member dis-
tricts in which minorities would constitute a majority of the elec-
torate. In Gingles, the Court explained that the gravamen of a di-
lution claim was that multimember districts permitted a
numerically superior majority, voting as a bloc, to consistently de-
feat the minority group's preferred candidates despite their re-
ceiving high levels of support from the group.97 Cohesive minori-
ties, however, were in a position to blame the election structure
for their defeat only if their residential patterns were such that
an alternative electoral system would permit them to elect candi-
dates without support from outside the group.9" While many fac-
tors, including those from the Senate Report, were relevant to the
ultimate determination of dilution, three conditions were essen-
tial to the plaintiffs' success:
First, the minority group must be able to demonstrate that it is suf-
ficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a majority in
a single-member district.... Second, the minority group must be
able to show that it is politically cohesive.... Third, the minority
must be able to demonstrate that the white majority votes suffi-
95. See, e.g., Jones v. City of Lubbock, 727 F.2d 364 (5th Cir. 1984); Ketchum v.
Byrne, 740 F.2d 1398 (7th Cir. 1984); United States v. Marengo County Comm'n, 731 F.2d
1546 (11th Cir. 1984); Major v. Treen, 574 F. Supp. 325 (E.D. La. 1983).
96. 478 U.S. 30 (1986).
97. Id. at 48-49.
98. Id. at 50.
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ciently as a bloc to enable it-in the absence of special circum-
stances... usually to defeat the minority's preferred candidate.
99
After Gingles, the lower courts continued to consider the Sen-
ate Report factors, but in fact most cases turned on the presence
or absence of the three Gingles preconditions.0 0 The Supreme
Court later made clear in Johnson v. De Grandy,' however, that
the existence of all three preconditions was necessary, but not
sufficient. °2 Plaintiffs were also required to demonstrate that,
based on the totality-of-the-circumstances, the challenged elec-
tion structure denied them an equal opportunity to participate in
the political process and to elect candidates of their choice.' °3
Nevertheless, only rarely have plaintiffs not prevailed when they
established the preconditions.0 4 Moreover, rather than face the
staggering attorneys' fees that accompany losing a section 2 suit,
many jurisdictions likely opted to abandon at-large elections at
the first sign of litigation.
It is a safe assumption that as a result of actual or threatened
litigation under section 2 over the past two decades, a substantial
number of jurisdictions that contain even modest percentages of
minority voters have abandoned at-large elections and multi-
member districts in favor of single-member districts, designed so
that some number contained a majority of minority voters. Con-
sequently, the number of jurisdictions at every level of govern-
ment that had to redraw their election districts in 2001 was sub-
stantially greater than for the last round of redistrictings. Thus,
future battles are less likely to involve whether single-member
districts must be adopted and more likely to involve whether
some of those districts must be majority-minority, and if so, how
many there must be and where they should be created.' 5
99. Id. at 50-51 (citations omitted).
100. See, e.g., Williams v. State Bd. of Elections, 718 F. Supp. 1324, 1330 (N.D. ]Ml.
1989); E. Jefferson Coalition for Leadership and Dev. v. Jefferson Parish, 691 F. Supp.
991, 997-98 (E.D. La. 1988); Neal v. Coleburn, 689 F. Supp. 1426, 1435 (E.D. Va. 1988);
Romero v. City of Pomona, 665 F. Supp. 853, 867-69 (C.D. Cal. 1987).
101. 512 U.S. 997 (1994).
102. Id. at 1011-12.
103. Id.
104. See Clark v. Calhoun County, 21 F.3d 92, 97 (1994) (noting that only in an un-
usual case should a plaintiff fail to establish a violation of section 2 when all three precon-
ditions are established). De Grandy itself was one of those rare cases. See also NAACP v.
Fordice, 252 F.3d 361, 374 (5th Cir. 2001).
105. The primary targets of vote dilution litigation prior to 1990 were at-large election
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A potential problem for line drawers is the unresolved issue of
whether a group that is unable to constitute a majority of a sin-
gle-member district may nevertheless obtain relief under section
2 for dilution of its "influence." °6 Basically, the claim is that the
group could influence the outcome of election contests and possi-
bly elect candidates of its choice with white cross-over support in
a single-member district constructed for its benefit, but could not
do so in the challenged system.10 7 The Supreme Court has on a
number of occasions assumed without deciding that an influence
dilution claim is available, but has not confronted a situation
where it was necessary to resolve the issue.' Despite the fact
that the Court has expressly left the issue open, recognizing an
influence claim would seem to make the first Gingles precondi-
tion superfluous-at least where the relief requested is a race-
based single-member district.'0 9
Nearly two decades after Gingles, a substantial number of un-
resolved issues remain, which, after Shaw, presents a dilemma
for line drawers. They should create majority-minority districts if
necessary to avoid section 2 liability, but if the jurisdiction is not
in fact potentially subject to liability under section 2, they risk
violating Shaw if they create such districts."0 I propose a resolu-
tion for the "create/don't create" minority districts dilemma in
Part Two.
systems and multimember districts. Because Gingles involved a challenge to multimember
districts, there was a question as to whether the preconditions applied when the chal-
lenged election structure was a single-member district system. Growe v. Emison, 507 U.S.
25, 40-41 (1993), answered that question in the affirmative.
106. See generally Stanley Pierre-Louis, Comment, The Politics of Influence: Recogniz-
ing Influence Dilution Claims Under § 2 of the Voting Rights Act, 62 U. CHi. L. REV. 1215
(1995).
107. See id.
108. See, e.g., Voinovich v. Quilter, 507 U.S. 146, 154 (1993); Growe, 507 U.S. at 41 n.5.
See generally Pierre-Louis, supra note 106.
109. See Voinovich, 507 U.S. at 158 (recognizing that if an influence claim were to be
recognized, the analysis of the Gingles first precondition would have to be modified); see
also Cousin v. Sundquist, 145 F.3d 818, 828-29 (6th Cir. 1998) (concluding that the trial
court erred in recognizing an influence claim under section 2); Turner v. Arkansas, 784 F.
Supp. 553, 569-70 (E.D. Ark. 1991), affd, 504 U.S. 952 (1992) (concluding that an influ-
ence dilution claim does not exist under section 2).
110. See infra notes 168-75 and accompanying text (discussing potential section 2 li-
ability as a justification to created race-based districts).
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C. The Constitution Prohibits Districting Plans that Purposely
Result in Dilution of Minority Voting Strength
After Bolden, a dilutive electoral system is unconstitutional
only if it has been adopted or maintained for the purpose of dis-
criminating against minority voters."' Moreover, as a subspecies
of Equal Protection claims, a constitutional vote dilution claim
requires both a discriminatory intent and a discriminatory im-
pact."' Because section 2 prohibits districting schemes that re-
sult in dilution of minority voting strength, without regard to the
drafters' intentions, the constitutional prohibition adds little,
unless vote dilution means something different under the Consti-
tution than it does under section 2.
The issue that has not been addressed by the Supreme Court is
whether a group too small to satisfy the first Gingles precondition
can claim "intentional dilution" of its ability to influence elec-
tions."' Intentional dilution of a group's political influence must
be distinguished from "negative racial gerrymandering," which is
merely the flip side of Shaw's affirmative racial gerrymander-
ing."4 Just as it cannot assign voters to districts in contravention
of traditional districting standards to enhance minority votes, the
state cannot do so for the purpose of diminishing minority
votes." 5
The influence dilution issue thus only arises when a jurisdic-
tion makes one "otherwise standard" districting choice instead of
another for the purpose of diluting a minority group's influence.
Consider, for example, a legislature faced with two choices for the
creation of two standard districts. One choice would keep to-
gether a minority population concentration too small to be a ma-
jority of a single-member district, yet sufficiently large that, in-
tact, it might have substantial influence over electoral outcomes
111. City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 62 (1980).
112. Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 127 (1986). Bandemer was a political gerry-
mandering claim, but it relied almost exclusively on racial vote dilution cases for its con-
clusion that "equal protection violations [may be found] only where a history [actual or
projected] of disproportionate results" demonstrates that the group "had essentially been
shut out of the political process." Id. at 139 (plurality opinion).
113. Were the Supreme Court eventually to recognize an "influence dilution" claim un-
der section 2, there should be no reason to pursue relief under the Constitution.
114. See Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
115. See id. When the line drawer is a federal court, it must avoid even the appearance
of racial gerrymandering. See Connor v. Finch, 431 U.S. 407, 425-26 (1977).
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in a district, including possibly electing candidates of its choice
with support from non-group members. The other choice, while
still respecting traditional districting standards, would divide the
group so that it is too small in each of the two resulting districts
to influence election outcomes in either district. If the jurisdiction
selects the scheme that divides the group in order to dilute its in-
fluence as a minority group, and not as a subset of a partisan po-
litical group, the issue of racially discriminatory influence dilu-
tion is squarely raised."6
In favor of recognizing the claim is simply the notion that relief
should be available for any negative impact that results from ra-
cially discriminatory motives." 7 The argument to the contrary is
that, when the remedy sought is for the injury of "vote dilution,"
then it is "vote dilution" that the plaintiffs must establish."' If
the Gingles preconditions are an essential part of the definition of
the cognizable injury known as vote dilution, then no lesser in-
jury will entitle the plaintiff to a race-based single-member dis-
trict, regardless of the underlying theory of recovery. In other
words, the impact necessary to satisfy the discriminatory effects
element of an Equal Protection claim is dilution as defined by
Gingles."9 Moreover, influence dilution claims would present an
even more difficult problem of proof than ordinary dilution
claims. As the size of the minority group diminishes, determining
whether the group's influence is in fact diminished by one
116. Because black voters' predictable support of the Democratic Party makes them
tempting targets for political gerrymandering, it may be impossible to determine whether
a decision to divide a black population concentration is "racially motivated" or merely a
short-cut for partisan gerrymandering. Racial data, but not political data, is provided by
the census. It is far easier to manipulate the racial makeup of a district than it is to ma-
nipulate the political makeup, which requires superimposing registration or election data
on the census data.
117. See Garza v. County of Los Angeles, 918 F.2d 763, 771 (9th Cir. 1990) (stating
that proof of first precondition not required when districts were drawn with the intent to
discriminate).
118. See Johnson v. DeSoto County, 204 F.3d 1335, 1344 (11th Cir. 2000) (expressing
doubts that plaintiffs who failed to establish the requisite injury for a section 2 claim could
establish a constitutional dilution claim, pointing to the fact that the standards for the two
are identical, except for the intent requirement); see also Turner v. Arkansas, 784 F. Supp.
553, 578 (1991).
119. Of course, dilution is not the only kind of voting related injury for which Equal
Protection would provide a claim for relief. For example, proof of dilution obviously is not
required when the claim is that the a state carefully selects disfranchising crimes with the
purpose and effect of disfranchising more blacks than whites. See, e.g., Hunter v. Under-
wood, 471 U.S. 222, 227-33 (1985).
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districting scheme rather than the other likely becomes highly
subjective.12°
My objective in this article is to provide redistricting advice,
supported by legal analysis. Consequently, the influence dilution
issue need not be resolved. 12' The advice is obviously the same re-
gardless of how the issue is ultimately resolved: do not set about
to discriminate on the basis of race. 22
D. The Constitution Prohibits Districting Plans that Purposefully
Dilute the Minority Political Party's Voting Strength
On the same day that it handed down Thornburg v. Gingles,
the Supreme Court also released Davis v. Bandemer,123 a political
gerrymandering challenge to Indiana's post-1980 redistricting
plan."2 The plan-which had been prepared in secret by a Repub-
120. For example, would a group that could constitute 40% of one district and 0% of
another be worse off if the districts were drawn so that the group makes up 20% of each, if
the group would predictably control the Democratic primary in the 40% district but just as
predictably lose the general election, and (equally predictably) two 20% minority districts
would each elect a Democrat but not necessarily the group's first choice Democrat?
121. The rationale of Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217 (1971), could provide a worka-
ble resolution, assuming that it is still good law. Palmer, a case that arose at the height of
the 1960s desegregation movement, involved a challenge to Jackson, Mississippi's decision
to close all city-operated swimming pools-a decision clearly undertaken to avoid integrat-
ing them. Id. at 221. The Court found no constitutional violation. Id. at 227. The Court
concluded that, because the city was under no obligation to maintain swimming pools, its
decision to cease to operate pools affected all citizens equally in that none of the city citi-
zens would have access to city sponsored pools. Id.
In the redistricting arena, if a jurisdiction does not consider the representational inter-
ests of any non-political groups (the most likely candidates would be residents of identifi-
able neighborhoods) when devising districts, its intentional extension of that principle to a
minority group should not be actionable, absent proof of dilution. If, however, its redis-
tricting principles include respecting communities of interest, the jurisdiction's intentional
failure to preserve minority groups intact under circumstances where others similarly
situated were preserved, would raise Equal Protection concerns. A discriminatorily moti-
vated decision to select "at-large" elections is distinguishable in that an at-large election
system affects all geographically concentrated groups the same way. None receives a rep-
resentational benefit from their "residential concentration."
122. A more significant problem for line drawers may be to avoid an after-the-fact ar-
gument that their decision not to benefit a minority group is a decision to discriminate
against the group. A jurisdiction that follows the proposed procedures for redistricting set
out in Part Two will be well positioned to respond to such a charge.
123. 478 U.S. 109 (1986).
124. In several earlier cases, the Court had implied that districting that operated to
cancel out the voting strength of racial or political elements of the voting population would
raise constitutional questions. See Burns v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73, 88-89 (1966); Fort-
son v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433, 436-37 (1965). In the Court's only decision to address political
gerrymandering prior to Bandemer, Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735 (1973), the Court
upheld a redistricting scheme formulated with bipartisan support to maintain the political
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lican-only committee, had passed both houses of the legislature
with a strict party-line vote, and had been signed into law by the
Republican governor-was conceded to have been designed to
maintain Republican control of the legislature.'25 In the first elec-
tion held under the new plan, Democratic candidates for the
House won 51.9% of the vote but captured only 43% of the seats
up for election.'26 Democrats challenged the plan as a violation of
their Equal Protection rights.'27
The lower court refused to dismiss the case as raising a non-
justiciable "political question"2 ' and ultimately concluded that
the Democrats were entitled to relief.'29 The Supreme Court
agreed that political gerrymandering presented a justiciable is-
sue, not falling within the political question doctrine. 130 Earlier
cases had suggested that the matter was non-justiciable, either
because matters of apportionment are delegated to the state, or
because of the absence of a manageable standard-issues the
Court concluded were not raised by the claim at hand.'3 ' Rather,
the Bandemer plaintiffs contended that as members of a political
group, they had been denied the same chance to elect representa-
tives of its choice as other groups.132 Adequate representation, the
Court held, is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. 33
party's relative strength within the state. Id. at 752-54. But despite the dictum on parti-
san vote dilution in some cases, the Court had on several occasions affirmed lower court
decisions finding political gerrymandering claims to be non-justiciable. See, e.g., WMCA,
Inc. v. Lomenzo, 382 U.S. 4, 5-6 (1965), summarily affg 238 F. Supp. 916 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
125. Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 117.
126. Id. at 115.
127. Id.
128. A "political question" raises issues which are either: (1) committed to a coordinate
political department; (2) lacking in judicially discoverable and manageable standards for
resolution; (3) impossible of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind
clearly for non-judicial discretion; (4) impossible for the court to undertake without ex-
pressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; (5) a political decision
already made; or (6) likely to raise the potential for embarrassment from multifarious
pronouncements by various departments on one question. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186,
217 (1962).
129. Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 115 (recounting lower court's decision in Bandemer v.
Davis, 603 F. Supp. 1479, 1492 (S.D. Ind. 1984)).
130. Id. at 118-25. Justice O'Connor, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice
Rehnquist, would have held political gerrymandering claims to be non-justiciable. Id. at
144 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
131. Id. at 121.
132. Id. at 124.
133. Id. at 132.
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The plaintiffs' victory on this point, however, turned out to be
rather hollow because the Court rejected the lower court's conclu-
sion that the challenged plan denied Equal Protection to Democ-
ratic voters.3 4 Citing the Court's racial vote dilution cases, a ma-
jority of the Justices agreed that to establish an Equal Protection
claim, plaintiffs must establish both an intent to discriminate
against an identifiable political group and an actual discrimina-
tory effect on the group.'35 The Court agreed that the evidence
sufficiently supported the lower court's finding of intent, but only
two Justices accepted the district court's legal and factual bases
for concluding that the effects of the reapportionment were suffi-
ciently adverse to violate Equal Protection.3 6
As pointed out by the other opinions in the case, discerning
from the plurality opinion the "effect" sufficiently adverse to be
discriminatory is no small feat.3 7 The plurality notes that the
simple fact that a scheme makes winning elections more difficult
and that the group failed to achieve proportional representation
were not enough to constitute impermissible discrimination.'
Rather, unconstitutionality must be based on "evidence of contin-
ued frustration of the will of a majority of the voters or effective
denial to a minority of voters of a fair chance to influence the po-
litical process."'39 Consequently, the Court concluded that reli-
ance on a single election to establish a discriminatory impact was
unsatisfactory. 4 °
The trial court had not found that Democrats' chances would
be unsuccessful in the future; that they would be consigned to
134. Id. at 143.
135. Id. at 127.
136. Id. at 185 n.25 (Powell, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). Justices Powell
and Stevens concluded that the facts found by the lower court were sufficient to support
findings of discriminatory intent and effect. Id. at 162. The three dissenting Justices on
the justiciability issue did not reach the issue of standards for a violation. Id. at 145
(O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice White provided an opinion, which was joined by the
remaining three Justices. Id. at 113.
137. Justice white, the opinion's author, concedes as much: "Wie recognize that our own
view may be difficult of application. Determining when an electoral system has been 'ar-
ranged in a manner that will consistently degrade a voter's or a group of voters' influence
on the political process as a whole,' is of necessity a difficult inquiry." Id. at 142-43; see
also id. at 155 (O'Connor, J., concurring); id. at 161-62 (Powell, J., concurring in part, dis-
senting in part).
138. Id. at 130-32.
139. Id. at 133.
140. Id. at 135.
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minority status in the Assembly throughout the upcoming dec-
ade; or that it was impossible to do better in the next reappor-
tionment. 4' The Court indicated that "unconstitutional discrimi-
nation occurs only when the electoral system is arranged in a
manner that will consistently degrade a voter's or a group of vot-
ers' influence on the political process as a whole."' Conse-
quently, noted the plurality, the district court erred in concluding
that the apportionment violates the Equal Protection clause.'1
In the final analysis, Bandemer provides one more basis for
those dissatisfied with a redistricting plan to challenge it, but the
Court's standard of proof means that few challenges will actually
be successful."M The Republican majority had utilized all the
standard gerrymandering devices: likely Republican voters were
spread over as many districts as their numbers could control;
Democratic voters were stacked into as few districts as possible,
creating supermajorities in those districts and submerging the
remaining Democrats in Republican districts. 45 The Republican
majority gave virtually no consideration to having district lines
conform to existing political subdivisions boundaries. 46 It made
no attempt to "nest" the two plans (having a large Senate district
contain several entire House districts).147 Nor did it solicit any
public input in the process.'" Finding a more extreme case of po-
litical gerrymandering would be difficult.
Despite the dim prospects for success, a number of post-
Bandemer partisan gerrymandering cases were attempted. The
outcome in Badham v. March Fong Eu,'49 a case alleging that
California's congressional districting plan was a Democratic ger-
rymander, was typical. The court easily found discriminatory in-
tent,5 ° but dismissed the case for failure to allege a legally cogni-
zable discriminatory effect.' 5' The court set out a two-part test for
141. Id. at 135-36.
142. Id. at 132.
143. Id. at 143.
144. While there was not majority support for the standard, there is little reason to be-
lieve that the Justices voting against justiciability would adopt a lesser standard.
145. Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 116-17.
146. Id. at 115-16.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. 694 F. Supp. 664 (N.D. Cal. 1988), affd, 488 U.S. 1024 (1989).
150. Id. at 670.
151. See id. at 673.
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discriminatory effect: (1) a history of disproportionate results and
(2) strong evidence that the plaintiffs lacked political power and
were denied fair representation." 2 As to the second requirement,
the court concluded that it "would be ludicrous for plaintiffs to al-
lege that their interests are being 'entirely ignore[d]' in Con-
gress ""' when Republicans held the governor's office, a U.S. Sen-
ate seat, forty percent of the congressional seats, and a
Republican and former governor of California had been President
for seven years.' 54 Almost all reported political gerrymandering
claims reached similar results.' 5 Thus, it appears that the only
practical limitations on partisan gerrymandering are those im-
posed by state law and legislative self-restraint.
152. Id. at 670.
153. Id. at 672.
154. Id.
155. See, e.g., La Porte County Republican Cent. Comm. v. Bd. of Comm'rs, 43 F.3d
1126 (7th Cir. 1994); Pope v. Blue, 809 F. Supp. 392 (W.D.N.C. 1992), aff'd, 506 U.S. 801
(1992); Republican Party v. Wilder, 774 F. Supp. 400 (W.D. Va. 1991). In one post-
Bandemer case, Republican Party v. Hunt, 77 F.3d 470 (4th Cir. 1996) (unpublished table
decision), available at No. 94-2410, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 2029 (4th Cir. Feb. 12, 1996),
the lower court twice found sufficient evidence of discriminatory purpose and effect to vio-
late Equal Protection, but the issue became moot when the legislature enacted a different
electoral scheme. Id. at *1-2. This case graphically demonstrates, first, the cost of a major-
ity party's succumbing to blatant gerrymandering instincts, and second, the downside of
the Supreme Court opening the door to a legal challenge without providing a workable
standard to resolve it. The case began in 1988 when the Republican Party of North Caro-
lina brought suit alleging that the state's system of electing superior court judges consti-
tuted an unconstitutional political gerrymander. Id. at *3. An early appeal reversed the
district court's dismissal of the claim as raising a non-justiciable political question. (The
lower court had distinguished Bandemer on the grounds that judicial elections, which are
exempt from the "one-person, one-vote" mandate, were inherently different from legisla-
tive elections. See Republican Party v. Hunt, 841 F. Supp. 722, 730-31 (E.D.N.C. 1994)).
On remand, the lower court concluded that the plaintiffs would likely prevail and granted
a preliminary injunction, which was partially modified in the second appeal of the case.
Hunt, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 2029, at *3-4. On the subsequent remand, the lower court
concluded that permanent relief was merited. Id. at *6. This decision was also reversed on
appeal because the lower court had not considered whether the most recent elections,
which had produced the first statewide Republican victories for these offices in many
years, undermined the court's prediction that Republican electoral exclusion would con-
tinue into the future under the statewide scheme. Id. at *5-7. While the case was pending
again in the lower court, the legislature changed the method of election, calling for non-
partisan district elections. Id. at *2. The lower court reaffirmed its conclusion that the
prior system was unconstitutional but found the issue mooted by the new legislation. Id.
at 2-3. The litigation finally ended nine years after it started, when the appellate court
dismissed an appeal of the decision as moot. Ragan v. Vosburgh, 110 F.3d 60 (4th Cir.
1997) (unpublished table decision), available at No. 96-2621, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 6626
(4th Cir. Apr. 10, 1997).
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E. Section 5 Prohibits Districting Plans that Cause, or Intend to
Cause, Retrogression in Minorities' Electoral Opportunities
Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act applies only in a limited
number of jurisdictions-initially, those that in 1965 had long
and substantial histories of intentional disfranchisement of Afri-
can-Americans.' In 1975, Congress imposed Section 5's unusual
requirements on certain additional jurisdictions in order to pro-
vide heightened protection for Hispanics. 5 7 In jurisdictions where
it applies-the so-called "covered jurisdictions"--section 5 is the
most onerous of the federal limitations on state redistricting. A
perception that section 5 required that minority districts be cre-
ated at any cost was the leading explanation for bizarre districts
in covered jurisdictions after the 1990 Census. As will be seen be-
low, a properly conceived concern about section 5 compliance may
indeed supply the compelling state interest needed to justify race-
based districting.'
Section 5 prohibits covered jurisdictions from administering
changes in their election laws until they have been federally "pre-
cleared." A section 5 jurisdiction must seek preclearance either by
filing a declaratory judgment action in the United States District
Court for the District of Columbia, or by submitting the election
law change to the United States Attorney General for adminis-
trative preclearance. The Voting Section of the Civil Rights Divi-
sion of the Department of Justice is charged with administering
preclearance on behalf of the Attorney General, as well as with
defending preclearance actions brought in the District of Colum-
bia court. To obtain preclearance, a covered jurisdiction must
convince federal authorities that the change was not adopted for
156. The jurisdictions initially subject to section 5's special provisions were the entire
states of Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, South Carolina, Virginia, forty coun-
ties in North Carolina, and a smattering of counties from other states. Jurisdictions Cov-
ered Under Section 4(b) of the Voting Rights Act, As Amended, 28 C.F.R. pt. 51 app.
(2001) [hereinafter Appendix].
157. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973b(a)-(b), 1973c (1994). The amendments extended section 5 cov-
erage to the states of Texas, Arizona, and Alaska, as well as to a smattering of counties in
other states. Appendix, supra note 156. A list of jurisdictions subject to section 5 coverage
can be found online. U.S. Dep't of Justice Civil Rights Division Voting Section, About Sec-
tion 5 of the Voting Rights Act, at http://www.usdoj.gov/crtlvotinglsec-5/covered.htm. (last
modified Feb. 11, 2000).
158. See Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 921 (1995); see also discussion infra Part One,
II.C.1.
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the purpose of discriminating against protected minorities and
will not have that effect.
159
1. Retrogression: The Substantive Standard for Section 5
Preclearance
While the Supreme Court has adopted a very broad interpreta-
tion of the election law changes subject to section 5,160 it consis-
tently has seen the purpose of the preclearance requirement as
limited to preventing covered jurisdictions from eroding minori-
ties' existing political opportunities. 161 Thus, in Beer v. United
States,162 the Court held that changes in election laws are entitled
to preclearance unless they "lead to a retrogression in the posi-
tion of racial minorities with respect to their effective exercise of
the electoral franchise."163 Even if the change perpetuates exist-
ing discrimination, it is entitled to preclearance unless it actually
increases the degree of discrimination."
Despite earlier Department of Justice (the "Department" or
"Justice Department") regulations to the contrary, it is now clear
that section 2 liability is not incorporated into section 5's stan-
dard. After section 2 was amended in 1982, the Department's
regulations for governance of section 5 took the position that a
159. See Georgia v. United States, 411 U.S. 526, 538-39 (1973).
160. Congress's likely purpose for including section 5 in the 1965 Voting Rights Act
almost certainly was to prevent the target ("covered") jurisdiction from adopting new re-
strictions on registration and ballot access. See Abigail Thernstrom, The Odd Evolution of
the Voting Rights Act, 55 PUB. INT. 49, 52, 58-68 (1979). However, early on, the Supreme
Court gave the provision a much broader reading, holding that it requires covered juris-
dictions to obtain preclearance of every change affecting voting in even a minor way. Allen
v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 565-66 (1969). In Georgia v. United States, 411
U.S. 526 (1973), the Court specifically held that redistricting changes are subject to pre-
clearance. Id. at 531-35.
161. See, e.g., City of Richmond v. United States, 422 U.S. 358, 388 (1975) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) ("I take to be fundamental the objective of § 5 ... the protection of present lev-
els of voting effectiveness for the black population.").
162. 425 U.S. 130 (1976).
163. Id. at 141.
164. City of Lockhart v. United States, 460 U.S. 125, 133-36 (1983). This seemingly
odd holding is a function of the limited remedy available under section 5, which is merely
to enjoin implementation of the new law, thereby "reviving" the existing practice. See 42
U.S.C. § 1973c (1994). "To deny preclearance to a plan that is not retrogressive-no matter
how unconstitutional it may be-would risk leaving in effect a status quo that is even
worse." Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 528 U.S. 320, 336 (2000) [hereinafter Bossier Par-
ish I!]. Section 5 preclearance, however, is not an "approval" of the change, nor does it
immunize an election practice from a traditional judicial challenge on others grounds. See
42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1994).
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non-retrogressive change would be denied preclearance if it was
so discriminatory as to constitute a clear violation of section 2.165
The Department based its position upon language in Beer to the
effect that a non-retrogressive change could be denied preclear-
ance only if it so discriminated on the basis of race as to violate
the Constitution.'66 Interpreting this dictum to mean that a
change resulting in "dilution," as defined by the Whitcomb-White
totality-of-the-circumstances test, should not receive preclear-
ance, the Department reasoned that a change that violated sec-
tion 2-which adopted the same standard-should also be denied
preclearance.'67
The Court disagreed, holding in Reno v. Bossier Parish School
Board ("Bossier Parish P'),'68 that section 5 preclearance may not
be denied solely on the basis that the change involved produces a
clear violation of section 2.169 The Court concluded that the Jus-
tice Department's position "would inevitably make compliance
with § 5 contingent upon compliance with § 2. ... [which would]
replace the standards for § 5 with those for § 2 [thereby] contra-
dict[ing] ... [the Court's] longstanding interpretation of these two
sections of the Act."7 °
2. The "Benchmark" Plan Against Which Retrogression is
Measured
Because section 5's objective is to freeze in place at least the
minimum minority influence that existed prior to the time a cov-
ered jurisdiction adopted a change affecting voting, identification
of a benchmark is essential to the preclearance decision. Two de-
terminations must be made: which plan is to serve as the bench-
mark, and by what yardstick should minority influence be meas-
ured pre-change and post-change? Often these questions are not
as easily resolved as might appear at first blush.
165. See 28 C.F.R. § 51.55(b)(2) (1996). This provision was amended in 1998, eliminat-
ing a "clear violation of Section 2" as a basis to deny preclearance. Id. § 51.54 (2001).
166. See Bossier Parish I, 520 U.S. 471, 504 (1997).
167. See id.
168. 520 U.S. 471(1997).
169. Id. at 477.
170. Id. The Court subsequently held that the Beer language upon which the Justice
Department regulation was based was dictum. Bossier Parish II, 528 U.S. at 338.
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a. The Benchmark When a Post-Census, Precleared Plan is
Judicially Invalidated
Absent unusual circumstances, the existing plan at the time a
change is enacted is the benchmark plan.' 7' Therefore, in the con-
text of the districting changes likely in 2001, the usual bench-
mark plan will be the one based on the 1990 Census, so long as it
was precleared.
Most questions about the appropriate plan for benchmark pur-
poses arise when a plan enacted after a new census obtains sec-
tion 5 preclearance, but subsequently is invalidated by a federal
court. The court must give the legislative body an opportunity to
devise a replacement plan that will comply with federal law-
including obtaining preclearance through the ordinary chan-
nels' 72-devising its own plan only on the clear failure of the leg-
islature to act.73 If the legislature is unable to produce a plan, a
plan drawn by the court is not subject to preclearance, 74 but nev-
ertheless must respect section 5's non-retrogression standard.'75
Regardless of whether the issue comes up in a preclearance con-
text (because the state has enacted a replacement plan) or in the
context of the court's devising its own plan, a benchmark plan
must be identified. Should the last precleared plan continue to
serve as the benchmark, even though it is the very plan that the
court has just determined violated federal law?
The answer should depend upon the reasons for the plan's in-
validity. When the existing plan is found to be unconstitutional
because the jurisdiction has subjugated its traditional districting
criteria to race-a violation of Shaw's mandate-the number of
minority districts in the plan, by definition, has been artificially
171. See Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 883-84 (1994). The regulations governing section
5 specify that to serve as a benchmark, the existing plan must be "legally enforceable." 28
C.F.R. § 51.54 (2001). A plan is legally enforceable if it has been precleared under section
5, or had been ordered into effect by a federal court, and therefore was exempt from pre-
clearance, or was already in existence on the effective date for section 5 coverage of the
jurisdiction. See id.
172. McDaniel v. Sanchez, 452 U.S. 130, 150 (1981). Only after ajurisdiction's plan has
obtained preclearance is the trial court to evaluate it as a remedy for the violation at issue
in the litigation. See id. at 145.
173. Wise v. Lipscomb, 437 U.S. 535, 539 (1978); White v. Weiser, 412 U.S. 783, 797
(1973).
174. See McDaniel, 452 U.S. at 138.
175. See id. at 149.
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inflated. "But for" affirmative racial gerrymandering, the invali-
dated plan would have contained fewer majority-minority dis-
tricts. The lower court in Abrams v. Johnson.6 faced this situa-
tion when the Georgia legislature failed to produce a replacement
plan for its 1990 congressional reapportionment plan, which the
court had invalidated earlier on Shaw grounds.'77 After the 1990
Census, Georgia enacted a plan containing two majority black
districts, an increase over its prior plan, which contained only
one, but in order to obtain section 5 preclearance, the state en-
gaged in substantial racial gerrymandering to add a third dis-
trict.'78 Challengers to the court-drawn plan argued that the trial
court's plan, which contained one majority black district, was ret-
rogressive, but they had difficulty defining a benchmark plan.'79
The Court rejected the argument that the invalidated three black
districts plan, cured of its constitutional defects, was the bench-
mark because this hypothetical plan had never been imple-
mented. 8 ° The Court further noted that using the invalidated
precleared plan with its constitutional defects as the benchmark
"would validate the very maneuvers that were a major cause of
the unconstitutional districting."'' The Court then concluded
that the benchmark plan was the last precleared districting plan
not found to be the product of an unconstitutional racial gerry-
mander, which in Georgia's case was the plan based on the 1980
Census.8 2
While the form of gerrymandering challenged in Abrams in-
volved subjugation of state districting standards of compactness
and respect for political subdivisions to race, the Court's reason-
ing should apply with equal force when the number of majority-
minority districts has been artificially inflated by violating the
constitutional principle of one-person, one-vote. For example,
suppose that in order to provide a district for a geographically
compact African-American population, which was too small to
176. 521 U.S. 74 (1997).
177. Id. at 81.
178. Id. at 80-81.
179. Id. at 95-97.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 86.
182. Id. at 97. The Supreme Court also rejected the challengers' argument that the
benchmark plan should be the two black districts' plan that Georgia originally submitted
for preclearance. Id. at 96. This plan, the Court observed, had never been implemented
because it had been refused preclearance. Id. at 97.
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constitute a majority of an "equally populated" district, the legis-
lature included the group in a district that was "underpopulated."
If, as a result, the total deviation for the plan exceeded constitu-
tional limits, the legislature's actions should be seen as an af-
firmative racial gerrymander,"a and the plan, which will be in-
validated on one-person one-vote grounds, should not then serve
as the benchmark for measuring retrogression in its replace-
ment.'84
When a precleared plan is subsequently invalidated for reasons
unrelated to artificial inflation of the number of minority dis-
tricts, the invalidated plan should serve as the benchmark. For
example, if a precleared plan is later determined to violate sec-
tion 2-which in effect says that there were too few minority dis-
tricts in the plan-there is every reason for the invalidated plan
to serve as the benchmark.185 Similarly, if the plan is unconstitu-
tionally malapportioned for reasons unrelated to efforts to artifi-
cially inflate the number of minority districts, the invalidated
plan should be the benchmark for measuring retrogression.
b. The Benchmark When the Existing Plan is "Race-Based," but
Was Never Judicially Challenged
Adjudicated claims of race-based districting in the 1990s very
likely represented only the tip of the iceberg in terms of the true
number of state and local redistricting plans that might have
been invalidated had they been challenged.'86 While acknowledg-
183. Note that if the district in question is otherwise standard-meaning one which
might have been produced to favor representation of the minority population concentra-
tion without regard to its racial make-up-the state can justify fairly substantial devia-
tions from population equality. If, for example, the underpopulated district happens to be
an entire majority black county in a state that includes respect for county boundaries as a
districting standard, the state's justification burden would be light. See discussion supra
Part One, I.A. "Racial gerrymandering" by "malapportionment" occurs only when the de-
viation produced by underpopulating a majority-minority district is too great to be justi-
fied.
184. When creating majority-minority districts causes the existing plan's invalidity,
returning to an earlier plan as the benchmark puts the minority group in exactly the posi-
tion it would have occupied, absent the state's improper efforts to benefit the group in the
invalidated plan.
185. Thus, if the replacement plan remedies the section 2 dilution, it inevitably will
include more majority-minority districts than its predecessor and thus easily should ob-
tain preclearance.
186. Given the documented pressure the Justice Department applied to states to
"maximize" the number of minority districts, it is reasonable to assume that similar pres-
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ing Abrams's benchmark rule, the Justice Department's Guide-
lines, released January 2001, take the position that the rule does
not apply "[a]bsent such a finding of unconstitutionality under
Shaw."' Consequently, the existing plan, constitutionality not-
withstanding, will be the benchmark, and its constitutionality
"will not be considered during the Department's Section 5 re-
view." "' The Department's position thus "freezes" in place levels
of minority influence artificially created in response to its own
improper pressure.
3. The Court's Measure of Effective Political Participation
The basic mandate of section 5 is to block election law changes
that make minority voters "worse off' than they were under exist-
ing law. To make the comparison obviously requires some meas-
ure of how "well off' the minorities are in their exercise of the po-
litical franchise.
The measure of "effective exercise of the political franchise" dif-
fers, depending upon the election law change at issue. When sec-
tion 5 was adopted in 1965, black registration in the covered ju-
risdictions was severely depressed.'8 9 Any practice or procedure
that imposed new restrictions on registration-even ones that
were absolutely racially neutral in their impact on new regis-
trants-would easily have been viewed as retrogressive because
it impeded blacks' ability to close the registration gap. 9 ° In other
situations, the Court found election law changes to be retrogres-
sure was applied to lesser elected governing bodies (counties, municipalities, and school
boards) as well. Indeed, I suspect that in any section 5 jurisdiction with even a modest mi-
nority population, "maximization" was the rule, not the exception.
187. Guidance Concerning Redistricting and Retrogression Under Section 5 of the Vot-
ing Rights Act, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1973c, 66 Fed. Reg. 5412, 5412 (Jan. 18, 2001)
[hereinafter Guidelines].
188. Id. at 5412-13.
189. See BERNARD GROFMAN ET AL., MINORITY REPRESENTATION AND THE QUEST FOR
VOTING EQUALITY 22-24 (1992).
190. As noted previously, Congress probably had new restrictions on ballot access in
mind when it adopted section 5, which was based on the so-called "freezing principle" de-
veloped by the federal courts in the South to prevent jurisdictions from adding new regis-
tration requirements. See Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 140 (1976) ("Section 5 was
a response to a common practice in some jurisdictions of staying one step ahead of the fed-
eral courts by passing new discriminatory voting laws as soon as the old ones had been
struck down.") (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 94-196, at 57 (1978)). See generally Derfher, supra
note 69, at 546.
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sive when the effect of the change was to increase black voters'
dependency on white votes to elect candidates of their choice.' 91
Thus, a change that increased the number of votes required for
election was retrogressive because a finite number of black voters
would need to attract more white votes to elect their choices.
Similarly, annexations were retrogressive if blacks made up a
smaller percentage of the enlarged city than they did of the pre-
annexation city. Rather than prohibit annexations outright, how-
ever, the Court permitted preclearance if the municipality ad-
justed its election system to "fairly reflect" black voting strength
within the enlarged city. 92 For these kinds of changes, "theoreti-
cal retrogression" was sufficient to trigger an objection. It was
immaterial that the group's chances for electing a candidate of its
choice were very slim in the existing system, if under the new
system its chances were slimmer still. Likewise, the extent to
which white voters supported candidates preferred by the minor-
ity appeared to be irrelevant if more white support was in fact re-
quired after the change. 93
This ability of the group's vote to impact elections is unwork-
able as a measure of effective political participation when the
191. See City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 183-87 (1980).
192. City of Richmond v. United States, 422 U.S. 358, 370-71 (1975). In City of Rich-
mond, the annexation actually changed the city's population from majority black to major-
ity white, thereby depriving blacks of potential control of city government. Id. at 363.
Thus, it was a reasonable compromise to condition preclearance of the annexation on a
change in the method of election (from at-large to single-member districts) to assure that
blacks would control their share of seats in the enlarged city. Later, however, in City of
Port Arthur v. United States, 459 U.S. 159, 167, 170 (1982), the Court extended the rule to
an annexation that caused a drop in the black percentage of an at-large city from 45% to
40%. Moreover the Supreme Court upheld the lower court's determination that a guaran-
tee of a third of the governing seats, via a change in the method of election, did not fairly
reflect the group's voting strength in the enlarged city. Id. at 167-68. Blacks made up
34.6% of the potential voters. Id. at 162 n.3. Because annexations that reduce the black
percentage of the city present a situation where compromise of the retrogression standard
is necessary, the "fairly reflects" standard announced in these cases should not lightly be
transferred to other situations. See also Katharine Inglis Butler, Reapportionment, the
Courts, and the Voting Rights Act: A Resegregation of the Political Process?, 56 U. COLO. L.
REV. 1, 30-32 (1984).
193. For example, before the changes at issue in City of Rome, blacks, constituting
about twenty-one percent of the voting-age population, had a theoretical (but highly
unlikely) opportunity to elect a candidate to the city commission and school board without
white support. See City of Rome, 446 U.S. at 159. The changes eliminated this theoretical
possibility. Moreover, the lower court found that black voters fully participated in the
city's political life and that white voters demonstrated a willingness to support black can-
didates. Id. at 183-87. Neither of the facts were found material to the preclearance deci-
sion. See id.; see also Butler, supra note 68, at 929-34 (discussing the changes in City of
Rome and their impact on black voters).
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change involves redrawing all of the jurisdiction's election dis-
tricts. For example, a city with five existing districts with black
populations of say, 45%, 40%, 30%, 20%, and 10% respectively, in
most circumstances could not maintain those exact percentages
in a new plan. Is a proposed redistricting plan for the city "retro-
gressive" if the two most black districts become more black-
making it easier for the group to elect its candidates in those dis-
tricts, while the other three districts lose black population, mak-
ing election of the group's candidates more difficult?
The Court's only actual section 5 case involving preclearance of
a redistricting plan was Beer, the case that produced the retro-
gression standard.'94 In Beer, the Court spoke of black influence
in terms of blacks constituting "a clear majority of [a district's]
registered voters" and also of blacks as "a majority of [a district's]
population" in the plan submitted for preclearance.'95 Because the
benchmark plan in Beer did not have any district satisfying ei-
ther of these conditions, the Court found the new plan, which did,
to be "ameliorative" and thus entitled to preclearance.'96
Additional support for the number of minority districts serving
as the measure of effective participation comes from the section 5
annexation cases, where a reflection of "minority voting strength"
was deemed to be the number of majority black districts. 9 v In
still other cases, the Court has also written of the measure of "ef-
fective exercise of the political franchise" as if it were the number
of "minority" districts, but with a different definition of that term.
For example, compare Abrams v. Johnson, where the Court im-
plied that a "black district" was one in which blacks constituted
an actual majority of the population,' with Bush v. Vera, 99
where certain language can be read as defining a black district as
one in which the minority has actually elected a minority candi-
date, regardless of its percentage of the district.
20 0
194. 425 U.S. 130, 141 (1976).
195. Id. at 142.
196. Id. at 141-42.
197. See, e.g., City of Port Arthur, 459 U.S. at 167; City of Richmond, 422 U.S. at 370-
72.
198. 521 U.S. 74, 84-85, 91 (1997).
199. 517 U.S. 952 (1996).
200. The district at issue in Vera had not been majority black in the prior, benchmark,
plan, but had nevertheless elected African-American candidates for two decades. See dis-
cussion infra Part One, H.C.2.d.
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In an early preclearance action, Mississippi v. United States,201
the District of Columbia district court saw the measure of "effec-
tive exercise" as the number of black voting age majority dis-
tricts, with consideration given to the actual black percentages in
those districts. 2 It granted preclearance to the districting plan
at issue203 because it concluded that the proposed plan had "a
greater number of black voting age majority districts than did the
[benchmark] plan and [it] provide[d] higher percentages of black
voting strength in those districts than did the [benchmark]
plan. 204
4. The Justice Department's Measure of Effective Political
Participation
As a practical matter, the important definition of effective po-
litical participation is the one likely to be employed by the Justice
Department. While the Department is bound by Supreme Court
precedent, it faces situations that arguably are factually distin-
guishable from all of the relatively limited number of judicial pre-
clearance determinations. The Department acts well within its
discretion when it fills in gaps in the law in a manner consistent
with section 5's underlying freezing principle. That said, many
(including the Supreme Court's conservative majority) viewed the
Department as abusing its discretion when it conditioned pre-
clearance of redistricting changes after the 1990 Census on
"maximization" of the number of majority-minority districts. 20 5
201. 490 F. Supp. 569 (D.D.C. 1979), affd, 444 U.S. 1050 (1980).
202. Id. at 582 n.6.
203. Id. at 583.
204. Id. at 582 n.6.
205. Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 925 (1995). Some courts hearing affirmative ra-
cial gerrymandering cases openly criticized the Department's coercion of covered jurisdic-
tions to create majority-minority districts when no feasible argument existed that these
districts were necessary to avoid retrogression. See, e.g., Johnson v. Mortham, 926 F.
Supp. 1460, 1486 (N.D. Fla. 1996) (discussing the Department's refusal to preclear dis-
tricts unless it included a proportionate number of majority-minority districts); Smith v.
Beasley, 946 F. Supp. 1174, 1208-09 (D.S.C. 1996) ("[Ihe Court has made clear that the
Department of Justice's interpretations of the [Voting Rights] Act should be accorded no
deference."). See generally MAURICE J. CUNNINGHAM, MAXIMIZATION, WHATEVER THE
COST: RACE, REDISTRICTING, AND THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE (2001) (providing exhaus-
tive documentation of the Department's pressure on covered jurisdictions to "maximize"
the number of majority black districts in the redistricting following the 1990 Census).
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Despite the absence of judicial approval for any basis to deny
preclearance other than retrogression, the Department has never
limited its objections to retrogressive changes.20 6 However, in the
last two decades, the Supreme Court has rejected several of the
Department's other theories for objections,20 7 leaving no room to
argue that there are legitimate bases other than retrogression to
deny preclearance to election law changes, including redistrict-
ings. 20 ' To avoid open defiance of Supreme Court precedent, the
Department will have to find another alternative if it plans to
continue its campaign to increase opportunities for the election of
minorities.
The alternative the Department appears to have selected is to
use plausible uncertainty about the Supreme Court's measure of
effective political participation when the change involved is a re-
districting. Arguably still open is the question of whether the
number of minority districts is the only acceptable measure, and
if so, how such districts are to be defined. Absent further word
from the Court, the Department is likely to answer these ques-
tions on a case by case basis, using any plausible measure of in-
fluence and any plausible definition of a minority district to find
retrogression if it believes that the jurisdiction could have pro-
duced a plan more favorable to the election of minority candi-
dates.
The Justice Department's recently released Guidelines (the
"Guidelines") include an explanation of the circumstances that
cause a redistricting plan to be retrogressive:
The effective exercise of the electoral franchise usually is assessed in
redistricting submissions in terms of the opportunity for minority
voters to elect candidates of their choice. The presence of racially po-
larized voting is an important factor.., in assessing minority voting
strength. A proposed redistricting plan ordinarily will occasion an
206. For examples of objections not based on retrogression, see Butler, supra note 192,
at 28-32.
207. See Bossier Parish II, 528 U.S. 320, 341 (2000) (section 5 does not prevent pre-
clearance of a plan adopted for a discriminating purpose unless that purpose is to cause
retrogression in the protected group's ability to participate in the political process); Bossier
Parrish I, 520 U.S. 471, 483 (1997) (the fact that a change that will result in a violation of
section 2 is not a basis to deny preclearance to a non-retrogressive change); City of Lock-
hart v. United States, 460 U.S. 125, 134-36 (1983) (finding that a non-retrogressive
change is entitled to preclearance even if it perpetuates existing discrimination).
208. Bossier Parish I, 520 U.S. at 498 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("[The Court holds that
retrogression is the only kind of effect that will justify denial of preclearance under § 5.").
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objection... if the plan reduces minority voting strength relative to
the benchmark plan and a fairly drawn alternative plan could ame-
liorate or prevent that retrogression.
2 09
Whatever the Department has in mind as an operational defi-
nition of "opportunity to elect," it is not merely the number of ma-
jority-minority districts. Otherwise, the Guidelines would simply
say so. The Guideline's notation that "[tihe presence of racially
polarized voting is an important factor" in measuring "minority
voting strength"210 is a further indication that the Department
will not equate "opportunity to elect" with the number of "major-
ity-minority districts." If a minority group is a majority of a dis-
trict, the electoral outcome is in minority hands, regardless of the
voting patterns of the majority. The Guidelines thus lend support
to Maurice Cunningham's observation, predating the Guidelines,
that the Department's new terminology for "black district" is the
nebulous "black opportunity district."211
If, as it now appears, the Department expects to apply a sliding
scale for defining "opportunity" by adjusting for the possibility
that reliable white cross-over support will help elect the group's
candidate, covered jurisdictions seeking administrative preclear-
ance will be less capable than ever of predicting whether their re-
districting plans will be precleared. The Supreme Court's elimi-
nation of all bases to deny preclearance other than retrogression
thus will have produced virtually no change in the Department's
behavior. A few examples will demonstrate the wide open possi-
bilities for finding retrogression in a protected group's opportu-
nity to elect.
Consider a city with five single-member districts, where the ex-
isting malapportioned districts were 45%, 40%, 35%, 30%, and
25% black, respectively. A Justice Department analyst might
conclude that the 45% and 40% districts were "opportunity" dis-
tricts in the existing plan, based on anticipated white cross-over
support for black candidates. If the proposed replacement plan
contained one 50% district, and the next highest black percentage
district was only 30%, the analyst would then conclude that the
proposed plan was retrogressive: two opportunity districts had
been reduced to one. Or suppose that the hypothetical city modi-
209. Guidelines, supra note 187, at 5413.
210. Id.
211. CUNNINGHAM, supra note 205, at 88, 126-27.
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fies its five districts to equalize the population, but is able to rep-
licate the existing percentages exactly. The Department analyst
might decide that the 45% district in the old plan was an oppor-
tunity district because of its location, but the 45% district in the
proposed plan in a different location is not.212 Or suppose that one
of the existing districts is 55% black, and at the time of redistrict-
ing, the district's incumbent is black. The city dutifully protects
the incumbent, actually increasing the black percentage to 60%
at his behest, but in so doing it drops a 45% black district, where
the incumbent is white, to 40%. The Department analyst con-
cludes that the incumbent's district in the new plan would be an
"opportunity district" at 50% black, and the 45% black district in
the old plan was also an "opportunity district," albeit unfulfilled
to date. The Department thus insists that two opportunity dis-
tricts (as it defines them) be preserved, which can only be accom-
plished by reducing the black incumbent's district to 50%.213
All told, adopting "opportunity to elect" as a measure of influ-
ence gives the Department an open-ended, case-specific, highly
subjective basis to object. Given the Department's recent efforts
to maximize the number of blacks elected in covered jurisdictions,
one suspects that the "opportunity to elect" is just a different
route to get there. Ironically, rather than increasing white sup-
port for black candidates translating into "no need to engage in
race-based districting," the Department sees it as an opportunity
for "customized" racial manipulation, with the end game being an
increase in black elected officials. 214
212. A footnote to an explanation in the Guidelines hints at why information beyond
the census data, which "may not reflect significant differences in group voting behavior"
for the existing and proposed plans, must be provided. Guidelines, supra note 187, at
5413. The footnote explains that:
[a] redistricting plan may result in a significant, objectionable reduction of ef-
fective minority voting strength if it changes district boundaries to substitute
poorly-participating minority populations (for example, migrant worker hous-
ing or institutional populations) for active minority voters, even though the
minority percentages for the benchmark and proposed plans are similar
when measured by Census population data.
Id. at 5413 n.1.
213. If indeed this is the intent of the new Guidelines, the Department may find itself
at odds with minority office holders. It is a rare elected official who parts happily with re-
liable supporters, even to benefit a political ally! Moreover, the incumbent legitimately
may be concerned that dropping the minority percentage will encourage more white chal-
lengers-challengers who would not have liked the odds in a sixty percent minority dis-
trict.
214. "But for" the Department's notorious history, one might interpret the new guide-
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As if having retrogression decided by the number of "opportu-
nity districts" were not sufficiently subjective to permit the De-
partment to retain its de facto veto power, the Guidelines suggest
still greater subjectivity in the standard by their inclusion of "fac-
tors" that will be relevant to the preclearance determination.215
Indeed, these "factors" are exactly the same as those contained in
the long-standing Procedures for the Administration of Section
5-procedures under which the Department had not limited ob-
jections to changes that were retrogressive. 216 According to the
Guidelines:
These factors include whether minority voting strength is reduced by
the proposed redistricting; whether minority concentrations are
fragmented among different districts; whether minorities are over-
concentrated in one or more districts; whether available alternative
plans satisfying the jurisdictions's legitimate governmental interests
were considered; whether the proposed plan departs from objective
redistricting criteria set by the submitting jurisdiction, ignores other
relevant factors such as compactness and contiguity, or displays a
configuration that inexplicably disregards available natural or artifi-
cial boundaries; and whether the plan is inconsistent with the juris-
diction's stated redistricting standards.217
Among the enumerated factors, only reduction in minority vot-
ing strength appears to be tied to the number of minority oppor-
tunity districts-and then only if voting strength is defined as the
number of seats under the group's control.218 Inclusion of the ad-
ditional factors in the new Guidelines, which were formulated af-
lines more charitably. If the Department has in mind a "bright-line" measure of minority
influence in the existing plan but a location-specific substitute for influence in the new
plan in certain circumstances, section 5's "freezing principle" might well be respected with
less overbreadth than in the past and actually may reward more racially inclusive juris-
dictions. For example, if an existing plan's two majority black districts simply cannot be
maintained without extreme gerrymandering, the Department might nevertheless find a
new plan with fewer districts not retrogressive, so long as the submitting jurisdiction es-
tablishes that black voters are likely to elect their choices in at least two districts, despite
their lack of majority status. See discussion of "unavoidable retrogression," infra Part One,
I.E.5-6.
215. Guidelines, supra note 187, at 5413.
216. 28 C.F.R. § 51.59 (2001). The prior procedures refer to these factors as relevant to
the determination of "whether a submitted redistricting plan has the prohibited purpose
or effect." Id. (emphasis added). The new guidelines refer to the factors as relevant to
"whether or not a redistricting plan has a retrogressive purpose or effect." Guidelines, su-
pra note 187, at 5413 (emphasis added).
217. Guidelines, supra note 187, at 5413 (referencing 28 C.F.R. §§ 51.56-.59 (2001)).
218. Id. Some of the factors could be indicative of an intent to minimize minority influ-
ence that would have existed, had standard district criteria been followed, which would be
grounds for a traditional racial discrimination lawsuit.
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ter the Court confirmed retrogression as the only valid basis for a
section 5 objection,219 provides further evidence that the Depart-
ment's past practice of objecting to non-retrogressive changes will
continue, but will now be justified by a new definition of retro-
gression.
When the Supreme Court confronts the issue of what is to be
measured for retrogression, I predict that it will reject the De-
partment's subjective "opportunity district" test, as well as its in-
corporation of nebulous, unmeasurable "factors" into the pre-
clearance decision, and will adopt a test capable of objective
application. While there are many situations in which minorities
can elect candidates of their choice without comprising a majority
of a district's electorate, majority districts have the dual advan-
tages of placing the electoral outcome in the group's hands and
also of being readily identified, usually by merely consulting the
census data.2 ° With no loss of objectivity, districts in which the
group has elected a member of the group, regardless of its actual
percentages, could also be considered minority districts. Under
such a standard, "potential" would be preserved by retaining as
many genuine majority-minority districts as existed in the old
plan, and "demonstrated influence" would be preserved by retain-
ing, to the extent possible, districts in which the group has in fact
elected its choices. A more open-ended definition provides virtu-
ally no guidance to covered jurisdictions and leaves them more
than ever at the mercy of the Justice Department.
5. Modification of the Retrogression Standard for Unavoidable
Retrogression
It is a fair assumption that the economic prosperity of the past
decade has enabled many minority citizens to move out of histori-
cally minority neighborhoods into more racially integrated com-
219. The Guidelines were issued after the Courts decision in Bossier Parish II, 528
U.S. 320, 332 (2000), which held that the only intent that will trigger an objection under
section 5 is an intent to cause retrogression.
220. Depending on the circumstances, it may be necessary to consider the impact of
non-voting populations on whether the group is a genuine majority of the potential elec-
torate. A seventy percent majority black district, per the census, will not be majority black
in potential voters if most of the black population reported by the census as residing in the
district is housed in a prison. If this is the kind of adjustment to census data contemplated
by the footnote in the Guidelines, it is perfectly reasonable. See supra note 212. It is also
objectively verifiable information, generally available from the census itself.
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munities, which will mean that jurisdictions will have difficulty
maintaining their existing number of minority election dis-
tricts.221 The frenzy to create majority-minority districts nation-
wide after the 1990 Census-many of them in fact non-standard
districts, whether or not they were ever challenged as such-
potentially will add to the number of jurisdictions that will have
difficulty complying with section 5's non-retrogression stan-
dard.222 The Justice Department's recently released Guidelines
recognize that in some circumstances, retrogression cannot be
avoided.2' However, the limitations the Guidelines impose on
covered jurisdictions' options when confronting retrogression
driven by demographic changes appear to be inconsistent with
the admittedly limited case law.224
The Department's Guidelines indicate that if a retrogressive
plan is submitted, the jurisdiction must demonstrate that "a less-
retrogressive plan cannot reasonably be drawn."225 If the De-
partment concludes that a less retrogressive alternative plan ex-
ists, it will interpose an objection.226 It is in defining when a less
retrogressive plan "reasonably can be drawn" that the Guidelines
appear to part company with Supreme Court precedent. The
Guidelines indicate that some traditional districting standards
will have to be sacrificed to avoid retrogression.227 The Depart-
ment will not require greater deviation from population equality
than constitutionally permissible in congressional plans, and in
the case of state and local plans, it will not require deviations in
excess of ten percent to avoid retrogression. 22' Beyond that, the
Guidelines indicate that almost all other districting criteria must
be ignored if necessary to avoid retrogression or to make an un-
221. I will use "minority districts" as the measure of influence with the caveat that, as
indicated above, the term may mean one thing to the Justice Department and another to
the courts.
222. These districts will be particularly susceptible to population shifts. The more ir-
regular the district, and the more that irregularity correlates with race, the greater will be
the difficulty in maintaining its existing minority percentage without further gerryman-
dering.
223. Guidelines, supra note 187, at 5413.
224 Id. at 5412-13.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Id. This, of course, is hardly an indication of a new leniency. Section 5's statutory
scheme cannot require covered jurisdictions to engage in unconstitutional acts-such as
ignoring "one-person, one-vote."
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avoidably retrogressive plan less so.22 9 It will consider whether a
lack of geographic compactness of the minority population im-
pacts the ability to create a district but will examine the jurisdic-
tion's historic allegiance to "compactness" in evaluating whether
an alternative, less retrogressive, plan would deviate from the ju-
risdiction's practices."' If "compactness" is a standard generally
followed, such "compactness" may have to "give way to some de-
gree to avoid retrogression."231 A covered jurisdiction must ignore
other traditional districting criteria if necessary to avoid retro-
gression, including policies of "least change,"2 32 respect for politi-
cal subdivision boundaries, protection of incumbents, and preser-
vation of partisan balance.
It remains to be seen whether the Supreme Court will find the
Department's position on the degree to which standard districting
criteria must be ignored to avoid retrogression consistent with its
Shaw line of decisions. In terms of Supreme Court precedent, the
closest analogy to an "unavoidably retrogressive" redistricting
plan is presented by municipal annexations that result in a low-
ering of the minority's percentage of the municipality's electorate.
City of Richmond v. United States233 recognized that strict appli-
cation of the non-retrogression standard would obviously mean
that municipalities subject to section 5 either could not grow, or
would be required, as the price of annexation, to assign to the
black community "the same proportion of council seats as before,
hence perhaps permanently overrepresenting them and under-
representing other elements in the community."2 34 The Court re-
229. Id.
230. Id. A defense frequently offered in Shaw-type challenges for highly distorted mi-
nority districts was that they were no less compact than other districts in the plan. See,
e.g., Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 917 (1995) (finding race to be the predominate factor
causing a district's bizarre shape, despite the presence of other non-race-based districts
that were equally bizarre). In many situations, this argument was disingenuous because it
was the need to create minority districts, which could only be accomplished by ignoring
compactness, that had a ripple effect on the entire redistricting plan, inevitably resulting
in other non-compact districts. The Department should be accused of bootstrapping if it
uses a jurisdiction's partial abandonment of "compactness," done in response to the De-
partment's maximization pressure, to conclude that "compactness" is not among the juris-
diction's districting standards, and therefore, should not stand in the way of creating more
minority districts to avoid retrogression.
231. Guidelines, supra note 187, at 5413.
232. This means changing existing districts only so much as necessary to comply with
"one-person, one-vote."
233. 422 U.S. 358 (1975).
234. Id. at 371.
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jected these alternatives as consequences not intended by Con-
gress. 5 Rather, the Court held that annexations were entitled to
preclearance if the electoral system "fairly reflects the strength of
the [black] community" in the expanded city.23 6 The Court did not
define "fairly reflects," but in the case of City of Richmond, it was
satisfied by the fact that the percentage of majority black dis-
tricts was roughly the same as the black percentage of the elec-
torate in the expanded city.2
3 7
There is an indication in Bush v. Vera, 8 one of the Shaw prog-
eny cases, that a similar modification of the retrogression stan-
dard will be necessary when the state's failure to maintain the
number of minority districts cannot be attributed to the state's
own acts. In Vera, Texas argued that one of its bizarre majority
African- American districts was justified by the state's obligation
to maintain the district as one in which the group could elect its
choices-an objective that could only be accomplished by extend-
ing the district's boundaries to bring in geographically dispersed
minority population concentrations. 239 The Court rejected the ar-
gument, instead concluding that, "[nlonretrogression is not a li-
cense for the State to do whatever it deems necessary to insure
continued electoral success; it merely mandates that the minor-
ity's opportunity to elect representatives of its choice not be di-
minished, directly or indirectly, by the State's actions."240
This language, coupled with the actual outcome in Vera, im-
plies that when, as a result of demographic changes, a jurisdic-
tion faces either creating fewer minority districts in its proposed
plan than were in its existing plan, or engaging in substantial ra-
cial gerrymandering to maintain the status quo, it must opt for
the first alternative.
The precedential value of Vera's dictum for a modification of
the standard, however, is weakened because Texas went far be-
yond avoiding retrogression when it drew the challenged district.
African-Americans made up 40.8% of one district's 1980 popula-
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Id. at 372; see also the earlier discussion of City of Richmond, supra note 192.
238. 517 U.S. 952 (1996).
239. Id. at 961, 965-66.
240. Id. at 982 (third emphasis added).
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tion, but by 1990 their percentage had dropped to 35.1%.241 De-
spite their lack of majority status, African-Americans had elected
their candidates of choice, all of them African-Americans, in this
district over the previous two decades.242 However, rather than
simply maintain the existing minority percentage, Texas in-
creased the group's portion of the district's population to 50.9% in
the new plan, ostensibly to maintain the group's electoral control
of the district.243 It was not clear whether maintaining the group's
population at 35.1% or restoring it to its 1980 level of 40.8% (a
level that had been sufficient over the decade for the group to
control the district's electoral outcome) could have been accom-
plished without violating traditional districting standards.
The Court's decision in Abrams v. Johnson provides additional
support for a modification of the preclearance standard when it is
not possible, without extreme gerrymandering, to create the same
number of minority-controlled districts as are present in the ex-
isting plan. Abrams involved a congressional redistricting plan
produced by a federal court after Georgia's legislature had failed
to pass one.2  The lower court's plan contained a single majority-
black district,245 which challengers claimed made the plan retro-
gressive when compared with earlier plans.2 46 Ultimately the
Court rejected the benchmark plan chosen by the challengers but
went on to indicate that even if the challengers were correct that
the benchmark plan contained two majority black districts, they
were incorrect in their position that the lower court's plan re-
quired two districts.2 47 The lower court had concluded that it was
not possible to create a second majority-black district within
"constitutional bounds."2" The constitutional problem with a sec-
ond majority black district was that it could not be created with-
out subjugation of traditional districting criteria to race.249
241. Id. at 983.
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Abrams v. Johnson, 521 U.S. 74, 78 (1997).
245. Id. at 78-79.
246. Id. at 97.
247. Id. at 96.
248. Id. at 91, 96.
249. Id. at 91 (noting that the trial court found creation of a second majority black dis-
trict to "require subordinating Georgia's traditional districting policies and allowing race
to predominate").
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The clear import of the language in Abrams is that a plan sat-
isfies section 5's substantive standards if, for reasons beyond the
jurisdiction's control, it cannot maintain the existing number of
majority-minority districts as long as its plan "fairly reflects" the
present day voting strength of the minority group.250 While "fairly
reflects" remains undefined, the definition most consistent with
the cases would be one that requires a jurisdiction faced with un-
avoidable retrogression to create as many minority districts as
possible without violating traditional districting standards, up to
a number equal to either the group's share of the electorate or the
number of districts in the benchmark plan, whichever is smaller.
The seeming conflict between the Department's Guidelines and
dicta in Vera and Abrams disappears if the Guidelines simply
mean that certain of the jurisdiction's traditional criteria must be
elevated above others if necessary to avoid, or lessen, retrogres-
sion. Rarely will every district adhere equally to all districting
criteria.25' The traditional criterion most likely to aid the creation
of majority-minority districts is "recognition of communities of in-
terest."252 No conflict with traditional districting criteria is pre-
sented if a covered jurisdiction is required to create a district for
a minority community under circumstances where it could have
accommodated a non-racial "community of interest." Note, how-
ever, to be consistent with traditional districting standards, the
minority district must be one that would have been sensible had
it been created for a non-racial group. 3 Unfortunately, nothing
in the Department's prior performance indicates that the Guide-
lines will be so limited. While certainly incumbency protection
and partisan advancement must yield to avoid retrogression, and
while, arguably, the community of interest concept must be
stretched somewhat to accommodate minorities, it is likely that
250. See id. at 96. As with the statement in Vera, the Court's conclusion in Abrams is
dictum. Having concluded that the appropriate benchmark for measuring retrogression
was a plan containing only one majority black district, it was unnecessary for the Court to
address the issue of whether, had the benchmark plan contained two minority districts,
gerrymandering to avoid retrogression would have been justified. See id. at 96-97.
251. For example, to recognize an economic community of interest-say, a state's fish-
ing industry-the state might create a district that incorporates the coastal portions of
several counties, which is inconsistent with the traditional criterion that districts respect
political subdivision lines.
252. See infra Part Two, I.A.1.
253. Id. While respect for communities of interest is a traditional districting standard,
typically the "interest" underlying a community is one tied to a geographically identifiable
area, such as a neighborhood, a political subdivision, or a region.
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the Supreme Court will see jurisdictions as having crossed the
Shaw line if they use this concept as justification for creating
geographically distorted minority districts--even to avoid retro-
gression.
6. Mitigation of Unavoidable Retrogression
When a jurisdiction is unable to maintain the number of mi-
nority districts in its existing plan, it nevertheless must mitigate
retrogression to the extent reasonably possible.254 Just what will
constitute mitigation is unclear. For example, suppose that Afri-
can-American voters are a majority of two of a county's seven
commissioner districts and that both are significantly underpopu-
lated. Suppose further than the county cannot add the population
to the two districts necessary to comply with one-person, one-vote
and also maintain both as African-American majority districts.255
However, it can, consistent with traditional districting standards,
shift enough of the African-American population in one of the dis-
tricts to the other district to maintain its African-American ma-
jority. The other alternative is to keep both districts with sub-
stantial, but less than majority, African-American populations.
A bright line measure of minority influence, such as the num-
ber of majority-minority districts, seemingly would mean that the
first option (one majority African-American district rather than
none) would be the "less-retrogressive" alternative. However per-
haps in the limited circumstance where retrogression is inevita-
ble when measured by the number of majority-minority districts,
254. The Department's Guidelines are clear on this point. "If a retrogressive redistrict-
ing plan is submitted, the jurisdiction seeking preclearance of such a plan bears the bur-
den of demonstrating that a less-retrogressive plan cannot reasonably be drawn." Guide-
lines, supra note 187, at 5413. Seemingly, the Supreme Court would agree. As noted in the
previous section, where the Court and the Department may part company is over the de-
gree to which traditional districting standards must be ignored to avoid, or lessens, retro-
gression.
255. This is a very plausible scenario in 1990-era districts centered around historically
black neighborhoods, many of which will have lost significant population over the past
decade. Redrawing the district lines to add African-American population may be difficult.
Maintaining majority Hispanic districts often presents the reverse problem. Substantial
growth in the country's Hispanic population over the past decade may mean that majority
Hispanic districts are overpopulated. Typically, for Hispanics to constitute an actual ma-
jority of a district's potential electorate, they must be a supermajority of its population be-
cause many are not citizens. Retaining the group's supermajority status, while redrawing
the district to remove population, will be particularly difficult.
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the Department's more flexible measure, the "opportunity dis-
trict," is a better alternative. The measure of influence in the
baseline plan would still be the number of minority districts, ob-
jectively determined.2 6 The "opportunity district" would be sub-
stituted as the measure of influence in the proposed plan only if it
were clear than maintaining the existing number of actual minor-
ity districts would be impossible, or would be possible only by ex-
treme gerrymandering.2 The burden would be on the covered ju-
risdiction to establish that it had selected the less-retrogressive
option under the "opportunity district" standard. In the hypo-
thetical above, two districts with substantial, but not majority-
minority populations, would be the less-retrogressive option if it
appeared that the group would retain the ability to elect its
choices in both districts.
7. The Section 5 Test for Discriminatory Purpose
Section 5 also requires a covered jurisdiction to demonstrate
that it has not adopted a submitted election law change for a dis-
criminatory purpose. 9 In Reno v. Bossier Parish School Board
("Bossier Parish i!'), 2 o the Court held that the only "discrimina-
256. As noted above, the Justice Department Guidelines would use the number of op-
portunity districts as the measure of influence in both the baseline and the proposed
plans.
257. One could argue that the jurisdiction should always have the option to demon-
strate that a less-than-majority district would provide the same influence as a majority
one. The counter, and I believe better argument is that the danger of miscalculating fu-
ture voter behavior mandates that electoral outcomes be left solely in the hands of the mi-
nority group when possible. In most circumstances, a measure of influence based on cen-
sus data or other irrefutable evidence will provide the best balance between preservation
of minority influence and the covered jurisdictions' need for clear direction. Substitution of
the subjective opportunity district should be limited to circumstances where application of
an objective measure of influence will clearly lead to greater retrogression.
258. A recent article by three political scientists who sometimes serve as consultants
for the Justice Department contains suggestions for how to determine the percentage mi-
nority population necessary to provide an "opportunity district." See generally Bernard
Grofinan, Lisa Handley & David Lublin, Drawing Effective Minority Districts: A Concep-
tual Framework and Some Empirical Evidence, 79 N.C. L. REV. 1383 (2001). In my re-
sponse to these authors' observations, I argue, as I do here, that the opportunity district
standard should be employed only to mitigate retrogression. See generally Katharine Ing-
lis Butler, A Functional Analysis of Potential Voting Rights Act Liability May Demonstrate
that the Intentional Creation of Black Remedial Districts Cannot be Justified, 79 N.C. L.
REv. 1431 (2001).
259. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1994).
260. 528 U.S. 320 (2000).
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tory purpose" sufficient to support denial of preclearance was an
intent to bring about "retrogression"--in other words, an intent to
worsen the position of minorities.26' As with the retrogression
standard generally, the Court's rationale for this limitation
rested upon the limited purpose of section 5-to prevent backslid-
ing.262 An intent to perpetuate an existing discriminatory system
does not, reasoned the Court, make minorities worse off than
they were before the change.263
As the dissent in Bossier Parish II points out, the legal effect of
this rule is to make the "purpose" prong of section 5 superflu-
ous.21 It catches only those legislators who are inept in their ef-
forts, since if they had been successful in bringing about their
goal of retrogression, the plan would have been denied preclear-
ance under the Act's "effects" prong anyway. Moreover, it makes
sense under the majority's view of section 5 as an "anti-
backsliding" provision only if the jurisdiction has adopted a plan
with precisely the same impact on minorities as the plan it re-
places and only if all neutrally motivated plans would inevitably
result in an actual improvement in the group's electoral chances.
Otherwise, failing to preclear the plan provides no benefit to mi-
norities.
There is, perhaps, a sensible explanation for why Congress in-
cluded the "purpose" language in section 5, even though it ap-
pears to add virtually nothing to the prohibition on retrogressive
changes. First, in 1965 Congress likely envisioned section 5 as a
"fail-safe" provision to back up the stringent ballot access protec-
tions put into place by other parts of the Voting Rights Act. Sec-
ond, Congress could have been concerned that a law with a possi-
ble discriminatory effect might be precleared because it was not
possible to determine its actual impact on minorities prior to im-
plementation.2 65 Third, while freezing voter qualifications was its
261. Id. at 340.
262. Id. at 335.
263. Id.
264. See id. at 369 (Souter, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
265. Given the history of the jurisdictions covered by section 5, it was entirely possible
for a seemingly racially neutral, even sensible, limitation to turn out to have a negative
impact on black voters. For example, a new provision requiring that voters produce posi-
tive evidence of their identity-either their voter registration card or a photo identification
card-might not readily be viewed as having a discriminatory impact on minorities prior
to its implementation. Evidence that such a provision had been adopted because election
officials expected black voters, more so than white voters, to be uninformed about the re-
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likely objective, nothing in the legislative history suggests that
Congress had any particular standard in mind for when a change
would be discriminatory in purpose or effect.266 As the Court's
standards for "discriminatory effect" ultimately evolved, a theo-
retical discriminatory effect has been sufficient to merit an objec-
tion, thereby subsuming many changes that might have been
envisioned earlier as slipping through without a "purpose" prong
in the statute.267
Bossier Parish II means that submitting jurisdictions that re-
ceive Justice Department objections to non-retrogressive changes
have an excellent chance of prevailing, should they elect to take
the Department to court. Not only is the particular prohibited
discriminatory purpose very narrow, but the Court has also re-
jected as impermissible some of the circumstances in which the
Department has in the past inferred a discriminatory purpose.268
Less helpful to covered jurisdictions is the Court's conclusion in
Bossier Parish I that evidence of an election law change's dilutive
effect within the meaning of section 2 can be relevant to the in-
tent inquiry.269 The Court reasoned that a jurisdiction adopting a
dilutive change "is more likely to have acted with a[n] ... intent"
to worsen the position of minorities "than a jurisdiction whose
plan has no such impact."2 "0 The Court emphasized, however,
quirement, to misplace their registration card, and not to have photo identification, would
lead to the assumption that local officials were correct in their expectations of a racially
disparate impact.
266. In Bossier Parish II, the Court notes that many federal statutes contain the dual
prohibition on "purpose or effect." Bossier Parish II, 528 U.S. at 327. Arguably the only
logical reason to ban legislation adopted for a discriminatory purpose is to prevent a dis-
criminatory effect that may not be provable at the time the legislation is reviewed. These
laws seem to assume that the risk that the legislators' discriminatory purpose will in fact
be accomplished is sufficient reason to prevent implementation of the legislation.
267. See, e.g., City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156 (1980). Under both the old
and the new election laws in City of Rome, black voters needed considerable white support
to elect a candidate of their choice. Id. at 159-60. The slight increase in white support re-
quired under the new law was sufficient for the Court to find the change retrogressive. Id.
at 187. See also City of Port Arthur v. United States, 459 U.S. 159 (1982), discussed in
Butler, supra note 192, at 60-63.
268. For example, the Department has taken the position that failure to adopt a plan
favorable to minorities is evidence that the plan actually adopted was selected for the dis-
criminatory purpose of avoiding benefit to minorities. See Johnson v. Miller, 864 F. Supp.
1354, 1363-64 (S.D. Ga. 1994). The Court seemingly rejected this view in Miller v. John-
son, a Shaw progeny case, in which the Court indicated that a discriminatory purpose
could not be inferred merely because the jurisdiction failed to adopt "the plan with the
greatest number of majority black districts." Id.; see also Butler, supra note 192, at 31-32.
269. 520 U.S. 471, 489-90 (1997).
270. Id. at 487.
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that the dilutive impact of a plan is not dispositive of the exis-
tence of discrimination, because otherwise section 2's standard
effectively would be incorporated into section 5.2"' The Court fur-
ther noted the mere fact that a jurisdiction selected a more rather
than less dilutive plan is not dispositive of purpose, regardless of
whether the jurisdiction selected the more dilutive plan because
it better complied with traditional districting principles, or for no
reason at all. 2
It remains to be seen whether the Court's restrictive interpre-
tation of the purpose standard will have any practical impact on
the Department's preclearance decisions. The burden of proof on
lack of discriminatory intent is on the submitting jurisdiction. 3
Thus, the Justice Department is as free as ever to determine that
it is unable to conclude that the jurisdiction has met its burden of
proof on this issue. Indeed, while Bossier Parish 11 appears to
mean that a jurisdiction that takes the Department to court over
a non-retrogressive change will probably prevail, Bossier Parish I
gives the Department ample room to "be unconvinced" on the
purpose issue. Bossier Parish I specifically incorporates the stan-
dard for intent from Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing
Development Corp.,274 a key element of which is the degree to
which the law bears more heavily upon one race than another. 5
Bossier Parish I approves a "dilutive impact" under section 2 as a
"disparate impact."276 This "evidentiary use" of section 2 may ac-
tually give the Department greater license to object to non-
retrogressive changes than would incorporation of section 2 into
section 5's standard. The Department's regulations at least pur-
port to place on the "challenger" the burden of demonstrating
that a non-retrogressive change violated section 2.27' The burden
of proof of a lack of discriminatory purpose, however, remains
271. Id. at 485.
272. Id. at 488.
273. Id. at 478.
274. 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
275. Bossier Parish I, 520 U.S. at 488. The Arlington Heights factors include: (1) the
historical background of the decision; (2) the sequence of events leading up to the decision;
(3) any departures from the normal procedural sequence in adoption; and (4) the legisla-
tive or administrative history of the enactment, including contemporaneous statements by
members of the legislative body. Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 266-68.
276. Bossier Parish I, 520 U.S. at 489-90.
277. See Revision of Procedures for the Administration of Section 5 of the Voting
Rights Act of 1965, 52 Fed. Reg. 486, 487 (Jan. 6, 1987) ("[Ulnder Section 2 ... the com-
plainant shoulders the burden of proving that the proposed change is discriminating.").
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squarely on the covered jurisdiction, which the Department's re-
cent Guidelines emphasize: "If the jurisdiction has not provided
sufficient evidence to demonstrate that the plan was not intended
to reduce minority voting strength, either now or in the future,
the proposed redistricting plan is subject to a Section 5 objec-
tion."278
In summary, section 5's substantive standard, as interpreted
by the Supreme Court, does not impose a particularly onerous
burden in most circumstances. If, however, the Justice Depart-
ment adopts an interpretation of recent cases that permits it to
continue to demand outrageous racial gerrymandering as the
price for preclearance, many covered jurisdictions will be forced
to choose their poison: either incur the financial and political
costs of judicial preclearance or acquiesce in the Justice Depart-
ment's demands and hope that no one notices.
II. CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS ON RACE-BASED DISTRICTING
AFTER SHAW
The most important development in the law of redistricting
during the 1990s was the Supreme Court's much maligned, much
debated decision, Shaw v. Reno ("Shaw 1'), 279 which limited the
states' ability to engage in affirmative racial gerrymandering.
There is, of course, general agreement that the Constitution pro-
hibits using race to create election districts in order to limit the
representational interests of racial and ethnic minorities.28 0 How-
ever, Shaw supporters and Shaw detractors occupy very little
common ground on the more difficult question of when states may
use race to benefit minorities. There are two primary issues.
First, to what extent may, or must, a legislative body use race to
design its districting plan to favor minorities? Second, what
measures that are not per se "race-based" may it, or must it, take
for the underlying purpose of favoring minorities? The purpose of
278. Guidelines, supra note 187, at 5414.
279. 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
280. All agree that legislators are prohibited from engaging in negative racial gerry-
mandering (deviating from race-neutral districting standards to disadvantage minority
voters). For example, legislators cannot create a bizarrely shaped district to avoid creating
a district that naturally would be majority-minority. Nor can they divide political subdivi-
sions for the purpose of limiting minority influence, if otherwise the subdivision would
have been left whole.
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this section is to examine how the Shaw doctrine, regardless of
its merits, limits states' redistricting options. Line drawers must
be aware that unanswered Shaw-related questions obscure the
safe path to a federally acceptable districting plan. These ques-
tions, and their tentative answers, are discussed in Part Two.
A. The Extreme Measures Legislators Took to Create Majority-
Minority Districts Precipitated the Court's Decision in Shaw
In the redistricting that followed the 1990 Census, an odd coa-
lition of civil rights groups and the Republican National Commit-
tee joined with local minority legislators to pressure legislative
bodies to adopt majority-minority election districts.28' The pres-
sure was backed by a widespread belief that both section 2 and
section 5 of the Voting Rights Act required minority-controlled
districts, even if they could only be created by ignoring traditional
districting standards.
Justice Department lawyers, who applied the most compelling
pressure, let it be known that redistricting plans would not be
precleared unless covered jurisdictions created as many minority
controlled districts as possible.282 Although the Department's
"maximization" policy was not supported and indeed was directly
contradicted by decisions of the Supreme Court,283 most covered
jurisdictions probably acquiesced rather than incur the expense
of judicial preclearance. 4
281. See Adam Pertman, GOP, Minorities Find Common Ground on Gains Through
House Redistricting, BOSTON GLOBE, May 26, 1992, at NI; Jack Quinn et al., Redrawing
Political Maps: An America of Groups?, WASH. POST, Mar. 24, 1991, at Cl; Abigail M.
Thernstrom, A Republican-Civil Rights Conspiracy, Working Together on Legislative Re-
apportionment, WASH. POST, Sept. 23, 1991, at All. Republicans, who, philosophically,
might have opposed affirmative racial gerrymandering, likely realized that they would be
the beneficiaries of a policy that concentrated black voters into fewer and fewer districts,
leaving behind overwhelmingly white (and often, therefore, majority Republican) districts.
White Democrats, likely to be the big losers, probably could not oppose these districts and
retain black voter support, which was arguably central to the party's political fortunes.
282. See, e.g., Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 913 (1996); Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900,
917-18, 924-25 (1995).
283. As the earlier discussion of section 5 indicates, "maximization" is absolutely in-
consistent with the retrogression standard of Beer. See supra Part One, I.E.1. Note the
Courtis observation in Miller: "The Justice Department's maximization policy seems quite
far removed from [the retrogression policy]." Miller, 515 U.S. at 926.
284. The judicial preclearance option, a traditional declaratory judgment action in the
District of Columbia court, involves standard, protracted, adversarial litigation against
the resource-rich, politically insulated Justice Department. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1994).
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While pressure from the Justice Department and others to cre-
ate minority-controlled districts was hardly new, all restraints
were abandoned after the 1990 Census. Emboldened by recent
success under amended section 2, and aided by a more localized
census285 and improved districting software, proponents of minor-
ity districts pushed for and received a total abandonment of state
districting standards when necessary to achieve their goals.
286
The press picked up some of the more extreme products of this ef-
fort, which led to public scrutiny and eventually to lawsuits.8 7
B. Shaw v. Reno Holds that Race-Based Districting Must Be
"Narrowly Tailored" to Meet a "Compelling State Interest"
In Shaw 1,28 the first of the affirmative racial gerrymandering
cases to reach the Court, white voters alleged that North Caro-
lina had ignored all standard districting criteria in order to create
two majority black congressional districts, one of which was the
infamous "interstate" district created by connecting pockets of
black population together along a 160-mile stretch of interstate
highway."9 The plaintiffs alleged that the state had deliberately
Perhaps as unattractive as the expense, however, is the fact that while its preclearance
action is pending, the jurisdiction does not have a constitutional districting plan in place
by which elections can be conducted. If elections are scheduled in the near future, some
group typically brings suit, requesting that a local federal court provide a temporary dis-
tricting plan to permit the scheduled elections to go forward. Once suit is filed, legislators
may find that they have lost control of the line drawing process temporarily, or even per-
manently. New legislators elected under the court's interim plan may decide to abandon
the preclearance effort, leaving in place indefinitely the court's remedial plan, which (they
reason) must be an exemplary plan, since it led to their election.
285. Prior to the 1990 Census, population outside of urbanized areas was reported only
for fairly large geographic areas known as enumeration districts. See BUREAU OF CENSUS,
U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, 1990 CENSUS OF POPULATION AND HOUSING GUIDE: PART A,
TEXT 59 (1992) [hereinafter CENSUS GUIDE]. More detail was available in urban areas,
where the Census Bureau reported the population by block. See id. In 1990, the Bureau
reported the population for every closed polygon in the United States, producing more
than seven million blocks, in contrast to the 2.5 million from the 1980 Census. See id.
286. See sources cited supra note 281.
287. See, e.g., Phil Duncan, House May Gain Non-white Members Under Redistricting,
STAR TRIB. (Minn.), Jan. 26, 1992, at 10A; Quinn et al., supra note 281; David Saffell,
Draw the Line on Gerrymandering, CmH. TRIB., May 27, 1993, at 31N; Michael Tomasky,
Out-of-bounds Lines? All the Marks of Multicultural Gerrymandering, HARPER'S MAG.,
Mar. 1992, at 56; John C. Von Gieson & Mike Oliver, How District Shapes Up, ORLANDO
SENTINEL, June 7, 1992, at G4. Graphics of some of these districts appear in Katharine I.
Butler, Commenti A National Survey of Regional Redistricting Approaches, The Voting
Rights Act and the Politics of Redistricting and Changing Boundaries, Changing Voices,
America's Political Future, 6 LA RAZA L.J. 50, 57 (1993).
288. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993) [hereinafter Shaw l].
289. Id. at 635-36.
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segregated voters into separate election districts on the basis of
race.29 The lower court dismissed the complaint, holding that
race-based districting to benefit a minority group is not per se
unconstitutional.29' The lower court found that white votes were
not diluted as a consequence of the creation of a small number of
majority black districts and that, at any rate, the state's action
was necessary to comply with the Voting Rights Act.292
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the plaintiffs had
stated a valid Equal Protection claim when they alleged that
North Carolina's reapportionment plan could not be rationally
"understood as anything other than an effort to separate voters
into different districts on the basis of race, and that the separa-
tion lacks sufficient justification."293 The relevant line of constitu-
tional authority, the Court said, was that of Brown v. Board of
Education.294 In Brown, the Court held that the state's use of race
to classify and assign citizens was presumptively invalid and
thus subject to strict scrutiny.295 Racial classification, with its
special harms, was the injury; no further injury needed to be al-
leged. The Shaw Court explained that joining geographically dis-
persed voters in the same district solely because they have the
same skin color "bears an uncomfortable resemblance to political
apartheid."296 It "reinforces the perception that" racial group
status determines interests and behavior, an "impermissible ra-
cial stereotype" that retards the progress of a multiracial democ-
racy.297 Moreover, it "undermine[s] our system of representative
democracy by signaling to elected officials that they represent a
particular racial group rather than their constituency as a
whole."29 Thus, there is no constitutional immunity for state-
based action that favors minorities. "Indeed," the Court wrote,
290. Id.
291. Shaw v. Barr, 808 F. Supp. 461, 472-73 (E.D.N.C. 1992), rev'd sub nom. Shaw v.
Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
292. Id.
293. Shaw l, 509 U.S. at 649.
294. Id. at 643-44 (citing Brown v. Bd. of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954)).
295. Brown, 347 U.S. at 393-95.
296. Shaw I, 509 U.S. at 647.
297. Id.
298. Id. at 650.
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"racial classifications receive close scrutiny even when they may
be said to burden or benefit the races equally."299
The Court concluded that if the plaintiffs' racial gerrymander-
ing claims remained uncontradicted on remand, the district court
would be required to determine whether North Carolina's use of
race in the plan was "narrowly tailored to further a compelling
state interest."00 To rely on the need to comply with section 5 as
a compelling interest, the state had to demonstrate that it had
not made greater use of race than was necessary to avoid retro-
gression."' The Court left open the possibility that either the
need to avoid section 2 liability or the desire to neutralize the im-
pact of racially polarized voting on minority candidates could con-
stitute a compelling interest.
0 2
Although the views of the four dissenting Justices, each of
whom wrote an opinion, differed in some respects, the key factor
that distinguished them from the majority was their perception of
the claim. The majority saw the case as one involving the state's
use of race to classify and assign citizens, which therefore meant
the claim should be evaluated by the standards of cases such
Brown v. Board of Education, Gomillion v. Lightfoot,3 3 and City
of Richmond v. Croson.304 According to the majority, assigning
citizens to voting districts on the basis of race represented just
one more example of race-based state action that should be sub-
jected to strict scrutiny.0 5
The dissenting Justices, however, saw the case as one involving
the state's choice of election structure, which in their view should
be controlled by the Court's racial vote dilution cases, Whitcomb,
White, and Bolden. °6 Plaintiffs claiming to have been injured by
the state's selection of the election structure, including its crea-
299. Id. at 651.
300. Id. at 658.
301. Id. at 654-55.
302. See id. at 655-56.
303. 364 U.S. 339 (1960) (holding that the City of Tuskegee, Alabama, violated the
Constitution when it redrew its municipal boundaries to exclude all of its black citizens
while retaining within the city all of its white citizens).
304. 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (holding unconstitutional a city ordinance setting aside a per-
centage of the city's contracts for minority contractors).
305. Shaw l, 509 U.S. at 658.
306. Id. at 659-65 (White, J., dissenting); id. at 680-81 (Souter, J., dissenting); see the
discussion of these cases, supra Part One, I.B.
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tion of specific election districts, must demonstrate that the "po-
litical processes.., were not equally open to ... [their participa-
tion in that they] had less opportunity than did other residents in
the district to participate in the political processes and to elect
legislators of their choice.' 3 °7 In an opinion joined by Justices
Stevens and Blackmun, Justice White argued that plaintiffs un-
able to establish both discriminatory purpose and effect simply
had no claim. °8 These Justices would not agree that North Caro-
lina had segregated the voters by using their race to assign them
to election districts,0 9 but, they argued, even if that term were
appropriate, plaintiffs were still required to demonstrate that
their political influence was thereby diluted.310
C. Subsequent Cases Clarify Shaw's Holding
1. Miller v. Johnson
In its first post-Shaw I decision, Miller v. Johnson,31" ' the Court
rejected Georgia's argument that its congressional redistricting
plan should not have been subjected to strict scrutiny because the
district at issue was not so bizarre as to be unexplainable on non-
racial grounds. 12 The Court wrote that it is not bizarre districts,
but rather the use of race for its own sake that offends the Con-
stitution.313 The bizarre shape of the district is merely "persua-
307. Shaw I, 509 U.S. at 661 (White, J., dissenting) (quoting White v. Regester, 412
U.S. 755, 766 (1973)).
308. Id. at 666-67.
309. Id. at 671 n.7.
310. Id. at 671. Justice Stevens dissented for the additional reason that, in his view, it
was constitutionally permissible for the state to create districts for the purpose of facilitat-
ing the election of members of any identifiable underrepresented group. Id. at 676 (Ste-
vens, J., dissenting). The state routinely draws boundaries to provide for representation of
rural voters, so why not minority voters? In his view, it was immaterial that districts for
minorities were created using non-standard districts because there is no constitutional
requirement that states follow traditional districting requirements. He lamented that "Af-
rican-Americans may now be the only group to which it is unconstitutional to offer specific
benefits from redistricting." Id. at 679 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Justice Souter was of the opinion that a state's decision to create a district "for" minori-
ties is distinguishable from its decision to take other affirmative action because a state
must consider race when redistricting to avoid problems with the Voting Rights Act. He
argued that there were no victims because no one was denied representation merely by his
placement in a particular district. Id. at 681-82 (Souter, J., dissenting).
311. 515 U.S. 900 (1995).
312. Id. at 913-14.
313. Id.
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sive circumstantial evidence that race for its own sake... was
the legislature's dominant and controlling rationale in drawing
its district lines."31 The lower court properly concluded that the
plaintiff had, through other evidence, carried its burden to estab-
lish that the state had subordinated traditional districting prin-
ciples to racial concerns.315
The Court then rejected Georgia's argument that its race-based
districts were justified by its need to obtain section 5 preclear-
ance. The Court concluded that the Department improperly re-
jected the state's prior two plans-plans that in fact satisfied the
substantive standards for section 5 without including the chal-
lenged district. The Justice Department's unauthorized pressure
for an additional black district could not insulate the plan from
constitutional challenge. Thus, the Court refused to find the need
to comply with "whatever preclearance mandates the Justice De-
partment issues""' to be a compelling state interest. To do so,
said the Court, would be to surrender to the Executive Branch
the Court's duty to enforce constitutional limits on race-based ac-
tion. To rely on the Voting Rights Act, the state must demon-
strate that its use of race was in fact required by a correct read-
ing of the Act.317
The same five Justices from the Shaw majority made up the
Miller majority, but Justice O'Connor wrote a short concurrence
to explain her view that the state may appropriately consider
race in the districting process. Strict scrutiny is triggered only if
"the State has relied on race in substantial disregard of custom-
ary and traditional districting practices."31 Justice O'Connor's
position on this point ultimately prevails because it is more ac-
ceptable to the four dissenting Justices than the view of the re-
maining majority Justices that "any use of race triggers strict
scrutiny."319
314 Id. at 913.
315. Id. at 910-11. There was little dispute that Georgia had adopted the challenged
plan to satisfy the Justice Department's demands, which the Court labeled a "black-
maximization" policy. Id. at 921. When necessary to make the district majority black,
Georgia ignored its objective districting standards and used racial data instead. Id.
316. Id. at 922.
317. Id. at 921-22.
318. Id. at 928 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
319. In Miller, Justices Souter and Stevens were joined in dissent by Justices Ginsburg
and Breyer, who replaced Justices Blackmun and White aier Shaw. Justice Stevens filed
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2. Bush v. Vera and Shaw v. Hunt
The next two cases, Bush v. Vera.2° and Shaw v. Hunt (Shaw
1/),321 were argued together, and the Court released the opinions
at the same time. The lower court in Vera found three highly ir-
regular majority-minority Texas congressional districts to be ra-
cial gerrymanders not narrowly tailored to satisfy a compelling
state interest.322 On very similar facts, the Shaw H lower court
concluded that North Carolina's two majority black congressional
districts were race-based but were narrowly tailored to satisfy the
state's compelling interest in complying with the Voting Rights
Act. 23 Both lower courts rendered their decisions without the
benefit of the Supreme Court's decision in Miller.
a. The Cases in the Lower Courts
The difference in outcomes in the lower courts was attributable
to the two courts' differing understandings of Shaw I rather than
to any significant differences in the circumstances surrounding
the challenged districts. The Shaw II lower court saw the Su-
preme Court as having created a new claim in voting rights juris-
prudence-a claim that the state had separated voters into dif-
ferent districts on the basis of race without sufficient
justification.124 The Vera lower court, however, saw Shaw I as a
an opinion essentially reiterating his views expressed in Shaw and chastised the Court for
failing to articulate the injury its "newly minted" claim was designed to address. He
pointed out that unlike true segregation, which frustrated the public interest in diversity,
the challenged district promoted diversity by increasing the chances that a black repre-
sentative would be added to the legislative debate. Id. at 929-38 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Justice Ginsburg delivered a separate dissent, joined in part by Justices Stevens, Breyer,
and Souter. She wrote that Georgia had not given too much weight to race in its balancing
of the myriad factors relevant to redistricting. She determined that the end product was
not all that irregular, and many considerations went into its boundaries. Moreover, re-
spect for communities of shared interests is a districting principle, and ethnicity is a well
documented basis for shared interests. Ultimately, Justice Ginsburg agreed with Justice
Stevens that race-based action to benefit minorities cannot be equated with race-based
state action that harms them. She noted that the white majority did not need special pro-
tection from the actions of its legislators. Id. at 933-49 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
320. 517 U.S. 952 (1996).
321. 517 U.S. 899 (1996) [hereinafter Shaw III (an appeal from the lower court's deci-
sion in Shaw I after remand).
322. Vera v. Richards, 861 F. Supp. 1304, 1345 (S.D. Tex. 1994), affd sub nom. Bush v.
Vera, 517 U.S. 952 (1996).
323. Shaw v. Hunt, 861 F. Supp. 408, 475 (E.D.N.C. 1994), rev'd, 517 U.S. 899 (1996).
324. Shaw, 861 F. Supp. at 471.
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standard application of the Equal Protection principle that the
state should not make decisions that classify citizens by race.325
Thus, the lower court in Shaw 11 looked for sufficient justifica-
tion and found it in North Carolina's belief that any plan not con-
taining two majority black congressional districts would violate
section 2 or section 5 or both.326 The court concluded that compact
majority-minority districts would not have provided for effective
African-American majorities.327 Moreover, one irregular majority
black district was made up of urban population and the other of
rural population, which the court saw as an additional positive
feature not available in majority black districts that adhered to
traditional districting criteria. 28 The lower court further con-
cluded that the state's use of race was narrowly tailored because
the districts were not "overly" majority black. Two such districts
were not excessive; no quota was involved, but two seats out of
twelve was close to the group's twenty-two percent of the popula-
tion; the race-based remedy was temporary in that it would exist
only until the next census; and no other group suffered vote dilu-
tion. 9 Moreover, the relevance of standard districting criteria
was merely evidence of racial gerrymandering. Once the use of
race was justified, standard districting criteria played no further
role because the criteria was not, in the Shaw Court's view, es-
sential to the goal of "fair and effective representation to all citi-
zens."
330
On similar facts, the lower court in Vera concluded that the
three minority districts actually created were not required by a
correct reading of section 5's substantive standard, and, if minor-
ity districts in fact were required to address concerns about sec-
tion 2 liability, the districts produced were not narrowly tailored
to achieve that end.33' It disagreed with the lower Shaw II court's
position that the state's failure to follow standard districting cri-
teria was merely evidence of racial gerrymandering. The lower
Vera court's view was that race-based districts would be narrowly
325. Vera, 861 F. Supp. at 1338-39.
326. Shaw, 861 F. Supp. at 474.
327. Id. at 475.
328. Id.
329. Id.
330. Id.
331. Vera v. Richards, 861 F. Supp. 1304, 1333-34 (S.D. Tex. 1994), affd sub noma.
Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952 (1996).
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tailored to comply with the Voting Rights Act only if the state fol-
lowed traditional districting criteria in the process, which the
court saw as a "concomitant part of truly 'representative' single
member district plans. "332
b. The States' Arguments on Appeal
Both states changed their arguments in the Supreme Court
based on the Court's post-trial decision in Miller. Picking up on
Justice O'Connor's controlling position that standard districts do
not trigger strict scrutiny, the states argued that the challenged
districts were in fact consistent with their own districting stan-
dards."3 Texas took the novel position that its foremost district-
ing principles were to seek partisan advantage and to protect in-
cumbents.334 It routinely ignored compactness and respect for
political subdivisions when necessary to further these "higher"
principles. 35 The states contended that it was not possible to cre-
ate compact minority districts and protect incumbents. Thus, the
bizarre districts resulted from an attempt to protect incumbents,
not minorities.336 North Carolina argued that it had, in fact, con-
sidered most traditional districting criteria, such as respecting
communities of interest, protecting incumbents, and partisan ad-
vancement when it created the two challenged districts. 337 The
only criteria it ignored were compactness and respect for political
subdivision lines, which the district court had found did not ad-
versely affect fair representation for all the state's citizens.338
Because Miller effectively undercut the states' reliance on sec-
tion 5 to justify their bizarre districts, both of them also argued
that their use of race was justified by a compelling state interest
in avoiding section 2 liability.339 Further, the states asserted that
the presence of geographically compact, politically cohesive mi-
332. Id. at 1334 n.43.
333. Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 960; Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 909 (1996).
334. Vera, 517 U.S. at 975.
335. Id. at 981.
336. Id. The district court's finding made this argument dubious at best. While ac-
knowledging that incumbency protection added to the bizarre boundaries of the chal-
lenged districts, the court concluded that all other concerns were secondary to maintain-
ing minorities as a specific percentage of the district's populations. Id.
337. Shaw II, 517 U.S. at 907.
338. Id.
339. Vera, 517 U.S. at 980; Shaw II, 517 U.S. at 911.
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nority groups within the general area of the challenged districts
(whose electoral choices would be defeated in districts in which
the groups were a minority) compelled the state's creation of ma-
jority-minority districts.34 ° These districts were then structured to
also accommodate the state's other interests in incumbency pro-
tection and partisan advancement.34'
c. Shaw II in the Supreme Court
In Shaw II, the Supreme Court reversed the lower court's deci-
sion.342 The Court agreed that strict scrutiny was properly ap-
plied and turned its attention to whether any of the compelling
interests put forward could justify the state's use of race and, if
so, whether the use was narrowly tailored to satisfy the inter-
est.31 The need to comply with section 5 was easily eliminated
because the Court found that the state's earlier non-
gerrymandered plans to which the Attorney General had objected
without the gerrymandered districts, satisfied the provision's
non-retrogression standard.3 '4 The Court assumed arguendo that
compliance with section 2 would be a compelling state interest
340. Vera, 517 U.S. at 980; Shaw II, 517 U.S. at 911.
341. Vera, 517 U.S. at 980; Shaw II, 517 U.S. at 911. This argument was also dubious.
In Vera, the lower court specifically found that the challenged districts were bizarre be-
cause otherwise they would not be majority black or Hispanic. There was no evidence that
compact minority districts could have been created and that bizarre districts were drawn
instead to accomplish partisan or other political goals. Vera v. Richards, 861 F. Supp.
1304, 1344 (S.D. Tex. 1994), affd sub nom. Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952 (1996). At oral ar-
gument in Shaw II, North Carolina was unable to identify any plan in the record with two
compact minority districts, and the United States, which intervened on behalf of the state,
conceded that compact minority districts could not be produced. Vera, 517 U.S. at 899.
342. Justice Rehnquist provided the opinion, which was joined without further elabora-
tion by the other members of the Shaw I and Miller majorities. Justice Stevens filed a dis-
senting opinion, which was joined in part by Justices Ginsburg and Breyer, who also
joined Justice Souter's separate dissenting opinion. The Court reached the merits only as
to District Twelve because none of the plaintiffs resided in District One, the other chal-
lenged district, and thus no party to the suit had standing to challenge District One. Id. at
900; see United States v. Hays, 515 U.S. 737 (1995).
343. Shaw II, 517 U.S. at 906-07. The Court agreed with the lower court that race was
the predominant consideration in the way the challenged districts were drawn. "Race was
the criterion that, in the State's view, could not be compromised; respecting communities
of interest and protecting Democratic incumbents came into play only after the race-based
decision had been made." Id. at 907.
344. Id. at 911.
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but concluded that the challenged district was not narrowly tai-
lored to accomplish that objective.345
The Supreme Court rejected the lower court's position that
once potential section 2 liability was found, the state could use
race to produce a remedial district without regard to whether the
compact minority was actually in the district.346 The Court indi-
cated, "[wie do not see how a district so drawn without regard to
the geographically compact minority population] would avoid § 2
liability."347 The Court went on to explain that a section 2 claim
belonged solely to the individuals who were part of the politically
cohesive, geographically compact minority that could benefit from
a standard compact district. The creation of a non-compact dis-
trict for other minorities somewhere else in the jurisdiction did
not address their claim. Consequently, the challenged district
was not narrowly tailored to further the state's interest in avoid-
ing section 2 liability.3"
The Court also indicated that the state's interest in remedying
the effects of past or present discrimination might, in a proper
case, justify its remedial use of race. To constitute a compelling
interest, however, it was necessary that the state first identify
the discrimination with specificity; "generalized" past discrimina-
tion was insufficient.349 Second, the state had to have a strong ba-
sis for believing that remedial action was necessary before, not
after, it embarked on an affirmative action plan. The Court noted
that North Carolina could not rely on this justification because
the district court had found that "remedying past discrimination"
had not actually precipitated the use of race in the districting
plan.350
d. Vera in the Supreme Court
The five Justice Shaw-Miller majority splintered in Vera, pro-
ducing three opinions. Justice O'Connor authored the plurality
opinion, but it is her separate concurring opinion that resolves a
345. Id. at 914-15.
346. Id. at 916-17.
347. Id. at 917.
348. Id.
349. Id. at 909.
350. Id. at 910.
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number of issues.35' Her views, while not endorsed by the dissent-
ing Justices, will be more palatable to them than the views of the
remaining Justices who voted to reverse the lower court.35 2 Set
out below are the issues seemingly resolved by Vera, either by
virtue of majority support, or by a combination of Justice
O'Connor's position expressed in her concurring opinion and the
anticipated future support of the four dissenting Justices.
(1) Strict scrutiny applies only when challengers establish that
traditional districting criteria have been subjugated to racial con-
cerns so that intentionally created majority-minority districts that
otherwise comply with standard districting criteria are immune
from strict scrutiny.
The use of race in districting does not alone trigger strict scru-
tiny, nor does the failure to follow standard districting criteria.
Rather, strict scrutiny is triggered only when traditional district-
ing criteria have been subordinated to race. This potentially im-
portant proposition is clearly dictum-no one could possibly have
viewed the districts at issue in Vera as "otherwise complying with
traditional districting criteria." However, absent a change in the
make-up of the Court, it appears that race-based districts that
otherwise comply with traditional districting criteria will escape
strict scrutiny. It is likely therefore that a district created for a
minority group under any theory by which such a district could
have been created for a non-minority group escapes strict scru-
tiny.
(2) When mixed motives are present, it must be race-and not
other legislative concerns-that causes the challenged district to
deviate from traditional districting criteria.
Race must be the predominant factor causing a deviation from
traditional criteria. Race for its own sake, and not some other dis-
tricting concern, must have been the legislature's dominant and
351. See Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 990-95 (1996) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
352. When a fragmented court decides a case, with no single rationale enjoying major-
ity support, "the holding of the Court may be viewed as that position taken by those Mem-
bers who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds." Gregg v. Georgia, 428
U.S. 153, 169 n.15 (1976). In Vera, Justice O'Connor filed an opinion joined by Justice
Kennedy and the Chief Justice. Vera, 517 U.S. at 956. Justice Thomas, joined by Justice
Scalia, filed an opinion concurring in the judgment. Id. at 999 (Thomas, J., concurring).
Justices Stevens and Souter filed dissenting opinions, both of which were joined by Jus-
tices Ginsburg and Breyer. Id. at 1003 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 1045 (Souter, J., dis-
senting).
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controlling rationale. Thus, if districting criteria were overridden
by concerns for incumbency protection or partisan advancement,
strict scrutiny does not apply.
353
Justice O'Connor's position as to when race will be viewed as
having predominated contains an important caveat-one with
which the remaining members of the majority would agree. When
race is used as a proxy to accomplish some other objective, such
as incumbency protection or partisan gerrymandering, and as a
result a non-standard district is produced, race will be viewed as
having predominated. Presumably, Justice O'Connor would con-
clude that race has not "predominated" if a compact minority
formed the core of a district, but the district was then distorted to
separate incumbents without any further use of race. 4
(3) The need to comply with the Voting Rights Act and the de-
sire to remedy the effects of past discrimination provide "compel-
ling state interests," which may justify race-based districts.
Justice O'Connor and the four dissenting Justices also supply
majority support for the proposition that a jurisdiction subject to
section 5 has a compelling interest in avoiding retrogression and
that all jurisdictions have a compelling interest in avoiding sec-
tion 2 liability.3 5
As the Court's response to the "need to comply with Section 5"
rationale in both Vera and Shaw 11 demonstrates, a mere incan-
tation of the "Voting Rights Act made us do it" will not suffice.
The "need" must arise from a correct interpretation of the law.
There also must be strong basis for the belief that race-based re-
353. The dissenting Justices did not join Justice O'Connor's opinion because they did
not agree that race had determined the bizarre lines of the challenged districts at issue,
and consequently they would not have applied strict scrutiny. Id. at 1004 (Stevens, J., dis-
senting). In future cases, however, these dissenters are likely to find Justice O'Connor's
position more palatable than that of Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Kennedy, who would
have found the matter of strict scrutiny resolved by the state's admission that it had in-
tentionally created a majority-minority district, which would not have existed "but for its
affirmative use of racial demographics." Id. at 1002 (Thomas, J., concurring).
354. For example, suppose that a compact minority population constitutes a majority
in a district to which a particular incumbenfs residence has been "added" by a "tentacle,"
and from which another incumbent's residence has been "excluded" by a finger-like projec-
tion of the adjacent district in the minority district. In that case, standard districting cri-
teria laws have been ignored but not subordinated to race.
355. The remaining Vera majority Justices "assume without deciding" that section 2 is
a compelling interest and appear to agree that avoiding retrogression is a compelling state
interest for covered jurisdictions. Id. at 979.
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medial action is necessary, which in the case of section 2, means
strong evidence of the presence of the three Gingles precondi-
tions. A "strong basis" can take many forms, but the state may
not "rely on generalized assumptions about the prevalence of ra-
cial bloc voting."356 Subject to the limitations discussed in Shaw
II, the Court would also recognize a compelling state interest in
remedying past discrimination.
(4) The State's race-based districting must be narrowly tailored
to satisfy its compelling state interest.
Once past the disagreement among the Justices over whether
strict scrutiny is to be applied to affirmative racial gerrymander-
ing, and, if so, under what circumstances, all appear to agree that
a compelling state interest can justify the use of race. However,
the use must be narrowly tailored to make no further use of race
than necessary to satisfy the interest.
If a strong basis in evidence exists to fear section 2 liability, the
state is permitted "a limited degree of leeway" in furthering its
compelling interest to avoid such liability."7 Thus, if there is in
fact a "compact minority" satisfying the first precondition (and
the other two Gingles preconditions are also present), a race-
based district "addressing the violation" satisfies strict scrutiny
even if it is not the most compact district possible: "A § 2 district
that is reasonably compact and regular, taking into account tradi-
tional districting principles such as maintaining communities of
interest and traditional boundaries, may pass strict scrutiny
without having to defeat rival compact districts designed by
plaintiffs' experts in endless 'beauty contests.' 358 Flexibility is
permitted, but is not limitless. A district drawn to avoid section 2
liability "must not subordinate traditional districting principles
to race substantially more than is 'reasonably necessary' to avoid
§ 2 liability."359
356. Vera, 517 U.S. at 994 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
357. Id. at 977.
358. Id.
359. Id. at 979. In the final part of the article, I will address the possible significance of
the difference between Justice O'Connor's separate, broader position that "standard" ma-
jority-minority districts are not subject to strict scrutiny at all and the view of the conser-
vative Justices that such districts can survive strict scrutiny if they are in fact necessary
to avoid section 2 liability. See discussion infra Part Two, I.A.4.
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(5) Application of the announced principles to the challenged
districts.
An examination of how the Court arrived at its ultimate con-
clusion that the challenged districts were unconstitutional is
helpful for understanding the decision's implications.
i. Strict scrutiny applied because, while mixed motives were
present, race was the predominant factor that produced the non-
traditional districts. The lower Vera court had found that: (1) the
state had substantially neglected traditional districting criteria;
(2) that it was committed from the outset to creating the major-
ity-minority districts; and (3) that it manipulated district lines to
exploit racial data.36° The plurality concluded that none of these
factors standing alone were sufficient to trigger strict scrutiny,
but that when combined were sufficient to merit further exami-
nation of what role race played in relation to other factors in the
production of the districts at issue.36' If race-neutral incumbency
protection or race-neutral political gerrymandering predominated
over race, strict scrutiny would not be appropriate. Likewise, if
the district lines were best explained by "respect for communities
of interest," this would weaken the claim that race predominated.
The determination of whether the predominate influence in the
production of any of the districts was race would require a dis-
trict-by-district evaluation.362
The plurality then examined the lower court's findings that re-
lated to the factors producing each district and ultimately agreed
with its conclusion that race was the predominate factor in the
drawing of all three.363 While the findings were district-specific,
some generic themes emerged. First, as was typical of the post-
1990 redistrictings, the state was in no position to deny that it in-
tentionally created the majority-minority districts. Denial was
difficult in part because the state originally "sold" these bizarre
districts to a skeptical public as "necessary" to assure fair repre-
sentation to minorities. Indeed, in one instance the state "sold"
the district to the Justice Department as "entitled to preclear-
ance" by representing that it had "constantly reconfigured [the
district lines] in an attempt to maximize the voting strength
360. Vera, 517 U.S. at 962.
361. Id.
362. Id. at 962-64.
363. Id. at 965.
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for.., the black community."3" Second, alternative explanations
for the distorted district lines were clearly devised after the fact.
Bloc level racial data from the census had been used to construct
the districts. Information about non-racial "communities of inter-
est," for example, had simply not been available. 6 Third, incum-
bency protection for Democratic congressmen and would-be con-
gressmen was achieved by manipulating the placement of
minority population concentrations, not by manipulating the
placement of Democratic voters who just happened to be minori-
ties.366 Thus, "political gerrymandering was accomplished in large
part by the use of race as a proxy."6 7 The fact that "tentacles" ex-
tending out from the core of the districts added minority popula-
tions, when Democratic-leaning non-minority population could
have been included in the district without employing "tentacles"
was very telling evidence that political gerrymandering was less
important than the racial makeup of the district. 6 In sum, in
each district, the creation of a majority-minority district was a
qualitatively greater influence on the district lines than other in-
terests.
ii. The use of race was not narrowly tailored to avoid section 2
liability. The Court assumed without deciding that the state had
a "strong basis in evidence" for finding that the minority groups
for whom the districts had been created were "politically cohe-
sive," and that their candidates of choice would be defeated by ra-
cial bloc voting if members of the group did not constitute a ma-
jority of the districts-the so-called second and third Gingles
preconditions for section 2 liability.369 The problem for the state's
position, however, was the first precondition. There was no evi-
dence of the existence of a minority group sufficiently numerous
and geographically compact to constitute a majority in a single-
member district.7 ° Indeed, the fact that numerous small minority
populations had to be added to the district by "tentacles" was
strong evidence that there was no "compact and sufficiently nu-
364. Id. at 969; see also id. at 970, 975.
365. Id. at 969-70.
366. Id. at 969.
367. Id.
368. Id. at 971.
369. Id. at 979.
370. Id.
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merous" minority group to satisfy this precondition.371 The plural-
ity noted, "These characteristics defeat [narrow tailoring] ... be-
cause § 2 does not require a State to create, on predominantly ra-
cial lines, a district that is not 'reasonably compact."372
The plurality rejected the state's argument that shape was ir-
relevant to narrow tailoring, writing that bizarre shape and non-
compactness convey the inappropriate message that "political
identity is, or should be, predominantly racial."373 It went on to
say that ignoring traditional districting principles is "part of the
constitutional problem insofar as it disrupts nonracial bases of
political identity and thus intensifies the emphasis on race." "
The plurality implied that it saw greater merit in the United
States's argument that the "narrow tailoring" requirement would
not have been implicated had a minority group satisfying the first
pre-condition in fact existed, but the district containing the group
had been drawn in a bizarre and noncompact fashion to simulta-
neously achieve incumbency protection, or some other non-racial
districting goal.37 The plurality concluded, however, that the ar-
gument was not available in this case because the bizarre shape
of the districts at issue was attributable to efforts to make the
district majority black, not to other factors.376
iii. Race-based districting was not justified by the need to com-
ply with section 5. The Court also rejected the state's argument
that in one of the districts, racial manipulation was necessary to
avoid retrogression and thus to satisfy section 5.377 The prior dis-
tricting plan had included a congressional district from which Af-
rican-Americans had elected their representatives of choice. 7s
The prior district had been 40.8% African-American in 1980 but,
through population shifts, had become only 35.1% African-
American by 1990.17' Through gerrymandering, the state had in-
371. Id.
372. Id. Justices Thomas and Scalia agreed that the state's redistricting efforts were
not narrowly tailored to achieve its purported interests. Id. at 1003 (Thomas, J., concur-
ring).
373. Id. at 980.
374. Id. at 981.
375. See id.
376. Id.
377. Id. at 982-83.
378. Id. at 983.
379. Id.
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creased the African-American percentage to 50.9%--action which
according to the plurality, was not necessary to avoid retrogres-
sion.380 In what may later prove to be a very important statement,
the plurality noted that "[nionretrogression is not a license for
the State to do whatever it deems necessary to ensure continued
electoral success; it merely mandates that the minority's opportu-
nity to elect representatives of its choice not be diminished, di-
rectly or indirectly, by the State's actions."38'
iv. Ameliorating the effects of past discrimination in voting was
not available to serve as a compelling interest. Similar to the
Court's decision in Shaw II, the plurality indicated that amelio-
rating past discrimination could supply a compelling interest.382
However, the only identified discrimination was alleged vote dilu-
tion flowing from racial bloc voting; this was the same concern
raised by the state's section 2 compliance defense, and for which
the same response applied-race-based districting was not justi-
fied unless the state employed sound districting principles, and
the minority group's residential patterns permitted it to benefit
thereby.38
3. Abrams v. Johnson
The congressional districting plan for Georgia was before the
Supreme Court for a second time in Abrams v. Johnson.3 4 The
Court (with the same Justices in the majority and minority) af-
firmed a plan produced by the lower court after the Georgia legis-
lature was unable to enact one.385 The fact that the lower court's
plan included only one majority black district (in contrast to the
challenged plan's inclusion of three), was the primary issue on
appeal. 86 The Court agreed with the lower court that section 5
did not require a second majority district.387 The Court also
agreed that, in light of the absence of a second "sufficiently large,
380. Id.
381. Id. See supra Part One, I.E.5 (discussing "inevitable retrogression"). Justices
Thomas and Scalia agreed with this position, thereby providing majority support.
382. Vera, 517 U.S. at 981.
383. Id. at 981-82.
384. 521 U.S. 74 (1997).
385. Id. at 78-79.
386. Id.
387. Id. at 90.
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geographically compact minority group," there was no basis to
create a second district to comply with section 2.88 It reiterated
that the inquiry into the existence of a "compact" minority group
"should take into account 'traditional districting principles, such
as maintaining communities of interest and traditional bounda-
"'389
ries.
D. Hunt v. Cromartie Offers Legislators an Effective Means to
Evade Shaw390
North Carolina's congressional districting plan returned to the
Court two more times. The first time, the state appealed the
lower court's grant of summary judgment to the plaintiffs, who
had challenged North Carolina's redrawing of the districts un-
done in Shaw II on racial grounds 9.3 ' A unanimous Supreme
Court reversed the decision, concluding that the legislature
raised a genuine issue of fact as to whether race had been the
"predominant factor" in the drawing of the districts, thereby pre-
cluding summary judgment. 92 On remand, the lower court once
again concluded that race had been the predominant factor in re-
drawing the district. 93 Once again, the ruling of the lower court
was reversed. 94 Justice O'Connor joined with the four dissenting
Justices from earlier cases to conclude that the evidence was in-
adequate to support the lower court's finding that race, rather
than politics, drove the legislature's districting choices.395
Cromartie II was the first case to reach the Court in which the
plan at issue had been drawn with full knowledge of the limita-
tions Shaw would place on the use of race in districting. In all of
388. Id. at 91.
389. Id. at 92 (quoting Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 977 (1996)).
390. Two cases resulting from North Carolina's 1990's congressional redistricting
reached the Supreme Court with the style Hunt v. Cromartie. The first, a 1999 decision,
Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541 (1999), will hereinafter be referred to as Cromartie I. The
Court's second decision, also styled Hunt v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234 (2001), will hereinaf-
ter be identified as Cromartie II. It is this second decision that we are primarily concerned
with for the remainder of this section.
391. Cromartie I, 526 U.S. at 543.
392. Id. at 552-54.
393. Cromartie v. Hunt, 133 F. Supp. 2d 407 (E.D.N.C. 2000), rev'd, 532 U.S. 234
(2001).
394. Cromartie II, 532 U.S. at 258.
395. Id.
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the earlier affirmative racial gerrymandering cases, challengers
had little difficulty demonstrating that racial concerns had driven
the districting process. The states had openly used racial data to
create the minority districts, often justifying their bizarre shapes
and their negative impact on other interests as necessary to in-
sure minority representation.396 Cromartie II demonstrates that
challengers will have substantial difficulty making the showing
necessary to trigger strict scrutiny in the absence of a record of
admissions to racial motivation.
In Cromartie II, the lower court findings were examined under
the "clearly erroneous" standard.397 Under this standard, the
Court concluded that the plaintiffs failed to carry their "demand-
ing" burden of proof to demonstrate that race was the predomi-
nant factor motivating the districting decision.9 The factual is-
sue was whether the shape of the district--specifically its failure
to follow traditional districting criteria-was the product of racial
concerns or political ones. 99 The lower court found that in re-
drawing the districts invalidated in Shaw I, the legislature
sought to avoid putting two incumbents in the same district and
also to preserve the existing district's partisan cores 4°°- bjec-
tives which it accomplished, however, by the use of racial data.
The subsidiary findings supporting the use of racial data included
the fact that the district was snake-like in shape; it split cities
and towns and contained a 47% African-American voting popula-
tion-facts which the Supreme Court had concluded in its review
of the lower court's grant of summary judgment were insufficient
to demonstrate that, as a matter of law, racial concerns predomi-
nated.40' The only additional fact noted by the lower court on re-
mand was that "the legislature had drawn the boundaries in or-
396. Undoubtedly, all of the challenged districts were made more bizarre because line
drawers were attempting to create majority-minority districts while still protecting in-
cumbents and perpetuating partisan advantages. It was also almost certainly the case
that the political objectives could have been accomplished without the serious violence
that was done to traditional districting standards, whereas without the race-based gerry-
mandering, the districts involved would not have contained black or Hispanic majorities.
397. Cromartie II, 532 U.S. at 237.
398. Id. at 258.
399. Id. at 237.
400. Cromartie, 133 F. Supp. 2d at 423.
401. Cromartie II, 532 U.S. at 239.
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der 'to collect precincts with high racial identification rather than
political identification."4 °2
This latter finding turned on whether, when the legislators
created the district using precincts as their building blocks, they
sorted the precincts into districts on the basis of their racial
characteristics or their political ones. The lower court concluded
that the precincts were sorted by race, primarily because heavily
African-American precincts were put into the districts, while
heavily Democratic precincts, which could have been included to
produce a more compact, still Democratic district, were left out.
The Supreme Court saw this findings as resting "solely upon evi-
dence that the legislature excluded heavily white precincts with
high Democratic Party registration, while including heavily Afri-
can-American precincts with equivalent, or lower, Democratic
Party registration."40 3 The Court went on to conclude that the
lower court erred when it gave insufficient weight to testimony
that precincts were included or excluded based on voter behavior
in the precincts, not on voter registration. According to North
Carolina, white Democrats were much more likely than black
Democrats to "cross-over" and vote for Republicans. Conse-
quently, when the more reliable Democratic precincts were in-
cluded in the district, they inevitably were more heavily black.40 4
Ultimately, the Court concluded that because race and political
affiliation were so highly correlated, the party attempting to
demonstrate that race rather than politics drove district lines
faces a difficult task. The party must demonstrate that its legiti-
mate political objective could be achieved in an alternative man-
ner more consistent with traditional districting principles and
that the alternative plan would have been more racially balanced.
The plaintiffs in Cromartie II failed to make that showing.4°5
Cromartie 11 ostensibly is a case about the adequacy of evi-
dence required to support a finding that race was the predomi-
nant motive, particularly in a situation where mixed motives
were present. As a practical matter, Cromartie 11 modifies Vera's
holding that race cannot be used as a proxy to accomplish other
objectives. The distinction between the impermissible use of race
402. Id. at 240.
403. Id. at 244.
404. Id. at 245.
405. Id. at 258.
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in Vera and the permissible use in Cromartie 11 appears thin. In
Vera, the state constructed the challenged districts by direct reli-
ance on racial data, with the well-founded expectation that the
minorities involved would support the Democratic Party's nomi-
nee.4" 6 In Cromartie II, the state constructed the challenged dis-
trict by reliance on actual voting behavior, placing the most loyal
Democratic precincts in the challenged district and leaving those
that were somewhat less loyal out.4 ' To no one's surprise, the
more solidly Democratic the precinct's voting record, the more
heavily African-American it turned out to be.
It remains to be seen whether Cromartie II will simply reintro-
duce the bizarre districts of the 1990s through the use of a differ-
ent rationale. Political gerrymandering and incumbency protec-
tion do require the cooperation of other legislators. In Cromartie,
at the time the district at issue was redrawn, it was represented
by a black Democrat.40 ' Because competing political forces had
come to rest, so to speak, producing the then-existing partisan
balance within the state's congressional delegation, perhaps there
was simply little political opposition to preserving the seat of the
district's incumbent. When all districts are again subject to being
redrawn, the political climate may not be as hospitable for find-
ing non-racial "substitutes" that will produce additional districts
tailor-made for minorities. With minority incumbents elected
from the racially distorted districts that are already in place,
there are likely to be competing forces at work. On the one hand,
without the threat of the Voting Rights Act to support the
preservation of the seat-indeed, with the threat of Shaw
litigation if it is maintained in violation of traditional districting
standards-the incumbent may find that hers is an easy district
to justify eliminating in order to accomplish other political objec-
tives.40 9 On the other hand, the incumbent may receive some
benefit from being a visible incumbent with a support group that
extends beyond her district. It was not just a fear of Voting
Rights Act liability that produced the majority-minority districts
406. Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 962 (1996). The state used "race as a proxy" for "De-
mocratic supporter." Id. at 969.
407. Cromartie II, 532 U.S. at 244-45.
408. Id. at 240.
409. Of course, in section 5 jurisdictions, the Justice Department will still press for
preservation of the district as an "opportunity district" that must be retained to avoid re-
trogression. Even here, however, jurisdictions may not be as willing as they have been in
the past to acquiesce if to do so exposes them to other litigation.
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of the past decade. Other forces also played a role, and these are
likely to remain powerful in the upcoming redistrictings. Included
among these forces were: legislators' genuine beliefs that "racial
fairness" demanded minority districts; the very substantial clout
of minority voters in the Democratic Party--clout that threatened
white Democrats with defeat if they did not take steps to increase
minority representation; and a realization on the part of Republi-
cans that creating majority-minority districts tended to substi-
tute a black Democrat for a white one, and to enhance the elec-
tion of Republicans in the now "whiter" surrounding districts.
Even if Cromartie II provides willing jurisdictions the means to
indirectly produce racially gerrymandered districts, there are also
factors that ensure that these districts will not be as bizarre as
the challenged districts from the 1990s. A critical practical dis-
tinction between using racial data from the census directly and
using voting behavior, knowing that it correlates highly with
race, is that the latter is only available at the precinct level. Be-
cause voting precincts are designed for the convenience of voters,
precinct boundaries generally correspond to known landmarks
and encompass reasonably compact geographic areas. Districts
constructed by aggregating hundreds of precincts can still signifi-
cantly violate standard districting criteria-as demonstrated by
the district at issue in Cromartie I--but the end product is not
likely to be as bizarre as a district constructed by aggregating
thousands of smaller census blocs. A second circumstance that
will reduce the number of bizarre districts created for minorities
is simply that greater geographic dispersion of the minority popu-
lation-particularly the African-American population-will limit
the circumstances where it is possible to cobble together a suffi-
cient number of majority-minority precincts to create a district.41
The Court's eight opinions setting out limits on affirmative ra-
cial gerrymandering resolve many issues but raise others. I will
address the remaining uncertainties concerning the states' use of
race in Part Two and will offer concrete advice to guide lawmak-
410. Ironically, Cromartie Irs greatest impact may be in the aura of legitimacy it casts
upon gerrymandering for political purposes. After Cromartie II, Justice Steven's oft-
quoted comment from his dissent in Shaw--"African-Americans may now be the only
group to which it is unconstitutional to offer specific benefits from redistricting" may now
be true. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 679 n.4 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Bizarre districts can
be created for any imaginable reason, except for the openly expressed purpose of sorting
voters into districts on the basis of race.
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ers between the limitations the Constitution places on the use of
race and the duty the Voting Rights Act imposes on lawmakers to
take race into account.
III. FURTHER COMPLEXITIES WHEN THE JUDICIARY BECOMES
ENMESHED IN THE REDISTRICTING PROCESS
Given the seemingly inevitable future involvement of the
courts in the redistricting process, legislators may be tempted to
do nothing and simply let the process start there. However, in
part because the Supreme Court has imposed additional limita-
tions on the line drawing options of federal courts, legislative ab-
dication in favor of the judiciary may result in a plan satisfactory
to no one. This is particularly true in jurisdictions subject to sec-
tion 5.
A. General Principles Governing Court-Ordered Districting Plans
(1) Respect legislative judgment. In recognition of the principle
that redistricting is a legislative function, the Supreme Court's
first limitation on federal court involvement is that judicial relief
is appropriate only upon a clear failure of the legislature to act.41 '
In Growe v. Emison,412 the Court held that deference to the states
in matters of redistricting extended to state courts. If redistrict-
ing efforts are underway in a state body, the federal court must
not interfere, unless it appears that "[the] state branches will fail
timely to perform [their] duty."413
When a court determines that a plan is unconstitutional or
that it violates section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, the court must
afford the jurisdiction an opportunity to propose a replacement,
which the court must adopt if it complies with federal law.1 4
When the court is forced to draw its own plan, it should follow
legislative policy to the extent possible,415 modifying the state's
411. Wise v. Lipscomb, 437 U.S. 535, 540 (1978).
412. 507 U.S. 25 (1993).
413. Id. at 34.
414. Wise, 437 U.S. at 542-43.
415. White v. Weiser, 412 U.S. 783, 785 (1973) (finding reversible error in the lower
courts selection of the plaintiffs plan instead of the one that most closely resembled the
legislative proposal).
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plan only to the extent necessary to remedy the violation of fed-
eral law.416 The more exacting standards for court-ordered plans
apply only to the portions of the state's plan modified to comply
with federal law.417
(2) Strictly comply with one-person, one-vote. When a court fi-
nally must act, its plan must achieve population equality with lit-
tle more than de minimis variation from population equality.
418
Court-ordered legislative plans are not required to attain the
near zero deviation required for congressional districting,4 9 but
variances that would be de minimis in the state's plans are not
acceptable in court-ordered plans without adequate justifica-
tion.42 ° The court must explain the reasons for failure to attain
population equality and must articulate the relationship between
the plan's variance and the state policy being furthered.42'
(3) Avoid the use of multimember districts. A court-ordered plan
must avoid the use of multimember districts,4 2 or, in local elec
tion plans, at-large seats,423 unless these devices were part of the
existing districting plan and were otherwise consistent with fed-
eral law.424 Otherwise, the court must articulate sufficient unique
factors to justify their inclusion.425 Occasional judicial misunder-
standing of this limitation notwithstanding, it merely prohibits a
federal court from imposing these devices on a jurisdiction that
has not chosen to use them.426 In recent times, the issue has most
416. Upham v. Seamon, 456 U.S. 37, 43 (1982).
417. Id.
418. Chapman v. Meier, 420 U.S. 1, 26-27 (1975).
419. Id. at 27 n.19.
420. Connor v. Finch, 431 U.S. 407, 419-20 (1977).
421. Chapman, 420 U.S. at 24.
422. Id. at 18.
423. East Carroll Parish Sch. Bd. v. Marshall, 424 U.S. 636, 639 (1976).
424. Id. at 19; Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 160-61 (1971).
425. Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315, 333 (1973), amended by 411 U.S. 922 (1973).
426. See, for example, Citizens for Good Gov't v. City of Quitman, 148 F.3d 472 (5th
Cir. 1998), where after a successful section 2 challenge to the town's at-large election sys-
tem, the town declined to propose a remedy. A court-appointed master recommended, and
the lower court accepted, a plan which retained one at-large seat, an arrangement specifi-
cally permitted by state law. Id. at 476. The appellate court reversed because the district
court had failed to articulate any justification for not using all single member districts. Id.
at 476-77. Arguably, however, the trial court's remedy was appropriate, so long as it ade-
quately remedied dilution, the existence of which was the only basis for the federal court
to provide a remedy at all. Since all the seats in the invalidated plan had been elected "at-
large," the court's remedy merely retained the at-large feature, rather than imposed it.
Since a remedy is inherently limited by the nature of the violation, there was no need for
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commonly arisen in the context of a court-devised remedy for a
section 2 violation,4 2' rather than in the context of a court-devised
redistricting plan. However, in the future, local federal courts
may have to confront the issue in the redistricting context when
faced with devising a replacement for a plan that has been re-
jected by the Attorney General because it retained some number
of at-large seats.428
(4) Avoid fragmenting concentrations of minority population,
but do not subjugate traditional districting criteria to race. In an
earlier era, when fewer voices were heard in support of producing
minority districts, courts were admonished to avoid departures
from neutral guidelines that resulted in fragmentation of minor-
ity population concentrations-concentrations that might other-
wise form a majority of a district. Such departures could give rise
to charges that the court was intentionally diluting minority vot-
ing strength.42 9 In more recent years, with most of the partici-
pants in the process insisting that more minority districts be cre-
ated, the courts are required to be vigilant in the opposite
direction. Without the discretion enjoyed by legislatures to com-
promise traditional districting criteria in order to balance com-
peting interests, the federal courts should adhere strictly to tradi-
tional districting criteria, deliberately creating only such
minority controlled districts as satisfy these criteria, or deviating
from these standards only to the extent necessary to avoid viola-
tions of the Voting Rights Act.43°
the court to eliminate an at-large seat specifically permitted by state law, unless the rem-
edy was actually required to avoid dilution. See also Williams v. City of Texarkana, 32
F.3d 1265 (8th Cir. 1994) (employing similar reasoning to refuse to include an at-large
seat).
427. In recent years, a number of federal courts have found at-large seats acceptable in
remedial plans presented by defendant legislative bodies. See Hines v. Maryoe of Ahoskie,
998 F.2d 1266 (4th Cir. 1993); Tallahassee Branch of NAACP v. Leon County, 827 F.2d
1436 (11th Cir. 1987); James v. City of Sarasota, 611 F. Supp. 25 (M.D. Fla. 1985).
428. See discussion infra Part One, TI.B.
429. See Connor v. Finch, 431 U.S. 407, 425 (1977).
430. See, e.g., Abrams v. Johnson, 521 U.S. 74, 101 (1997). Gerrymandering for parti-
san advancement and incumbency protection does not trigger strict scrutiny. Thus, after
Cromartie II, a legislative body can use political, rather than racial, data to construct its
non-traditional districts and escape strict scrutiny. A court, however, has no discretion to
promote partisan advancement. Its discretion to "protect incumbents," even if based on an
obvious state policy to do so, should be limited in its ability to separate incum-
bents-because otherwise it makes a political decision that only one of them will be re-
turned to the legislature-and then only through, at most, modest modifications to tradi-
tional districting criteria.
2002]
222 UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 36:137
B. Limited Subject Matter Jurisdiction for Preclearance Actions
Produces a Procedural Quagmire for Court-Ordered Plans
If federal court litigation involves a section 5 jurisdiction, an-
other layer of seemingly intractable complexity is added to the
court's production of a redistricting plan. The court's options de-
pend upon the context in which its obligation to produce a plan
arises. Various scenarios are discussed below.
Scenario 1: The legislature is unable to adopt a redistricting
plan at all. If the legislative body is unable to adopt a redistrict-
ing plan to replace its malapportioned districts, a federal court
will be asked to produce a plan in the legislature's stead. The
court's first obligation will be to respect the legislative judgments
presently existing in the now malapportioned districting plan."
Unless other federal issues are presented by the old plan, the
court should undertake to make only such changes as are needed
to correct for population deviations432 to comply with the substan-
tive standards for section 5,433 and, if established to be necessary,
to avoid vote dilution as defined by section 2. Thus, in this sce-
nario, the court's obligation generally is very similar to that of a
legislature that chooses to enact a "least change" replacement for
a malapportioned plan, except that its districts must adhere more
strictly to population equality.
It is very likely that there are many post-1990 redistricting
plans that contain unconstitutional, but never challenged, race-
based districts. The existence of these districts in a plan for which
the court must create a replacement complicates its task. Possible
Shaw-type violations in the existing plan are generally moot be-
cause the plan must be replaced anyway. Nevertheless, the pres-
ence of race-based districts in the existing plan can impact the
court's remedial plan because of the court's obligation's to respect
legislative policy and to avoid retrogression. As to the former,
Shaw seemingly prohibits the court from maintaining a district
that can only be constructed by elevating racial concerns over
traditional districting criteria.434 Moreover, since the court lacks
431. See White v. Weiser, 412 U.S. 783, 795 (1973).
432. Chapman v. Meier, 420 U.S. 1, 26-27 (1975).
433. Court-ordered plans do not have to be submitted for preclearance. Connor v. John-
son, 402 U.S. 690, 691 (1971) (per curiam). The court, however, must avoid retrogression.
Abrams, 521 U.S. at 96.
434. Note, however, that if a race-based district was constitutional when cre-
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the mandate to balance political concerns, it should not use po-
litical data-a la Cromartie-to replicate a non-traditional dis-
trict, even if the legislature would have done so. As to its obliga-
tion to avoid retrogression, Abrams v. Johnson strongly suggests
that the court's obligation does not extend to the creation of bi-
zarre districts. 5
Scenario 2: The legislature adopts a new redistricting plan, but
the Attorney General refuses preclearance, and the legislature is
unable to adopt a replacement. A local three-judge court's juris-
diction in section 5 matters is limited to determining whether a
covered jurisdiction has adopted an election law change that is
subject to section 5, and if so, whether it has obtained preclear-
ance." 6 The only remedy available from the local three-judge
court is an injunction against implementation of the change until
the Attorney General or the District of Columbia court preclears
it.
437
Today, however, it would be rare for a jurisdiction to attempt to
utilize a plan which has not been precleared. The more common
scenario involves a jurisdiction that has adopted a new districting
plan but has been unable to obtain its preclearance. Imagine a
scenario where, as elections draw near for the jurisdiction in-
volved, someone implores the federal court to produce a plan.
Now things get murky. Since the "new plan" has not been pre-
cleared, one might assume that it is of no further significance,
and the court merely is to follow the guidelines discussed in Sce-
nario 1, including respect for the legislative judgment expressed
in the last precleared plan. However, the Supreme Court took a
different tact in Upham v. Seamon" There, when faced with a
ated-perhaps because it was necessary to avoid section 2 liability--the court arguably
can retain the district, even if circumstances have changed so that a race-based remedy is
no longer needed. Retention of the population cores of existing districts is a traditional
districting criteria. Residents of the race-based remedial district should be seen as having
acquired the same interest in its preservation as residents of other districts. If, however,
the race-based district was not constitutional when adopted, the court is obligated to con-
form the district to race-neutral districting criteria, just as it must conform the plan to
other federal mandates.
435. Abrams, 521 U.S. at 95-98.
436. United States v. Bd. of Supervisors, 429 U.S. 642, 645-47 (1977).
437. See id. at 646-47.
438. 456 U.S. 37 (1982). Technically, the "plan" subject to suit is the existing "malap-
portioned" plan, which is the only plan for which the local federal court can provide a rem-
edy. The state's unprecleared plan is a state-sponsored "remedy" which the court should
use, except for those portions that failed to obtain preclearance.
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congressional redistricting plan to which the Attorney General
had objected, the lower court modified the objected-to districts,
but then made additional adjustments to comply with the re-
quirements for court-ordered plans.439 The Supreme Court re-
versed, holding that unobjectionable parts of the state's plan were
to be preferred as a remedy, so long as they did not violate federal
law. 4o
Since the lower court in Upham undertook to "cure" the section
5 objection, the Supreme Court did not address the issue of
whether it was required to do so.4' Subsequently, however, in
Lopez v. Monterey County,"2 the Court addressed a slightly dif-
ferent issue when it determined that a local court could not order
elections to be conducted at-large, even temporarily, when adop-
tion of at-large elections was the very reason for which the county
had not obtained section 5 preclearance." 3 Monterey County's
treatment of a never-submitted, and thus totally unprecleared at-
large plan is arguably not directly comparable to a districting
plan that has been submitted and to which the Attorney General
has entered an objection to some specific aspect-particularly in
light of Upham's admonition that unobjected-to parts of the
state's plan should be given deference as a remedy. 4 At the very
least, however, Monterey County suggests that the court cannot
use as a part of its remedy any portion of the state's plan to which
an objection has been entered.
439. Id. at 38.
440. Id. at 43.
441. See id. at 44.
442. 519 U.S. 9 (1996).
443. Id. at 20-25. This factually complicated case involved several changes to the
manner of electing certain judges in Monterey County, California, the net result of which
was change from district to at-large elections for these positions. Id. at 12. The local court
enjoined implementation of the new scheme because it had not been precleared and or-
dered that, pending preclearance, elections be conducted from districts which it devised.
Id. at 15-18. Rather than seek preclearance of the at-large plan-a plan now specifically
mandated for the county by state law-the county, after joining with minority plaintiffs in
an agreement that the at-large plan violated section 5's substantive standards, adopted
the court's districts, which were then precleared by the Attorney General. See id. at 18.
Subsequently, the lower court had second thoughts about the constitutionality of its dis-
tricts, which in addition to possibly raising Shaw issues, were clearly contrary to Califor-
nia law. Id. After several years of waiting for the county and the state to devise a plan
that satisfied state law and could also be precleared under section 5, the Court ordered
elections to be conducted at-large-which was precisely the "change" which had not been
precleared. Id. at 18-19.
444. See Upham, 456 U.S. at 43.
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If the Justice Department only objected to retrogressive
changes, a court could easily accommodate both the procedural
limitations and the substantive requirements flowing from sec-
tion 5. A court could do this merely by respecting the non-
retrogression principle. However, as the Shaw line of cases so
dramatically demonstrated, in the past the Department made no
pretense of limiting objections to retrogressive changes. There are
indications that the Department will continue its prior practice,
but will now justify its objections under a strained notion of "ret-
rogression."" 5
The lower court's dilemma is thus what to do when the objec-
tion is one which, had it been challenged in the District of Co-
lumbia court, would have been overturned. On the one hand, it
must not utilize portions of the state's plan to which an objection
has been entered, even when the objection is clearly not based on
retrogression. On the other hand, it cannot itself "cure" the At-
torney General's invalid objection if to do so would involve uncon-
stitutional race-based action in violation of Shaw. Seemingly the
only resolution is to ignore the legislature's policies in the ob-
jected to (even if substantively valid) parts of the state's plan, but
not to follow the Attorney General's "suggestions" for race-based
districting except when it would be consistent with Shaw."6
In some redistricting situations, the court seemingly can avoid
Shaw yet comply with Monterey County simply by making only
minor changes to the objectionable districts in the state's plan.
However, in other circumstances a court faces a more daunting
challenge to act in a manner simultaneously consistent with
Shaw, Monterey County, and Upham. One easily anticipated
problem is that the Attorney General, instead of couching his ob-
jection in terms of the contours of a specific district, will allege
that the submitted plan is retrogressive because it does not con-
tain as many minority opportunity districts as were present in
the benchmark plan. So long as it does not violate Shaw, a court
could elect to create an additional opportunity district-based on
its own view of the evidence concerning the characteristics of
445. See Guidelines, supra note 187, at 5412-14; see also discussion supra Part One,
I.E.7.
446. In producing a remedial redistricting plan, the court must confront all of the un-
certainties concerning the extent to which compliance with section 5 actually requires that
traditional districting criteria be ignored. See discussion supra Part One, I.E & Part Two,
IA5.
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such a district-even if, in the court's view, such a district were
not required under a correct reading of the retrogression stan-
dard. The court confronts greater difficulty when the Attorney
General's objection cannot be cured without violating the Consti-
tution. While Abrams v. Johnson is not directly on point for this
scenario because it involved a precleared plan subsequently suc-
cessfully challenged on Shaw grounds," the Cour's analysis
there nevertheless provides guidance.
Several of the Abrams parties argued that under Upham, the
Court was required to follow the state policies inherent in the in-
validated plan, particularly the policy to create a second minority
district. The Court disagreed, distinguishing Upham on several
points. First, the portions of the precleared plan at issue in
Abrams that "subordinated traditional districting principles to
racial considerations" were not entitled to deference.' Federal
courts, the Court noted, must "correct-not follow--constitutional
defects in districting plans.""9 Second, in Upham the plan's viola-
tion of federal law was narrowly confined-the lines for two con-
tiguous districts had not been precleared. The remainder of the
plan had been precleared and was otherwise consistent with fed-
eral law. It was therefore possible to redraw the objected-to dis-
tricts, leaving the remainder of the state's plan mostly intact. In
Abrams, however, the constitutional violation affected almost
every district in the state's plan, meaning that a remedy neces-
sarily would involve redrawing most of the state's districts. Thus,
the Court found that the lower court in fact complied with
Upham when it made substantial changes in the existing district
lines necessary to conform the plan to constitutional require-
ments but did so in a manner consistent with the state's general
traditional districting principles.4 50
When the federal problem with the state's plan is that the At-
torney General has refused to preclear any part of it and has sug-
gested that the state must engage in unconstitutional race-based
447. The Abrams Court was not faced with the possibility that its inclusion of some
part of the state's plan in its remedial plan would permit the state to circumvent section
5's preclearance mandate.
448. Abrams, 521 U.S. at 85.
449. Id.
450. Id. at 86. The Court followed the state's generic districting principles-such as
respecting county boundaries-but did not necessarily follow the specific district lines con-
tained in the state's plan.
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districting to obtain preclearance, the court seemingly follows the
course suggested by Abrams if it adheres to the various Supreme
Court mandates in hierarchal order. Since Shaw is a constitu-
tional principle, it must be strictly followed. Then section 5's sub-
stantive, non-retrogression standard must be followed to the ex-
tent that doing so is consistent with the Constitution. Finally,
Monterey County, as the embodiment of Congress's intent that
changes reflecting the policy judgments of the jurisdiction's
elected officials not be implemented unless precleared, takes
precedent over legislative judgments expressed in the unpre-
cleared plan. Thus, in drafting its replacement plan, the court
should, if possible, retain specific districts in the challenged plan
when these districts also were in the last precleared plan and fol-
low the state's more general districting standards.45'
Local redistricting plans that contain some number of at-large
seats can present a version of the Monterey County dilemma. Sin-
gle-member districts in a mixed plan will have to be adjusted af-
ter the census to correct for malapportionment. Legally, retaining
the at-large seats is not a change in the jurisdiction's election
laws when the jurisdiction redraws its single-member districts,
thus retaining these seats in the new plan per se cannot be a ba-
sis to deny preclearance.4"2 However, if the jurisdiction is unable
to maintain its existing number of majority-minority single-
member districts, the Attorney General may refuse preclearance
and "suggest" that retrogression can be avoided by abandoning
the at-large seat or seats, thereby permitting the creation of an
additional majority-minority seat.
If the jurisdiction subsequently fails to enact a replacement
plan, some may argue that the court is prohibited from using at-
large seats as part of its court-ordered remedy. The response
should be that, if the only claim is that the single-member dis-
tricts are malapportioned, the at-large seats, which cannot possi-
bly contribute to malapportionment, are simply not before the
court. Moreover, their inclusion in the court's plan would not con-
stitute implementation of an unprecleared change prohibited by
451. For example, if the state's last precleared plan placed specific counties together in
a district, the court should be permitted to follow that policy, even if these districts are
identical to ones in the state's current unprecleared plan. If the state's unprecleared plan
reflects a policy of not splitting small counties unnecessarily, the court should respect that
policy, unless it has been implicated by the Attorney General's objection.
452. Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 138-39 (1976).
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Monterey County. However, the court must come up with re-
placements for the unprecleared new districts which must comply
with the non-retrogression principle. If the Court's statement in
Bush v. Vera that section 5 "merely mandates that the minority's
opportunity to elect representatives of its choice not be dimin-
ished, directly or indirectly, by the State's action,"45 is taken lit-
erally, the court seemingly fulfills its obligation so long as its plan
contains as many minority districts as can be created consistent
with traditional districting standards, even if that number is
fewer than were in the prior plan. 6
Scenario 3: The state acquiesces in the Attorney General's de-
mands for race-based districting, and its plan is precleared. After
receiving a section 5 objection, most jurisdictions simply modify
their redistricting plans to satisfy the Attorney General without
regard to the validity of the objection. Moreover, many jurisdic-
tions adjust their plans to satisfy the Department's actual, or an-
ticipated, demands, thus avoiding drawing an objection in the
first instance. In the context of a redistricting change, the modifi-
cations necessary to satisfy the Attorney General almost inevita-
bly will require race-based districting, which is precisely the cir-
cumstance that led to the Shaw cases. Ironically, while a local
federal court must enforce an objection, even one that is patently
invalid, a covered jurisdiction's race-based actions undertaken to
overcome, or to avoid, an objection are fully reviewable. As a part
of its review, the court must consider the objection's validity in
order to determine if the state's race-based action in response to
it is justified.
As noted above, Abrams presented just this scenario. Georgia
eventually acquiesced to the Department's demand that it add a
third majority black district to its congressional districting plan,
which was then granted preclearance. 455 Thereafter, the pre-
cleared plan was successfully challenged by voters as a racial ger-
453. Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 955 (1996).
454. Retrogression in the number of minority districts caused by demographic changes
cannot be seen as comparable to retrogression in a minority's voting strength brought
about by a municipality's voluntary annexation of a population that results in a lowering
of the group's percentage of the city's electorate. Consequently, there is no reason to apply
the "fairly reflects" modification of the retrogression standard from City of Richmond v.
United States, 422 U.S. 358 (1975). See supra notes 233-37 and accompanying text.
455. Abrams, 521 U.S. at 80.
REDISTRICTING IN A POST-SHAW ERA
rymander in Miller v. Johnson.5 6 Politically unable to enact a re-
placement plan, the legislature left the matter up to the court.45'
Because the plan at issue in Miller and Abrams had been fully
precleared, the Attorney General's objection to the state's earlier
plan was an issue in the case only because the state offered it as
a justification for the state's use of race in the challenged plan.
Ultimately, the Abrams Court adopted a remedial plan that
contained only one African-American district-the same number
as in the post-1980 precleared plan, and one fewer than Georgia's
initial post-1990 Census plan which the Attorney General refused
to preclear.455 The Court concluded that there was not a second
concentration of black population sufficient to constitute a major-
ity of another district.459 It rejected arguments that Georgia's first
plan, containing two majority districts, should have been consid-
ered as a remedial plan, concluding that this plan was also
impermissibly driven by race.46° Thus, the end product was
probably not very reflective of any plan adopted by legislature, all
of which admittedly had been adopted under improper pressure
from the Justice Department. Inevitably, the effect of the Court's
decision was to "overturn" the Attorney General's substantive
section 5 determination.
So long as section 5 is the law, and politics remains politics,
Georgia's tortious path to a federally acceptable districting plan
is likely to be repeated by other jurisdictions. A change of admini-
strations is unlikely to have much impact on the Justice Depart-
ment's Voting Section's push for race-based districts. Theoreti-
cally, one need have little sympathy for the Georgias of the world
who could have short-circuited the process by initially seeking ju-
dicial preclearance. However, there is enormous political pressure
to create majority-minority districts, especially when backed by
an objection from the Attorney General that to the press and the
public is accepted as proof that the submitted plan is discrimina-
tory in purpose or effect. There is an element of unfairness in not
permitting the state to acquiesce to the Department's demands
456. 515 U.S. 900 (1995).
457. Abrams, 521 U.S. at 82. It would have been interesting to see the Attorney Gen-
eral's response had Georgia re-submitted the plan to which the original objection had been
entered after the court invalidated its three black districts plan.
458. Id. at 74-75.
459. See id. at 86-88.
460. See id. at 74-75.
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for race-based districting, rather than incur the expense of dis-
tant, unpopular litigation. However, in the final analysis the in-
terest of the electorate in not being saddled with a race-driven,
often totally irrational, election district is more compelling.
Shaw-type litigation now provides the only source of relief for
citizens of all stripes who are aggrieved by the Attorney General's
overreaching and their own legislators' often expedient decision
to buy peace at the expense of sensible districting standards.
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PART TWO: SAFE DISTRICTING PRACTICES AFTER SHAW:
CONSIDER RACE LAST, NOT FIRST
461
In the almost forty years since Baker v. Carr6 2 opened the door
to federal involvement in state redistricting, many of the legal is-
sues concerning federal limitations on the process have been set-
tled. Jurisdictions with insignificant or highly dispersed minority
populations need be concerned only with the liberal population
equality requirements and exercise modest self restraint in the
area of partisan gerrymandering to be assured that their redis-
tricting plans will survive federal challenge. Congressional dis-
tricts must satisfy more exacting population equality standards,
which, while occasionally annoying, seldom significantly thwart
the line drawers' efforts to advance other interests.
Jurisdictions with even relatively small concentrations of mi-
nority citizens face a more harrowing task, and a safe path is less
clear. Federal litigation in the upcoming decade will focus on the
appropriate balance between "too little concern for minority rep-
resentation" and "too much use of race and ethnicity in the crea-
tion of districts." Jurisdictions will face both legal and practical
problems in their efforts simultaneously to placate minority vot-
ers and legislators while avoiding litigation from both the left and
the right.
From the electorate's perspective, there are signs that in the
upcoming redistrictings, legislators themselves may prove to be
the greatest hazard to the creation of a fair and workable district-
ing plan. Sometimes forgotten in the preoccupation with racial is-
sues is that old-fashioned, non-racial gerrymandering has not
gone away. As a practical matter, compliance with federal and
state limitations on redistricting has always been secondary to
the personal and political interests of those who ultimately con-
trol the line drawing process.463 These more traditional forms of
461. For a reader generally familiar with redistricting, the Shaw line of decisions, and
sections 2 and 5 of the Voting Rights Act, this part of the article is a stand-alone piece.
Readers less familiar with these topics may need to refer to material in Part One to un-
derstand the issues addressed and the positions taken in Part Two.
462. 369 U.S. 186 (1962); see discussion supra Part One, I.A.
463. Indeed, while creating majority-minority districts that otherwise could not have
been drawn was the initial motivation behind the bizarre districts of the 1990s, in many
cases these districts were more distorted than they had to be in order to simultaneously
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gerrymandering harm the political process, negatively impacting
would-be candidates and the electorate as a whole. In the past,
traditional districting criteria provided some protection from ex-
cessive gerrymandering. One unfortunate side effect of the Shaw
decisions is that they have inadvertently lent an aura of legiti-
macy to non-racial gerrymandering, which may tempt legislators
to throw off all restraints in the interest of self and party promo-
tion.
I have four objectives in Part Two of this article: (1) to high-
light important unresolved legal issues concerning the use of race
in redistricting; (2) to extol the virtues of traditional districting
standards, adherence to which not only is essential to the health
of the political process but also provides a measure of protection
against future challenges to a districting plan; (3) to propose spe-
cific districting standards; and (4) to suggest a process that will
produce a functional, politically acceptable redistricting plan that
should survive challenges from either the right or the left mostly
intact. At the outset, however, the reader must understand that
compromise will be necessary. The most functional plan may not
be the most preferred plan politically, and both function and poli-
tics must at times yield to federal or state restrictions on the
process.
I. REMAINING LEGAL AND PRACTICAL ISSUES CONCERNING THE
USE OF RACE IN DISTRICTING
Unresolved issues remain in connection with virtually all of the
race-related aspects of redistricting. In some instances, line
drawers should be able to produce a plan that will be satisfactory
regardless of how the issues are ultimately resolved. In others,
jurisdictions must take their chances. An appreciation of these is-
sues is important to understanding the proposed districting stan-
dards and procedures that follow.
protect incumbents or further partisan agendas. See Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 635-36
(1993).
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A. Unanswered Shaw Questions
1. How Can a Jurisdiction Have the Intent to Create a Minority
District, Yet Comply with Traditional Districting Standards?
According to Justice O'Connor, whose position is controlling,
two circumstances must coexist to trigger strict, and therefore of-
ten fatal, scrutiny of state districting decisions. First, the state
must have neglected traditional districting criteria when it con-
structed the challenged district, and second, the neglect must be
"predominantly due to the misuse of race."4" Thus, "so long as
they do not subordinate traditional districting criteria to the use
of race for its own sake or as a proxy, States may intentionally
create majority-minority districts, and may otherwise take race
into consideration without coming under strict scrutiny."465 Jus-
tice O'Connor reiterates, however, that "districts that are
bizarrely shaped and non-compact, and that otherwise neglect
traditional districting principles ... for predominantly racial rea-
sons, are unconstitutional."466
Because a district's racial make-up is not a traditional district-
ing criterion, it is not clear how the state can simultaneously con-
sider race but not let it predominate, and still comply with these
criteria. One possibility is simply an affirmation of the obvious: a
state may select one standard districting option, rather than an-
other, precisely because a majority-minority district will be pro-
duced.46 Thus, districts that accommodate the interests of racial
464. See Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 993 (1996) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
465. Id. Justice Kennedy and the Chief Justice (who together with Justice O'Connor
formed the plurality in Vera) agree: "[states] may avoid strict scrutiny altogether by re-
specting their own traditional districting principles.... And nothing that we say today
should be read as limiting 'a State's discretion to apply traditional districting principles,'
... in majority-minority, as in other, districts." Id. at 978.
466. Id. at 994 (emphasis added).
467. Given that many minorities live in communities in which they are in the majority,
some number of majority-minority districts should quite naturally emerge by simply fol-
lowing traditional districting standards. Depending on the jurisdiction's population, size,
and the number of districts to be created, there will be dozens of options available to pro-
duce a redistricting plan, all of which will comply with traditional districting criteria. All
the Justices agree that selecting one standard option rather than another, knowing that it
will include majority-minority districts does not involve the use of racial classification in
districting. It bears no relationship to the sorting of whites into one district and blacks
into another that was undertaken to create the districts invalided in Shaw, Vera, and
Miller.
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groups could be created in the same manner that districts tradi-
tionally have been created for non-racial groups.
One traditional means to create such a district is available
when the group is concentrated in a political subdivision, such as
a county, which can supply the population for all, or part, of one
or more districts. For example, a district can be made up primar-
ily of the population of, say, a highly Republican county. Another
example would be a district created by combining the population
of several rural counties to accommodate rural interests. Making
similar use of majority-minority counties or other political subdi-
visions as the core of districts clearly should be acceptable to
every member of the Court. The test should be whether the deci-
sion to create this district would have been as sensible if it were
not possible to know the district's racial make-up. If not, the dis-
trict is not a standard one, but rather one in which race was the
predominant factor in its creation.
A second traditional means to create a district for a group is by
adherence to the criterion "respect for" or "accommodation of' a
community of interests. This method is available even when the
minority community does not correspond to a political subdivision
boundary. The Court specifically noted in Miller that:
[a] State is free to recognize communities that have a particular ra-
cial makeup, provided its action is directed toward some common
thread of relevant interests. "When members of a racial group live
together in one community, a reapportionment plan that concen-
trates members of the group in one district and excludes them from
others may reflect wholly legitimate purposes. n
468
Suggestions by Shaw's critics that North Carolina's interstate
district should have been seen as accommodating an African-
American community of interests were based on a distorted no-
tion of this concept.469 In a territorial system of representation,47 °
468. Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 920 (1995) (quoting Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630,
646 (1993)).
469. See, for example, Justice Stevens' lament in Shaw that the Court had deprived
racial and ethnic minorities of the benefits of districting typically enjoyed by others in the
electorate. Shaw, 509 U.S. at 676-79 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
470. Oversimplified, in a territorial system of representation, members of the govern-
ing body are elected from geographically defined districts. The elected official, regardless
of her political persuasion, represents the district. By contrast, in an interest-based sys-
tem, seats in the governing body are distributed to political parties in accordance with the
portion of the votes they received. Elected officials then directly represent the particular
interests of supporters of their party, without regard to the supporters' residences.
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as ours is, no provision is made for the direct representation of
any group or interest. Rather, representation is tied to geographi-
cally constructed, territorial election districts. Thus a "commu-
nity of interests" that can be accommodated by the districting
process must be one that is tied to a definable geographic area.471
A "Polish district," for example, is just short-hand for a district
created to accommodate the residents of an identifiable neighbor-
hood who are Polish. The person elected represents the interests
of the district, including its non-Polish citizens and, at least tech-
nically, does not represent Polish citizens who live outside the
district. Moreover, unlike the African-American district chal-
lenged in Shaw, districts "for" Polish voters generally are not
constructed by using narrow corridors to connect distinct Polish
neighborhoods in cities hundreds of miles apart.
It is precisely the community's strong connection to an identifi-
able geographic area that permits its accommodation as a com-
munity of interest. Equally strong interest groups-teachers, for
example-cannot be accommodated because their residences are
not concentrated in specific areas which can be included in a dis-
trict. Thus, while the community of interests concept is available
to support the intentional creation of a majority-minority district,
in order to be consistent with traditional districting standards,
the district must not be one that would require detachment of the
concept from its territorial mooring. The real test of whether this
concept has been employed in a traditional fashion would be to
ask, if the racial data from the census were unavailable to pin-
point the group's location, could this district nevertheless have
been created to accommodate a "community of interest"?
If to escape strict scrutiny an intentionally constructed minor-
ity district must be consistent with traditional districting stan-
dards, then shared racial characteristics should not be sufficient
SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF, PAmELA S. KARLAN & RICHARD H. PILDES, THE LAW OF
DEMOCRACY ch.13, at 1096 (2d ed. 2001); see also Arend Lijphart, Comparative Perspec-
tives on Fair Representation: The Plurality-Majority Rule, Geographical Districting and
Alternative Electoral Arrangements, in REPRESENTATION AND REDISTRICTING ISSUES IN
THE 1980S (Bernard Grofman et al. eds., 1982).
471. Indeed, the concept "community of interests" almost certainly refers to a tangible
physical community that shares a number of political interests, rather than to a group of
individuals who share certain common interests unrelated to their residences. For exam-
ple, many individuals share common political interests in certain tax policies. These indi-
viduals may properly be seen as an "interest group," but not as a "community of interests"
in the sense that term has been traditionally employed in redistricting.
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to deem a minority population concentration a "community of in-
terest." The community must be a physical one, identifiable with-
out having to resort to census data. Impermissible stereotyping is
not involved when one assumes that residents of a neighborhood
or economic region share representational interests. However, the
equation of race and interest makes the very stereotypical as-
sumptions Shaw rejects. Thus, creation of a majority-minority
district using a reasonably compact minority population concen-
tration, but one which could not be deemed a "community of in-
terest," would violate traditional districting standards unless the
district is one that otherwise sensibly could have been created
without regard to race. 2
2. Is a Compact Minority District that Causes Wide-Spread
Distortion in Other Districts One that is Consistent With
Traditional Districting Criteria?
Proponents of minority districts may argue that legislators
should create compact minority districts first because gerryman-
dering for other reasons does not offend the Constitution. Support
for the success of such a ploy can be found in Hays and Shaw II,
which limit standing to persons who actually reside in a "race-
based" district.41 3 The Court has refused to recognize that a citi-
zen has suffered a cognizable injury from race-based districting
on the theory that serious distortions in the boundaries of the
race-based district have a ripple effect on the district in which he
resides.474 If the standing issue permits the "neat minority dis-
tricts" tactic, the Court has a myopic view of "race-based" distor-
tions of the districting process. 5 Indeed, distortion of a few dis-
tricts to make them minority districts (the 1990's version of race-
472. Such a district should trigger strict scrutiny, but would survive strict scrutiny as
"necessary to avoid Section 2 liability" if the other two Gingles preconditions are also pre-
sent. See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986).
473. See Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899 (1996); United States v. Hays, 515 U.S. 737
(1995).
474. See Sinkfield v. Kelley, 531 U.S. 28 (2000); Hays, 515 U.S. at 738.
475. Alternatively, the standing issue can be solved by recognizing that the "neat dis-
trict" is "race-based" and has in fact been created by subjugating the jurisdiction's tradi-
tional districting criteria to race. "But for" the motivation to create the majority-minority
district, the surrounding districts would not have violated districting standards. Any resi-
dent of the "neat" race-based district would have standing to challenge it. The standing
issue arose in Hays when a resident of a bizarre, but not race-based, district attempted to
challenge the race-base district, claiming as an injury the distortion its creation caused in
his district. See Hays, 515 U.S. at 742-47.
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based districting) is in the long run less disruptive of other repre-
sentational interests than will likely result from creating a few
"neat" race-based districts, and in the process distorting many
other districts to accomplish non-racial representational objec-
tives.
It is doubtful that compact minority districts that could be cre-
ated only by violating traditional districting standards in order to
create other districts is what Justice O'Connor had in mind when
she voted to immunize "standard" race-based districts from strict
scrutiny. Moreover, Justice Kennedy's position would subject
such districts to strict scrutiny, even if the surrounding districts
were not necessarily distorted by their creation. In Vera, Justice
Kennedy wrote separately to explain that while he agreed that
some intentionally created minority districts escaped strict scru-
tiny, he would apply strict scrutiny if the state foreordained that
one race would be in the majority in a certain number of dis-
tricts."6 Justice O'Connor's position on this potentially critical
point is not clear.
3. How Much Will Cromartie Impact Plaintiffs' Burden to Prove
that Race Predominated in a District's Creation?
In the initial racial gerrymandering cases, plaintiffs had little
difficulty establishing that race was the predominant factor pro-
ducing the bizarre challenged districts because the districts had
been sold to opponents and the public as necessary to assure mi-
nority representation." As Cromartie demonstrates, without the
state's concession that a district was race-based, a plaintiff will
have more difficulty establishing that race, rather than some po-
litical factor correlated with race, is the predominate reason that
a district violates traditional districting standards.
Unclear at this time is how much Cromartie 11 modifies or pro-
vides an easy dodge of Vera's limitation on the use of race as a
proxy. It is difficult to discern a meaningful philosophical distinc-
tion between creating a Democratic district by artificially includ-
ing black voters who can be demonstrated empirically to be the
most loyal Democratic supporters and creating a black district by
476. Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 996 (1996) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
477. See id. at 959.
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artificially including precincts that have been most loyal in their
support of Democrats, knowing that these precincts will contain a
majority of black voters.
At a minimum, jurisdictions should not use racial data directly
to manipulate the political makeup of a district, which was the
situation in Vera.4"' Moreover, using precinct-level voting behav-
ior allegedly for political gerrymandering begins to look like a
subterfuge for race-based districting if the draftsman picks as a
basis to assign precincts to the putative Democratic district a
level of support for Democratic candidates likely to exist only in
majority black precincts. However, when the alternative explana-
tion for what appears to be a race-based district is incumbency
protection for a minority legislator, the state's task should be eas-
ier. Incumbency protection is generally advanced by including the
incumbent's most faithful supporters in "his" district. Providing
identical treatment to a minority incumbent will likely mean that
the precincts are heavily minority.
47 9
Creation of a minority district by resort to some shared charac-
teristics other than race will seldom be a viable option. One strat-
egy proposed to avoid Shaw is that line drawers attempt to create
minority districts by reference to shared socio-economic status."0
Strict scrutiny would not be triggered by a district genuinely cre-
ated to accommodate a community of interest defined by shared
socio-economic status, even if the result were a non-traditional
district. However, it is unlikely that actually using socio-economic
information from the census will produce a majority-minority dis-
trict when simply building a district that incorporated identifi-
able minority communities would not. While African-American
families are more likely than white families to be below the pov-
478. See id. at 961-63.
479. Cromartie I thus may provide an unexpected boost to the reelection of the nu-
merous minority incumbents who were reelected in redrawn, more standard districts.
Many of these districts will have lost significant population since the 1990 Census, moti-
vating the incumbent to look for friendly population to add to her district. Incumbency
protection seemingly would provide a non-racial explanation for adding precincts that
were heavily supportive of the incumbent when he ran in the invalidated district. If, how-
ever, the incumbent's present district was an unconstitutional, but heretofore unchal-
lenged, racial gerrymander, perpetuating the district by political gerrymandering will not
negate its predominate racial nature.
480. After Cromartie II, this strategy seems unnecessary. High levels of support for
Democratic candidates are more reliable than socio-economic status as a marker for ma-
jority black precincts and, while political data is not available from the census, a correla-
tion between precinct boundaries and census population is easily made.
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erty level, in absolute numbers, many more of the poor are white.
Moreover, to avoid strict scrutiny, line drawers would have to use
socio-economic data to select the population to be included in the
district. It is unacceptable to create the district using racial data,
and then later attempt to justify the district by reference to some
other characteristics shared by residents of the district, as well as
by many others who were not included in the district because
they were white.48'
Cromartie II's heightened proof requirement to trigger strict
scrutiny makes gerrymandering easier when it is accomplished
by using partisan advancement and incumbency protection as
markers for race. Remember, however, that in the 1990s jurisdic-
tions supported their extreme departures from traditional dis-
tricting criteria by insisting that race-based districting was re-
quired by the Voting Rights Act. The fact that gerrymandering
for partisan and personal advancement is not prohibited by the
Constitution will not immunize districts distorted for these pur-
poses from scrutiny on state law grounds. A more satisfactory so-
lution for voters, and one which avoids strict scrutiny, would be
for legislators to comply with standard districting criteria.
4. When Will Section 2 be Both Needed and Available to Survive
Strict Scrutiny?
A careful analysis suggests that the answer is "only rarely."
Despite the Court's recognition that the need to avoid section 2
liability can provide a compelling state interest,482 in most cases
where it might justify the creation of a race-based district, it will
not be needed. In most cases where it will in fact be needed, it
will not be available. The reason for this anomaly is that to be a
potential response to threatened section 2 liability, a district
must contain a group that satisfies the first Gingles precondition
(a sufficiently large and geographically compact minority
group). 3 If it does not, it will fail narrow tailoring. However, if
481. See, for example, Vera v. Richards, 861 F. Supp. 1304, 1322-23 (S.D. Tex. 1994),
where the court refused to find that certain non-racial characteristics of a district meant
the district could represent a "community of interest," when these characteristics were a
post hoc description of the district, rather than interests that actually influenced the dis-
trict's creation. Id.
482. See Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 977 (1996).
483. See id. at 978 (citing Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 50-51 (1986)).
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the district contains such a group and also complies with tradi-
tional districting criteria, it escapes strict scrutiny completely. If
it contains such a group but violates traditional districting crite-
ria for reasons other than race, it also escapes strict scrutiny.
Thus, the only circumstance where a putative section 2 district
would need to be justified is where, despite the fact that the dis-
trict contains a compact minority group, inclusion of the group
within the district could only be accomplished by ignoring tradi-
tional districting standards.
Only two circumstances come to mind when a district contain-
ing a compact minority group would violate traditional districting
standards for racial reasons. First, a minority population may be
"compact," meaning that all or a substantial part of the group
could be placed in a non-distorted district, but that the population
does not otherwise satisfy the traditional requirements for a
community of interest. By this I mean that the area it occupies is
not one with a single, recognized geographic identity, and the dis-
trict is not otherwise a sensible one which might have been cre-
ated for a non-racial reason. For example, suppose that a high-
density urban African-American neighborhood, which happens to
be near the city limits, were combined with a heavily African-
American rural population from an adjacent county, to produce a
majority African-American district.' Rarely would these com-
bined populations be seen as a "community of interests" based
solely on their relative geographic proximity to one another.8 5
This non-standard, race-based district would trigger strict scru-
tiny. Section 2 is then potentially available to justify the district's
creation. 6
484. Another example might be a district that was created by bringing together in a
single district minority populations from, say, four sparsely populated rural counties. Ab-
sent some unifying connection other than race, this population would not satisfy tradi-
tional notions of a "community of interest," and, but for the race of the population, would
not have been included in a single district. The district so created would violate traditional
districting standards in that it cuts across many political subdivision lines, and further-
more might not have easily recognized boundaries.
485. Note, however, that when the district is one that must contain a substantial popu-
lation--such as a congressional district-rural counties often will have to be combined
with urban areas. Under this circumstance, placing majority black rural counties in a dis-
trict dominated by an adjacent majority black urban population may be as reasonable an
alignment as any.
486. This assumes, of course, that the first Gingles precondition is satisfied by the
presence of a geographically compact minority group, even if the group is not one whose
members would have been placed together in a district "but for" their racial characteris-
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The second circumstance is the situation described above
where the state begins its districting process by the creation of a
fixed number (or sets out to maximize the number) of compact
minority districts, and as a result is forced to ignore its tradi-
tional districting standards when drafting non-minority districts.
Under these circumstances, the fact that the minority districts
are compact does not make the decision to create them consistent
with standard districting principles.
Distinguishing between a district that is standard, and thus
escapes strict scrutiny even if racial concerns dominated its crea-
tion, and a district that contains a section 2 qualified minority
group, but nevertheless is non-standard for racial reasons, is both
legally and practically important. The former district will not
raise Shaw problems and avoids liability under section 2, even if
the second and third Gingles preconditions are present. On the
other hand, creating the latter district raises Shaw problems if
the remaining two Gingles preconditions are not present, but not
creating the latter district raises the risk of section 2 liability if
the other preconditions are present. Prudent resolution of the
create/do not create issue thus requires a potentially time con-
suming analysis of whether the minority group is "politically co-
hesive" (the second Gingles precondition) and, if so, whether its
electoral choices will be defeated if it is not a majority of a single-
member district (the third precondition). As a part of my pro-
posed redistricting procedures, I suggest a streamlined means to
make these determinations. 7
5. When Will Section 5 Be Both Needed and Available to Justify
Race-Based Districting?
Section 5's availability as a compelling state interest to justify
tics. See Gingles, 478 U.S. at 50. If, however, a district that would remedy a section 2 vio-
lation also must actually, or potentially, comply with traditional districting standards in
addition to compactness, then there is never a need to resort to a compelling state interest
to justify the district. See Vera, 517 U.S. at 978. There is a hint of this possibility in Vera
when the plurality notes that "[a] Section 2 district that is reasonably compact and regu-
lar, taking into account traditional districting principles such as maintaining communities
of interest and traditional boundaries, may pass strict scrutiny without [being more com-
pact than on other possible district]." Id. at 977. The focus of this discussion was the de-
gree of compactness required for a district to be narrowly tailored, however, not the degree
to which a putative section 2 district must also comply with other standards.
487. See discussion, infra Part Two, 1.0.
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race-based districting may also be limited."8 Section 5 clearly
mandates that covered jurisdictions take race-based action if nec-
essary to avoid retrogression."9 However, for compliance with
section 5 to justify race-based action, the jurisdiction's actions ac-
tually must have been required under a proper interpretation of
the law.49° Whether the state's obligation to avoid retrogression is
limited to steps consistent with traditional districting standards
is an open question. If it is, as the Court has suggested in dictum
in Vera and in Abrams v. Johnson, there should never be an occa-
sion when section 5 is needed to justify a race-based district. A
jurisdiction would not be required to adopt a non-standard dis-
trict to avoid retrogression, and a standard, even if race-based,
district would not trigger strict scrutiny.
The Justice Department's seemingly contrary position is that
all districting standards, except compactness, must yield if neces-
sary to avoid or lessen retrogression, and compactness must give
way to some degree.491 In the unlikely event that the Depart-
ment's position is merely that "respect for communities of inter-
est" must be elevated over all other criteria, the supposed conflict
disappears because districts created for such communities are
consistent with traditional districting standards. Despite dictum
implying the contrary, I suspect that when confronted with an ac-
tual case, a majority of the Supreme Court will permit the com-
munity of interest concept to be stretched to cover a district cre-
ated to protect any reasonably compact minority group from
retrogression, even if the community has no physical definition
and must be defined solely by reference to racial data in the cen-
sus. However, the leeway recognized will not be unlimited and
the state's conclusion that race-based action was necessary must
still be based on a correct interpretation of the law.4 92
488. Most of the issues discussed here are considered in greater detail in Part One. See
discussion supra Part One, I.E.
489. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (2001); Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 141 (1976).
490. See discussion supra Part One, ll.C.1.
491. Guidelines, supra note 187, at 5412-13; see discussion supra Part One, I.E.5.
492. The Coures decision affirming the court-ordered plan in Abrams emphasizes the
limitations. Abrams v. Johnson, 521 U.S. 74, 91-92 (1997). There the Court indicated that
the need to avoid retrogression could not justify extreme racial gerrymandering. Id. at 96;
see discussion supra Part One, II.C.3.
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B. Issues Generated by the Justice Department's Unpredictable
Administration of Section 5
Aside from its potential to justify race-based action, Section 5
plays a critical independent role in the districting process in cov-
ered jurisdictions. The Justice Department is by far the least
predictable hazard to any redistricting plan in these jurisdictions.
Moreover, unlike avoiding potential section 2 liability, the safe
means to satisfy the Department, but avoid Shaw problems, is
less clear.
As discussed in Part One, the Department's recently issued
Guidelines hint that their past policy of "maximization" of the
number of majority-minority districts will be modified to press ju-
risdictions to maximize minority "opportunity" districts.49 This is
a highly subjective concept which may or may not be limited to
districts in which the minority group is a majority of the potential
electorate. The Department presumably bases this new policy on
what it sees as arguable uncertainty in the Supreme Court's deci-
sions concerning what it is that must not be "retrogressed" in or-
der for a redistricting plan to qualify for preclearance, and the
degree to which traditional districting criteria must give way to
the creation of "minority opportunity districts" to avoid retrogres-
sion. Depending on just how far beyond existing Supreme Court
precedent the Department is prepared to push jurisdictions to
create minority opportunity districts, covered jurisdictions may
simply have to pick their poison-incur the economic and political
cost of challenging the Department in the District of Columbia
court, or acquiesce in the Department's demands and leave their
districting plan's ultimate fate to would-be challengers. Below, I
make more concrete suggestions for dealing with the Depart-
ment.
C. Practical Problems in Accommodating Minorities Brought
About by Demographic Changes
1. Maintaining Existing Minority Districts
Shaw notwithstanding, significant political pressure, backed to
493. See discussion supra Part One, I.E.4.
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some degree by the requirements of the Voting Rights Act, will be
brought to bear on legislators to maintain existing minority dis-
tricts and to create others-a task that will be more difficult than
in the past. Over the past decade, many historically African-
American neighborhoods have lost population.494 Districts de-
pendent on these neighborhoods for their majority-minority
status now will be significantly underpopulated. If as anticipated,
minority population from these districts has moved either to in-
tegrated areas or to new minority suburbs, line drawers may
mind it impossible to both restore them to population equality
and maintain the minority's majority status.
Maintaining minorities' majority status will be most difficult in
those districts with significantly geographically distorted
boundaries. Because most of these districts were created by cob-
bling together geographically disparate minority population con-
centrations, they will be particularly susceptible to population
movement.495 Moreover, the fact that a particular race-based dis-
trict was not challenged in the last round of redistricting is no
guarantee that its retention in a new plan will escape scrutiny.
Section 5 jurisdictions quite predictably will find themselves
caught between the Justice Department's insistence that these
distorted districts be maintained and the Supreme Court's admo-
nition that reliance on section 5 must be based on a correct inter-
494. EDWARD L. GLAESER & JACOB L. VIGDOR, THE BROOKINGS INS., RACIAL
SEGREGATION IN THE 2000 CENSUS: PROMISING NEWS (2001) (reporting a drop in the num-
ber of African-Americans living in overwhelmingly African-American census tracts),
available at http'/www.brookings.edu/es/urban/census/glaeser.pdff LEWIS MUMFORD
CENTER, ETHNIC DIVERSITY GROWS, NEIGHBORHOOD INTEGRATION LAGS BEHIND (2001)
(reporting a substantial shift of minorities from cities to suburbs, but with only a four
point drop in the segregation index), available at http://www.mumfordl.dyndns.org
cen2000/report.html.
495. It is possible that some of these districts will not be ones that will be deemed "mi-
nority districts" in the baseline plan for retrogression purposes under section 5. The Jus-
tice Department's Guidelines for the 2000 redistrictings specify that the baseline for effec-
tive minority participation will be determined by imposing new census data on existing
district lines-seemingly eliminating as "minority districts" those districts that were ma-
jority-minority districts in 1990, but are no longer. See Guidelines, supra note 187, at
5413. Note, however, if a district has elected a minority candidate in recent years, I have
suggested that it be deemed a "minority district" in the baseline plan. It is not clear that
the Department's substitution of "opportunity districts" for majority-minority districts as
the measure of the influence that must be preserved will be so limited. This would mean
that decisions as to which districts and how many districts must be preserved can no
longer be objectively determined.
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pretation of the law and not on "whatever preclearance mandates
the Justice Department issues."496
2. Competing Minority Groups
In the last round of redistrictings, some jurisdictions had diffi-
culty simultaneously creating a district "for" Hispanics and a dis-
trict "for" blacks.49 Politically, at least, that problem will be exac-
erbated today in jurisdictions where more than one minority
group is sufficiently organized to have the political clout to insist
upon its own district. However, because the Shaw doctrine sig-
nificantly limits the circumstances in which deliberately race-
based districts may be created-limits which include not using
"race as a proxy" to protect incumbents-minority groups often
will not be able to back up their political clout with credible
threats of litigation. Now when minority groups argue that mi-
nority districts must be created in order to avoid section 2 liabil-
ity, Shaw mandates that the Gingles compactness requirement be
taken seriously. Even with today's apparently greater geographic
dispersion of the black population, blacks are still likely to be
more geographically compact than Hispanics,49 which means
that when both groups cannot be accommodated, blacks will be
better situated to argue that they "must" get the district.499
Section 5 continues to provide legal backup for minority politi-
cal clout. In those jurisdictions where section 5 protection extends
to both blacks and Hispanics, the Justice Department's veto
power over the redistricting plans will complicate any resolution
of these groups' competing claims to districts. The Department's
recently released Guidelines offer no special guidance for ad-
dressing the problem of two compact minorities being located in a
district, except to note that districting criteria other than com-
pactness will have to "give way to some degree to avoid retrogres-
496. Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 922. See discussion supra Part One, I.E.3-4.
497. See Vera v. Richards, 861 F. Supp. 1304, 1323-24 (S.D. Tex. 1994), aftd sub noma.
Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952 (1996).
498. LEWIS MUMIFORD CENTER, supra note 494 (reporting that Hispanics are consid-
erably less segregated than African-Americans).
499. Justice Kennedy noted in Vera, "Section 2 does not require the State to create two
noncompact majority-minority districts just because a compact district could be drawn for
either minority independently." Vera, 517 U.S. at 998 (Kennedy, J., concurring). This ob-
servation, however, is not very helpful for a jurisdiction where a compact district can be
created for either, but not both groups.
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sion."' °° As with section 2, deciding which group's district to pre-
serve, if both cannot be, may turn on which group is better situ-
ated to take advantage of a compact district. This is true because,
in addition to Shaw concerns, the Guidelines indicate that "the
geographic compactness of a jurisdiction's minority population
will be a factor" in its assessment of whether a less retrogressive
plan can be produced.5"'
A thorny issue that can arise in jurisdictions with only one pro-
tected minority group, but that is potentially even more of a prob-
lem when there are competing groups, concerns the number of
minority districts that must be provided. A minority group can
constitute a majority of a single-member district, even if its nuim-
bers do not equal a "seat's worth" of the electorate." 2 For exam-
ple, a compact minority group constituting just slightly more
than ten percent of the citizen voting age population could easily
constitute a majority of a single-member district in a jurisdiction
that has a five member governing board. It should be clear that
the jurisdiction cannot gerrymander to avoid creating a district
dominated by this group. Equally clear is that the jurisdiction can
voluntarily create a standard district for the group.
The more difficult question is, does the group qualify under the
first Gingles precondition, so that the district is mandated by sec-
tion 2, if the other elements of dilution are present? Suppose that
there are two minority groups similarly situated. Must the juris-
diction then set aside forty percent of its seats for minority
groups that constitute just twenty percent of the electorate? The
closest analogy in a decided case arose in Johnson v. De
Grandy. 3 In De Grandy, the lower court concluded that because
racially polarized voting was present, Florida was required to
create additional Hispanic districts in its legislative redistricting
plan, even though in the contested region of the state, Florida
had already provided the group with a proportional number of
seats."4 The Supreme Court disagreed, noting that it could not
see how districts that had provided the group with proportional
500. Guidelines, supra note 187, at 5413.
501. Id.
502. By a "seat's worth," I mean simply that the group's share of the electorate is equal
to one vote on the governing body. To equal a seat's worth of a five-member board, the
group must constitute twenty percent of the electorate.
503. 512 U.S. 997 (1994).
504. Id. at 1002-03.
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representation could deny the group equal political opportu-
nity."5 The Court then described how a minority group constitut-
ing forty percent of the population could be made to be a majority
in seventy percent of the districts and noted that it would be "ab-
surd to suggest that the failure of a districting scheme to provide
a minority group with effective political power seventy-five per-
cent above its numerical strength indicates a denial of equal par-
ticipation in the political process.""6
By analogy, one could argue that a group equal to only half a
seat is not entitled to have seats set aside that would give it effec-
tive political power 100% above its numerical strength. The real
difficulty with concluding that the group is entitled to a district in
these circumstances is not that "whites" would then be under-
represented. Rather it is that setting aside a seat for the group
reduces the seats available for accommodation of the multiplicity
of other interests in the electorate as a whole--diluting all other
interests.0 7 Obviously, as the number of undersized minority
groups in a jurisdiction grows, the problem of diluting other in-
terests becomes more severe.08
D. Enforcing State Districting Standards
If line drawers in the post-Shaw era see the fact that gerry-
mandering for partisan advantage is not subject to strict scrutiny
as an implied endorsement of this all too common practice, they
may become more blatant than ever in their disregard for the
state's traditional districting standards. Thus, challenges to dis-
tricting plans on state law grounds may become more common in
505. Id. at 1014.
506. Id. at 1017.
507. Very little thought should be required to realize that "whites" as "whites" have no
representational interests. They hardly can be seen as a politically cohesive group. Most
would recognize that white voters' interests are all over the map. No one has a basis to
complain when a naturally occurring district, or one designed to accommodate a defined
neighborhood, turns out to be dominated by a minority group. A section 2 or section 5
"remedy" however, says "this district is not available for general political competition, be-
cause we have designed it for minority group representation." When the "set aside" dis-
tricts exceed the group's share of the electorate, the remaining interests--whatever they
may be-are unfairly diluted.
508. The solution should be a somewhat flexible standard for satisfying the numerous-
ness requirement. It is probably too dilutive of other interests to create a district for a
group equal to halfa seat's worth of the electorate, but as the group's numbers approach a
seat's worth, that should be sufficient.
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the future." 9 However, litigants in covered jurisdictions may be
surprised to find that section 5 will effectively block their efforts
to force their legislators to follow neutral districting princi-
ples-at least when the non-conforming districts are "minority
districts." Consider the following plausible scenario.
Legislators now educated by Cromartie 11 0 follow its formula
for constructing minority districts under the guise of partisan or
incumbency gerrymandering. In other words, when a minority
district cannot be created in accordance with traditional stan-
dards, they employ political data, rather than racial data from
the census, so as to include only the "most reliable" Democratic
voters-knowing that they will be black-in a district, which I
will dub a "Cromartie district." The plan containing Cromartie
districts, as well as many other non-traditional districts for which
partisan gerrymandering was the sole objective, obtains preclear-
ance. Relief from the federal court for purely political gerryman-
dering is all but impossible to obtain, and relief for the Cromartie
districts is possible seemingly only if the challengers demonstrate
that the state's use of political data to create the district was a
mere subterfuge for the use of race.51'
Assuming that the state permits its districting standards to be
judicially enforced, a challenger may be able to invalidate non-
conforming districts in the state court. However, unlike a plan
produced by a federal court, a remedial districting plan produced
by a state court must be submitted for preclearance before it may
be implemented.512 The preclearance benchmark presumably
would be the invalidated plan, which will present very interesting
issues if the state court invalidated the plan precisely because
some of its districts, including the minority districts, did not con-
form to the state's districting standards. Redrawing the politi-
cally gerrymandered, non-minority districts should present no
problem. However, the Attorney General will likely take the posi-
tion that any redrawing that reduced the number of minority dis-
tricts is retrogressive under section 5.
509. A general consideration of the means to enforce state districting standards is be-
yond the scope of this article.
510. 532 U.S. 234 (2001).
511. Id.
512. Hathorn v. Lovorn, 457 U.S. 255, 266 n.16 (1982).
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An alternative for voters frustrated by distorted districts would
be to bring suit in federal court on Shaw grounds and add their
allegations of violations of state districting standards as pendant
state law claims.51 Even if the Shaw claim ultimately fails, so
long as the claims were "substantial" when filed, the court can
adjudicate the state law claims.514 To avoid reconfronting the Jus-
tice Department, the jurisdiction would have to elect not to pro-
pose a replacement plan, therefore leaving it to the court.515 The
federal court's replacement plan must not be retrogressive, but
the court may be more inclined than the Justice Department to
agree that avoiding retrogression is not necessary if it can only be
accomplished by extreme gerrymandering.
II. THE PROPOSAL
A. Consider the Virtues of Sound, Race-Neutral, Politically
Neutral, Districting Standards
1. Ugly Districts Undermine the Political Process
In the 1990s, an observer new to the subject of redistricting
would have concluded that the primary purpose of the process
was to assure minority representation. Until the Court decided
Shaw, rarely did supporters of a proposed plan, defenders of
adopted plans, or those commenting on the process discuss any
other interest.516 Lost in the debate over justifying race-based dis-
tricts was the fact that protecting insular minorities is but one of
513. See United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966). See generally
28 U.S.C. § 1367 (2001) (extending the subject matter jurisdiction of federal courts to in-
clude a state law claim that is part of the same case or controversy as a claim independ-
ently cognizable in federal court).
514. See Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 722.
515. The decision, of course, would be up to the very lawmakers who had been elected
under the precleared gerrymandered plan. Their motivation to leave the redrawing up to
the court probably would be low, but even if the Department were to preclear another ger-
rymandered plan, this plan would have to be approved by the court as a remedy for the
violations of state law.
516. I was briefly involved in some of the 1990s-era litigation involving Florida's legis-
lative apportionment plans. In terms of interests that should be represented in its legisla-
ture, Florida is an unusually diverse state, quite apart from the racial and ethnic make-up
of its population. Yet, except for my client, every other participant's primary, if not sole,
argument for why their particular plan should have been adopted was that theirs was the
best plan for minorities. In many, perhaps most cases, these arguments were merely dis-
guises for other interests, typically partisan ones.
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the many legitimate concerns of a districting scheme. In an ironic
turn of events, Shaw's restrictions on racial gerrymandering
could result in redistricting plans which serve the self-interests of
legislators to the serious detriment of the citizens' interest in fair
and effective representation.
For the majority of citizens, traditional districting criteria pro-
vide the primary protection for sensible districts that contribute
to fair elections and effective representation.517 There exists an
inevitable tension between the goals of a fair representational
system, which must permit genuine political competition, and the
understandable desire of legislators to use redistricting as an op-
portunity to enhance their own, and their party's, competitive ad-
vantage. For as long as political bodies have had the final word,
incumbency protection and partisan advancement have been the
most powerful forces affecting the ultimate configuration of dis-
trict lines. However, prior to the 1990s, neutral districting stan-
dards protected the electorate from excesses of legislative self-
interest, primarily by mandating that districts be sensible geo-
graphic units for electing representatives. These standards pro-
vided sufficient limitations on the line drawers that unhappy vot-
ers who found themselves in skewed districts were nevertheless
able to mobilize against incumbents.
In the 1990s, however, legislators used the "need" to create mi-
nority districts to satisfy the Voting Rights Act as an excuse to
jettison many of these standards, producing the largest crop ever
of really ugly districts. Cutting as they did across voting pre-
cincts, disregarding natural boundaries, and slicing up neighbor-
hoods, these "bug splat" districts undermined the electorate's ul-
timate weapon against personal and partisan self-promotion by
disrupting political activity ordinarily carried out by community
organizations and other watch dogs of localized interests. These
districts accomplish the ultimate objective of gerrymander-
ing-insulating those in office from those who would organize to
defeat them---far more effectively than distorted districts of the
past.
517. See generally Daniel D. Polsby & Robert D. Popper, The Third Criterion: Com-
pactness as a Procedural Safeguard Against Partisan Gerrymandering, 9 YALE L. & POLY
REV. 301 (1991) [hereinafter Polsby & Popper, Third Criterion]; Daniel D. Polsby & Robert
D. Popper, Ugly: An Inquiry into the Problem of Racial Gerrymandering Under the Voting
Rights Act, 92 MICH. L. REV. 652 (1993). These authors argue that a requirement that
districts be compact is the best check on gerrymandering of all kinds.
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While the Court in Shaw and its progeny held that race-based
districting violated the Constitution, it also reiterated that tradi-
tional districting standards are not mandated by the Constitu-
tion.518 Consequently, districts that deviate from criteria such as
compactness and respect for political subdivision lines for non-
racial reasons are not unconstitutional. In an ironic turn of
events, legislatures responded to Shaw by immediately embrac-
ing incumbency protection and partisan gerrymandering-the
very forces traditional districting criteria were designed to curb-
as the true explanation for their bizarre districts!.19
To be sure, the Court has not endorsed gerrymandering for po-
litical reasons and has recognized that the Constitution protects a
minority party from its prolonged effects. 2° Moreover, the Court
has recognized that traditional districting criteria play a crucial
role in the redistricting process, noting in Vera that in response
to Shaw, legislators and courts nationwide had: "modified their
practices-or, rather, reembraced the traditional districting prac-
tices that were almost universally followed before the 1990 cen-
sus .... Those practices and our precedents, which acknowledge
voters as more than mere racial statistics, play an important role
in defining the political identity of the American voter." 2'
Nevertheless, in legislative minds clouded by the desire for safe
seats, it is a small step from "the Constitution does no prohibit
ugly districts, except for racial reasons," to "incumbency protec-
tion and partisan advancement are legitimate political goals,
more important than creating sensible districts." To them, those
are legitimate political goals, more important than districting
standards. For example, witness Texas's claim in defense of its
bizarre congressional districts that these were the state's only
districting standards!522 Commentators and judges eager to find a
518. See Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 647 (1993).
519. These alternative explanations were seldom accepted by the Court, no doubt in
large part because the very same legislators had previously justified these districts to the
public, the Justice Department, and sometimes to the courts, as necessary to provide the
minority districts required by the Voting Rights Act. Legislators who redrew plans invali-
dated under Shaw were no doubt more careful to put forth alternative non-racial justifica-
tions from the outset, making it more difficult to establish that racial concerns had driven
the creation of distorted districts, as demonstrated by the outcome in Cromartie IL
520. Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109 (1986); see also supra notes 123-49 and accom-
panying text.
521. Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 985 (1996).
522. Vera v. Richards, 861 F. Supp. 1304, 1333 (S.D. Tex. 1994), affd sub nom. Bush v.
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means to create minority districts encourage this thinking when
they argue that districting standards "have little inherent value
in the districting process" and are "not necessary to ensure fair
and effective representation."523
It will be tragic indeed if closing the door to racial gerryman-
dering, which was to some extent self-limiting in its impact on
the electorate, becomes an endorsement of unrestrained political
gerrymandering. The final result could be, in the words of Judge
Edith Jones, not "one in which the people select their representa-
tives, but [one] in which the representatives have selected the
people."524
2. Traditional Districting Criteria Are Essential to an Open and
Competitive Political Process
No one believes that adherence to traditional districting crite-
ria will eliminate self-promotional districting. Indeed, most would
view restrained self-promotion as legitimate; however, there is
little support for removing the constraints traditional districting
standards place on this wide-spread practice. Traditional district-
ing criteria promote two functions in addition to restraining ram-
pant self-promotion. First, by insisting that election districts be
sensible geographic or territorial units, these criteria assure that
elements within the electorate will be able to effectively organize
for political activity-activity directed against the incumbent, if
necessary. Judge Edith Jones eloquently captures this issue:
Traditional, objective districting criteria are a concomitant part of
truly "representative" single member districting plans. Organized
political activity takes place most effectively within neighborhoods
Vera 517 U.S. 952 (1996) (Texas "asserts that its districts cannot be unconstitutionally
bizarre in shape because Texas does not have and never has used traditional redistricting
principles such as natural geographical boundaries, contiguity, compactness, and confor-
mity to political subdivisions.").
523. Shaw v. Hunt, 861 F. Supp. 408, 451 (1996). The (Shaw remand) court goes on at
some length to explain its views, which do in fact support the proposition that traditional
districting criteria cannot guarantee fair and effective representation. Id. at 451-52.
Equally clear, however, is that the court's arguments do little to dispel the logic that dis-
tricts that violate these criteria generally have been created precisely to undermine politi-
cal competition and often are very effective in doing so. See also Cromartie II, 532 U.S.
234, 245 (2001) (Justice Breyer, writing for the majority, characterizes partisan advance-
ment as a legitimate political interest).
524. Vera, 861 F. Supp. at 1334.
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and communities; on a larger scale, these organizing units may
evolve into media markets and geographic regions. When natural
geographic and political boundaries are arbitrarily cut, the influence
of local organizations is seriously diminished. After the civic and
veterans groups, labor unions, chambers of commerce, religious con-
gregations, and school boards are subdivided among districts, they
can no longer importune their Congressman and expect to wield the
same degree of influence that they would if all their members were
voters in his district. Similarly, local groups are disadvantaged from
effectively organizing in an election campaign because their num-
bers, money, and neighborhoods are split. Another casualty... is
likely to be voter participation.... A citizen will be discouraged from
undertaking grass-roots activity if... she [cannot locate her
congressman's district's boundaries].
[Als the influence of truly local organizations wanes, that of spe-
cial interests waxes. Incumbents are no longer as likely to be held
accountable by vigilant, organized local interests after those inter-
ests have been dispersed. The bedrock principle of self-government,
the interdependency of representatives and their constituents, is
thus undermined by ignoring traditional districting principles.
525
Second, following traditional districting criteria increases the
likelihood that legislators will be able to effectively represent
their constituents. Obviously, whether a district functions well as
a representational unit depends upon more than its shape and its
boundaries.5 26 Nevertheless, many of the factors Judge Jones dis-
cusses are also important to the ability of the person elected from
the district to represent her constituents. Moreover, while not all
of a voter's representational interests correlate with the interests
of others living in close proximity to him, many do and those that
do not simply cannot be considered when designing geographic or
territorial districts. Traditional districting standards are de-
signed, in part, to produce districts that can be effectively repre-
sented in a system based on territorial-rather than interest
group-representation. Gerrymandering is an attempt to selec-
tively graft representation of group interests-be the interest
525. Vera, 861 F. Supp. at 1334-35 n.43.
526. For example, districts should be constructed with an eye towards the governmen-
tal functions of the elected body involved. If a county council's chief function is to maintain
county roads and parks, it is prudent to design districts so as to equalize road mileage and
distribute the parks among the districts. If, as is typical, the council's primary authority is
in the unincorporated areas of the county, but all county voters participate in council elec-
tions, districts should be designed with an awareness of the inherent conflict between the
interests of those who need the county's services and those who do not, but whose taxes
probably support county government.
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partisan, racial, or simply those of the loyal supporters of an in-
cumbent-onto what is otherwise a territorial representation sys-
tem.
527
While present federal law provides the electorate very little
protection from unrestrained self-promotion, 28 state law may of-
fer relief. Realistically, however, self-restraint on the part of indi-
vidual legislators is the only effective avenue by which to promote
sensible districts.
527. A district in a territorial representation system would not be designed intention-
ally to include populations as diverse as residents of an area dominated by a rural agricul-
tural economy and residents of a low income urban neighborhood. Supporters of North
Carolina's congressional district, which contains just these kinds of diverse populations,
would note that, if both sets of residents are African-Americans, they will perceive their
shared racial heritage as more indicative of a shared political agenda than their geo-
graphic proximity to white neighbors. Similar arguments can be made by Republican (or
Democratic) legislators who see nothing wrong with connecting the geographically dis-
persed party faithful into geographically distorted districts. To the extent that their ar-
gument is that race and party labels are more important indicators of overall political ori-
entation than geographic proximity, they are almost certainly correct. What this
argument really supports, however, is not racially or politically selective distortion of our
existing territorial representation system, but rather abandoning that system in favor of
direct interest group representation for everyone. In such a system, African-Americans
and Republicans could be represented directly in accordance with their numbers in the
electorate, and so could any other group with sufficient numbers to command a
seat-environmentalists, gun-control advocates, abortion foes, and white supremacists
alike. Note, however, that imposing interest group representation on a territorial repre-
sentation system has additional drawbacks not found in systems designed for direct inter-
est representation. In a proportional representation system, all sufficiently popular shared
interests are represented in the elected body. Gerrymandering, however, results in repre-
sentation of only selective interests and, equally significant, means that voters who do not
share the selected interests, but are assigned to the district to bring it up to population
equality, are simply filler. Indeed, the aim of a partisan gerrymander is to craft the dis-
trict so as to have just enough partisans to carry the election, thereby "wasting" the votes
of as many of the opposing party's supporters as possible. For further discussion of graft-
ing interest group representation onto a territorial representation system, see Katharine
Inglis Butler, Affirmative Racial Gerrymandering: Rhetoric and Reality, 26 CtiJB. L. REv.
313, 357-62 (1996).
528. Thus far, the Supreme Court has given no indication that it would see a distinc-
tion between old-fashioned gerrymandering-which, given tools available at the time, was
limited in its ability to craft districts that would be dysfunctional from voters' and chal-
lengers' perspectives-and new-age gerrymandering-which is virtually unlimited. If,
however, gerrymandering for partisan advancement and incumbency protection are
pushed to the extreme, the Court may eventually see that the "ins" are effectively shutting
out the "outs" in a manner for which there is no political solution, much the same way that
malapportioned districts permitted rural areas to keep urban areas underrepresented be-
fore Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
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B. Guiding Principles for the Redistricting Process5 29
1. Adopt Standards in Advance of Drafting a Plan
The first official steps in the redistricting process should be: (1)
to adopt the standards by which redistricting will take place (if
none are mandated by statute); (2) to adopt rules for resolving
conflicts among standards; and (3) to set out the procedures that
will be followed. The goal of the standards should be to create
sensible districts, taking into account the specific interests that
should be represented in the body to be elected. The interests
that should be accommodated in a districting scheme are highly
specific to the jurisdiction involved, except that the interest must
have a sufficient connection to definable geographic areas to be
furthered by the creation of territorial or geographically based
election districts. Technical standards-those setting out the
rules for constructing individual districts-are more generic. For
example, all districts should have easily recognized boundaries
that, when possible, serve some function beyond merely defining
who is in and who is out of the district.
When necessary, state interests must yield to the requirements
of the Constitution and the Voting Rights Act, even if the result is
that some districts are not optimally sensible.3 ° Generally, how-
ever, so long as sensible districts are produced, state standards
should be tailored to the legislative body at issue and should be
applied flexibly to accommodate the representational interest to
be furthered. For example, respect for political subdivision lines
may serve an important top priority interest in a congressional
districting plan, but may be of virtually no consequence in a mu-
nicipal plan. Equalizing road mileage among districts may be a
529. My proposal is directed toward legislatures and other entities that must redistrict.
However, with very little modification, a court called upon to provide a plan of its own can
follow the proposal and produce a redistricting plan that complies with the law and with
the mandates for court-ordered plans, discussed supra at Part One, II.A. Indeed, I ini-
tially developed these procedures while acting as the Court's expert in Wilson v. Jones,
130 F. Supp. 2d 1315 (S.D. Ala. 2000). Similar modifications will permit the plan to be fol-
lowed by litigants, who often are expected to provide alternative plans for the court's con-
sideration. Proposals for modifications will be included in the footnotes.
530. For example, the population of a congressional district otherwise created out of
whole counties may have to be supplemented by the addition of 100 people from a county
outside the district in order to comply with the Constitution's stringent population equal-
ity standards. See discussion supra Part One, IA.
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very important interest from the standpoint of effective represen-
tation when the body is a county council charged with maintain-
ing the roads, but of no interest at all for a state senate district.
Establishing in advance when one districting standard should
yield to another is perhaps wise, but it should be done with the
proviso that an established hierarchy should not override com-
mon sense. For example, a requirement that districts be compact
ordinarily will contribute to sensible districts, but sensible dis-
tricts, not compactness, should be the goal. Thus, in some circum-
stances, a well-known, easily recognized natural or man-made
barrier, such as a body of water or an interstate highway, makes
a better district boundary, even if the districts produced are less
compact than they would have been had an obscure street or an
invisible census division line been selected.
2. A Suggested List of Goals and Objectives
The following is a list of goals that should be furthered by a
districting plan.
(1) The entity involved should enumerate the non-technical
standards that incorporate representational interests to be fur-
thered by the plan. These matters are necessarily specific to the
elected body involved, but might include such things as: "every
county shall be afforded at least one seat in the lower legislative
house;" "efforts shall be made to equalize the potential electorate
among districts by dividing the populations in prisons, military
installations, and other non-, or under-, voting populations
among as many districts as feasible;" and "regions in the state
shall be assigned identifiable districts in accordance with their
population." 3' The desire to accommodate these representational
objectives shall be tempered by the mandate to create sensible
districts.
(2) The ultimate goal of the districting process is to create sen-
sible districts that will serve as vehicles for fair elections and ef-
fective representation of all citizens, and which, when it can be
531. Modification for courts and litigants: because neither courts nor litigants have the
political mandate to select from among the many possible interests competing for repre-
sentation, they should adopt only those goals that are both lawful and actually manifested
in the last plan adopted by the jurisdiction.
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accomplished consistent with this principle, will further the spe-
cific representational objectives set out above.
(3) A sensible district is one in which voters can easily deter-
mine its boundaries, which is conducive to citizens' political par-
ticipation as voters and candidates, and which is capable of being
effectively represented by its elected representative.
(4) In recognition of the jurisdiction's many, often competing
interests, and the need for political compromise, the creation of
sensible districts is an aspirational goal, not a rigid rule. The
standards that follow are listed in order of priority, but with the
caveat that the ultimate goal of sensible districts, the realities of
the law, and practical political necessity may at times mean that
a lower priority standard is elevated over one above it in the hi-
erarchy.
3. A Suggested List of Standards to Guide the Construction of
Individual Districts
(1) To the extent possible, districts shall be of equal population.
Deviations within constitutional limits shall be permitted only
when necessary to create sensible districts, which may at times
include the preservation of communities of interest, or to comply
with the Voting Rights Act. 32
(2) Districts shall comply with the Voting Rights Act, as de-
fined by the United States Supreme Court and the Department of
Justice, except when in the opinion of legal counsel, the Depart-
ment's definition is in clear conflict with decisions of the Supreme
Court or the United States District Court of the District of Co-
lumbia.
(3) Districts shall be created using the population cores of ex-
isting districts to the extent the resulting district is reasonably
consistent with the requirements for sensible districts.
(4) Districts shall contain only contiguous territory. Land
masses totally separated by a body of water shall be considered
continuous so long as the water-side of each mass is within [X
miles of a bridge connecting to the other land mass. Otherwise,
532. Courts and litigants preparing proposals for adoption by courts must adhere to
the stricter population standards for court-ordered plans.
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two land masses that intersect for less than [Y] miles shall not be
considered contiguous, unless unusual circumstances make the
resulting districts a sensible one under the circumstances. The
fact that a district is made up solely of contiguous territory does
not, standing alone, assure that the district is a sensible one.
(5) Districts' boundaries shall, when possible, correspond to
well-recognized natural and man-made barriers or well-known
highways, roads, and streets, or when well-known in the commu-
nity, to a political boundary.
(6) Districts shall be compact. A district shall be considered
compact, even if its boundary is irregular, if the boundary is a
well recognized natural or man-made landmark. The reason for
an irregular boundary must be independent of its having been
designated a district boundary, and the district must otherwise
be sensible. The fact that a district is compact does not, standing
alone, assure that it is a sensible one. No formula or technical
measure of compactness shall control whether a district is com-
pact.533 Rather the objective is a common sense one, to be inter-
preted in light of the underlying purpose to create sensible, func-
tioning districts.
(7) When consistent with the stated representational goals, and
with the population equality requirements of the Constitution,
districts shall respect political subdivision boundaries and shall
include whole precincts when feasible."4
533. There are a number of "formulas" for measuring compactness. See Richard H.
Pildes & Richard G. Niemi, Expressive Harms, "Bizarre Districts," and Voting Rights:
Evaluating Election-District Appearances After Shaw v. Reno, 92 MICH. L. REV. 483, 549-
50, 553-59 (1993). See generally Polsby & Popper, Third Criterion, supra note 517. At
some point, consulting these measures is an elevation of form over substance. Compact-
ness, as with other standards, functions to keep partisan and personal interests in check
and to aid the creation of sensible districts and is useful only to the extent that it accom-
plishes those objectives. One needs no measure of compactness to discern that the districts
challenged in Shaw, Miller, Vera, and other racial gerrymandering cases were anything
but compact-a fact obvious merely from looking at the districting maps. Bush v. Vera,
517 U.S. 952 App. A-C (1996); Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 App. A & B (1995); Shaw v.
Reno, 509 U.S. 630 App. (1993). Moreover, an absolutely compact district is not for that
reason alone a sensible district. For example, a circle is the most compact geometric shape,
but absent some truly unusual circumstance, a circular shaped district would not be a
sensible one.
534. With the proliferation of single-member districts for county, school board, and
municipal elections, this will be a difficult standard to follow. "Nesting" of dis-
tricts-including all lesser political units within all greater ones (meaning a state senate
district would contain x number of whole state house districts which would contain y
number of whole county council districts, etc.)-usually cannot be accomplished within the
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(8) Districts may be permitted to deviate modestly from these
standards to accommodate communities of interest so long as the
underlying community is one which is geographically identifiable,
and the interest represented by the community arguably will not
otherwise be adequately accommodated by the districting plan.
(9) When otherwise consistent with the creation of sensible dis-
tricts, reasonable accommodation may be made to keep incum-
bents in districts containing the core populations of their existing
districts and to accomplish other political objectives as may be
necessary to secure adoption of the plan.
C. Procedures for the Production of a Challenge-Resistant Plan
Following are the steps that, if substantially followed, should
limit the risk that the plan will be successfully challenged. In the
event of a successful challenge, following these procedures should
limit the degree to which the plan will have to be adjusted to
eliminate the problem. These steps assume that the proposed
standards have been made public and that any notice require-
ments have been satisfied.
1. Turn off the redistricting software's racial and political in-
formation and produce the first plan consistent with all of the
enumerated standards except compliance with the Voting Rights
Act. The objective here is to produce a plan based on the jurisdic-
tion's enumerated standards, but without initially considering
race-based steps that later may be needed to comply with federal
law and without considering political data. If the plan that
emerges without using race satisfies federal law and is politically
acceptable, no further adjustment will be necessary, and a Shaw
challenge will be virtually impossible. All incumbents, including
those who are minorities, will be afforded some protection, first
by including a specific districting standard designed to preserve
the core of their existing districts, and second, by a later provi-
sion to reconnect incumbents severed from their core constitu-
ents. Ideally, this first step should be performed without knowl-
edge of the location of incumbents residences. Otherwise, the
focus inevitably will be on protecting the incumbent and not cre-
ating sensible districts. Even a tail-like adjustment to an other-
requirements of "one-person, one-vote." The ideal of having all the contests on the ballot in
a particular precinct be identical may be impossible for the same reason.
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wise sensible district to accommodate an incumbent is better
than having the district's entire makeup driven by the location of
the incumbent's residence. Make a permanent record of this first
race-neutral, politically neutral plan.
2. Do a reality check-politics do matter, adjust accordingly.
This step should also proceed with the racial information in the
districting program turned off. Begin by reconnecting incum-
bents, where needed and feasible, with the core of their old dis-
tricts. The justification for this step is that voters ought to be
given the opportunity to return an incumbent with whom they
have been pleased and turn out one who has not performed to
their satisfaction.535 Next, partisan adjustments that will be nec-
essary to achieve passage of the plan should be made utilizing
such political data as may be available.
As a part of the reality check for the draft plan, line drawers
should be receptive to information from incumbents and others
that indicate that the draft plan has divided a neighborhood, po-
litical subdivision, or identifiable area containing an interest
group for which a sensible district otherwise could have been con-
structed. Politically expedient accommodations for such a group
should be made at this stage.
Make a permanent record of the second race-neutral, politically
adjusted plan. This plan should to the extent possible represent
the plan that would have been presented to the body for approval
as a final plan but for the necessity of assuring that the plan
complies with the Voting Rights Act. The entity producing the
plan might want to consider actually putting this plan before the
legislative body for a conditional vote. Such a measure would re-
veal any remaining non-racial political hurdles to the plan as
drafted. Moreover, the body's conditional approval of the plan
would provide convincing evidence of the plan that would have
been adopted without any consideration having been given to
race. This provides a back-up plan should a court subsequently
determine that race-based steps perceived to be necessary to
comply with the Voting Rights Act went too far.536
535. The Supreme Court described the process as a policy aimed at maintaining exist-
ing relationships between incumbents and their constituents and preserving seniority.
White v. Weiser, 412 U.S. 783, 791 (1973).
536. There are obvious obstacles to such action, not the least of which is the very likely
resistance to spending the time, energy, and political capital necessary to pass a plan that
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3. Using the available racial information, consider whether to
reunite minority population concentrations inadvertently divided
in the draft plan. Now turn on the racial information associated
with the districting program. Check to see if district lines have
divided minority population concentrations that, if left intact,
could have formed a substantial percentage (approaching fifty
percent) of a district's population. If so, determine whether the
minority population concentration is one that could have been
recognized as a "community of interest," consistent with the way
similarly situated non-minority groups were treated.55 7 Unless all
similarly situated non-minority groups were accommodated in
the earlier draft, the decision as to whether this group should be
reunited is a political one. A decision by the redistricting entity to
create a district for this group should not trigger strict scrutiny. 8'
The fact that the interest group is a racial minority should not
deprive it of the benefits other similarly situated groups have re-
ceived.539 Preserve the plan produced by the changes made on this
basis, noting the reasons for doing so.
4. Test for retrogression under section 5, making such race-
based adjustments as may be needed. The first task here is to de-
termine the number of minority districts in the baseline plan.
The Justice Department's recently released Guidelines indicate
that it views the baseline plan as being the last legally enforce-
able district lines, with the 2000 Census population superim-
posed.5 40 Thus, to compare the proposed plan with the baseline
plan, the line drawers will have to come up with 2000 Census
minority population and voting age population figures for, at a
minimum, those districts in the old plan in which minorities were
in the majority in 1990 and those in which the minority might
have become a majority in 2000 by virtue of population growth.
may have to be significantly modified before a final vote.
537. See supra note 251 (discussing the appropriate use of the "community of interest"
concept to create districts).
538. See Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 919-20 (1995).
539. If the prior drafts did not make accommodations for any groups, it is perhaps
questionable whether accommodating minority populations would be consistent with the
jurisdictions standards. However, unless the district so created would be obviously differ-
ent from others in the plan, its creation is not likely to provoke a legal challenge.
540. The Guidelines state, "After the 'benchmark' districting plan is identified, the
staff inputs the boundaries of the benchmark and proposed plans into the Civil Rights Di-
vision's geographic information system. Then, using the most recent decennial census
data, population data are calculated for each of the districts in the benchmark and pro-
posed plans." Guidelines, supra note 187, at 5413.
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The Guidelines are vague about how the Department will de-
fine a minority district for retrogression purposes.541 Absent fur-
ther guidance from the either the Supreme Court or the district
court of the District of Columbia, a section 5 jurisdiction's wisest
approach is to view minority districts in the baseline plan as be-
ing those in which either a single minority group is a majority of
the citizen voting age population, 542 or the district's current office
holder is a minority who was elected with the support of at least
a majority of the relevant minority group.543 In balancing the risk
of Shaw litigation against the risk of drawing a section 5 objec-
tion, the jurisdiction is on firmer ground initially to take a view of
minority districts that appears to be consistent with decided
cases. If the Justice Department ultimately pushes for some dif-
ferent definition, the jurisdiction can decide at that time whether
to acquiesce and adjust the plan, or to bring suit in the District of
Columbia court. If it acquiesces, the actual extent of its respon-
sive race-based action will be easily documented, limiting the
damage to the overall plan if a Shaw challenge is subsequently
successful.
If there are fewer majority-minority districts in the proposed
plan than in the baseline plan, or if a minority incumbent elected
in a non-majority minority district, per the 2000 Census, is in a
proposed district with a smaller minority population percentage
than her existing district, the proposed plan is very likely retro-
gressive. Note, however, that the plan arguably is not retrogres-
sive if the protected minority group's overall percentage of the ju-
risdiction's voting age population has dropped precipitously, and
the number of "minority districts" in the proposed plan is in line
with the group's percentage of the electorate.5"
The action to be taken to avoid retrogression must obviously be
based on the specific circumstances of the plan. If it is possible to
541. See discussion supra Part One, I.E.4.
542. Combining two minority groups to create a majority-minority district is seldom
justified. However, African-Americans who are only a plurality of the voting age popula-
tion of a district that also has a large Hispanic population may turn out to be a majority of
the district's potential electorate when non-citizens are removed from the calculation.
543. A district with a black Democratic incumbent likely would qualify, but not one in
which a black incumbent was a Republican, who very likely was not the choice of the dis-
trict's black electorate.
544. In such circumstances, the inability to maintain the existing number of majority-
minority districts is almost certainly a function of some of them being substantially un-
derpopulated.
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adjust the plan to avoid or reduce retrogression, this step should
be taken unless the resulting districts can only be produced by
subjugating traditional districting criteria to race. If accommoda-
tions have already been made for minority incumbents and mi-
nority groups that qualified as "communities of interest," retro-
gression may be unavoidable. Population shifts over the decade
may make it impossible to retain the prior number of minority
districts without the outrageous gerrymandering that the Court's
Shaw line of cases indicated was unnecessary.145 If retrogression
cannot be feasibly avoided without totally disrupting the remain-
der of the plan, the jurisdiction should attempt to establish that
its plan nevertheless will provide the group "influence" in accor-
dance with its numbers in the electorate. Regardless of whether
the jurisdiction elects to violate districting standards to avoid ret-
rogression, or to submit the plan as one which it deems to be un-
avoidably retrogressive, it should fully document every action
taken, and every action considered but not taken, and include the
reasons therefor.
5. Examine the plan for possible section 2 liability. If minority
"communities of interests" have already been accommodated by
the plan, genuine risk of section 2 liability should be slight. If for
any reason there remain significant concentrations of minority
population divided by district lines, the jurisdiction should under-
take further analysis to decide if it should make race-based ad-
justments to the plan. In order to assure that the plan will sur-
vive future strict scrutiny, race-based adjustments should be
made only if a reasonable examination of the available evidence
indicates the likely presence of the Gingles preconditions.
a. The First Precondition
Is there a compact minority group with the potential to be a
majority of a district's citizen voting age population, but which is
not currently contained within a single district? If the answer is
no, the analysis does not need to proceed any further because
there is no risk of section 2 liability.
Shaw and its progeny make clear that only a group that could
take advantage of a reasonably compact district satisfies the first
545. See Abrams v. Johnson, 521 U.S. 74, 96 (1997), discussed supra Part One, II.C.3.
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precondition, but as noted above, the case law is less clear as to
whether a district for the group must also satisfy the jurisdic-
tion's other districting standards. 46 While the matter is certainly
not free from doubt, the better view is to take a flexible approach.
The question that should be answered is whether a district cre-
ated for the group would be a sensible one that might have been
created for some reason other than race--even if some reordering
of priorities and stretching of the community of interest concept
is necessary. If the answer is no, the putative group should not be
seen as satisfying the first precondition. The rationale of section 2
is to provide the group with the same opportunities that others
similarly situated might enjoy-not to provide it opportunities
that a non-racial group never would have had.
If a sufficiently large compact minority group exists which,
without regard to race qualifies for interest group status, the ju-
risdiction can, if it chooses, create a district for this group without
further analysis. However, if it wishes to create the district only
if necessary to avoid section 2 liability, or if it can create the dis-
trict only by reordering and stretching some of its traditional dis-
tricting standards, other than compactness, it must proceed to
the next step in the analysis.54
546. See supra Part One, II. Reading such a requirement into section 2 would be con-
sistent with the original notion behind vote dilution litigation-that when minority voters
were fenced out of the political process by discrimination and racism, it was a reasonable
limitation on the state's choice of electoral schemes to insist that it replace the scheme
that permitted dilution with another equally legitimate and equally recognized, electoral
system. Section 2 would then be seen as a mandate that, when dilution is present, a state
must utilize single-member districts and furthermore must elevate "communities of inter-
ests" above other districting criteria, even if it otherwise would not do so, if in so doing
minorities will be placed on equal footing with others.
547. When the jurisdiction itself is producing districts, it has the discretion to create
standard minority districts without any evidence that such districts are necessary to avoid
section 2 liability. It also has the discretion as to whether to reorder its standards or ig-
nore them to some degree to avoid section 2 liability, but when it does the latter, it must
have a reasoned basis in evidence to believe that it otherwise faces that liability. The state
merely needs to be reasonable in its analysis of the facts to avoid a Shaw violation. A court
producing a plan is in a different position vis A vis section 2 than is the legislature. Be-
cause the burden of proof of a section 2 violation is upon the party alleging it, the court
need not take steps to create minority districts except where following traditional district-
ing standards would naturally produce them, or unless necessary to avoid retrogression.
Any party seeking minority districts beyond that must carry its burden to establish that
failure to include such districts will result in a section 2 violation. Unlike the state's vol-
untary adoption of race-based districts---which, to avoid Shaw liability, need be based only
upon a reasonable assessment of its potential liability--the court must not impose a race-
based remedy on the state absent actual proof of a race-based violation.
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b. The Second and Third Preconditions5"
Short of a recent judicial determination that the other two pre-
conditions have been satisfied, the legislator will confront diffi-
cult factual and legal issues in connection with what constitutes
"political cohesiveness," and when "white bloc voting" is the
"cause" of the defeat of candidates of choice of the minority group.
In the context of actual section 2 litigation, these are issues that
require an intensely local factual inquiry, as well as expert testi-
mony subjected to careful scrutiny by the adversarial system. It
is impractical to expect legislators to engage in the same exacting
scrutiny. Yet, without some objective basis to determine whether
legislators "had a strong basis in evidence" for their fears con-
cerning section 2 liability, the holding in Shaw is easily sub-
verted, and judicial scrutiny is likely reduced to a determination
of whether the more objective first precondition exists.
Proponents of majority-minority districts are likely to produce
evidence of racially polarized voting, but organized opposition to
the creation of these districts on the grounds that they are uncon-
stitutionally race-based is likely to arise only after the fact. Legis-
lators therefore cannot safely rely on a one-sided presentation of
evidence to decide whether fear of section 2 liability can support
race-based action. For a jurisdiction with the resources to do so,
hiring an expert to do a polarization analysis is the preferable
course of action.549 When elections for the body to be redistricted
are partisan elections, the polarization analysis should look at
registration by party, by race, voting behavior by race in the De-
mocratic Primary and the General election, and the election out-
comes in each.
A simple short-cut to doing the full analysis may exist in some
jurisdictions. If minority candidates have routinely been elected
548. To adequately address the means to determine the presence of the second and
particularly the third precondition requires more space than can be allocated to this issue
here. A jurisdiction for which the "createldon't create a minority district" determination
actually rests on the presence of the second, or more likely the third, precondition would
be well advised to consult the section 2 cases for its federal circuit. All I can do here is ad-
dress the most obvious situations.
549. Counsel for the redistricting body should be careful not to turn legal issues over to
statisticians or even political scientists. The expert should provide the basic information of
which candidates were supported at what level by majority and minority voters. Deter-
mining whether the results of the analysis support the existence of the second and third
precondition should be the lawyer's job.
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in the area that includes the putative section 2 group in districts
that are not majority-minority in voter turnout, it cannot be said
that polarized voting is defeating the group's candidates of choice.
The consistent election of minorities to other offices involving the
voters in the area should suffice to negate the existence of polar-
ized voting, so long as the minority candidates have not been rou-
tinely defeated when running for the actual office that is the sub-
ject of the redistricting. Absent substantial minority success,
further analysis will be necessary.550
c. Political Cohesiveness
If seventy-five percent of the group's members have registered
with the same party, the group passes the first cohesiveness hur-
dle.55' If fewer than seventy-five percent of voters are registered
with one party, or consistently support the nominees of one party,
the group is not politically cohesive.552 Most everywhere, black
voters will be registered as Democrats and will support nominees
of the Democratic Party at levels that exceed seventy-five per-
cent. 55
3
Cohesiveness in support of Democrats, however, does not dis-
tinguish the minority group from other Democrats. The second
step in the cohesiveness analysis is to determine if the group is
cohesive without regard to the party label. If over the prior ten
years, seventy-five percent or more of the group has supported
550. While there is disagreement as to the degree to which white candidates elected
with overwhelming minority support "count" as the group's candidates of choice, a juris-
diction cannot assume that white candidates were supported by the group without further
analysis. However, when black candidates have been routinely elected, this suggests that
race is not a barrier to election, which would negate the existence of dilution even if these
candidates were not the choices of the group.
551. If registration records by race are not available, a finding that seventy-five per-
cent of the group supports the nominees of one party seventy-five percent of the time is an
alternative means to determine that the group is cohesive in its party preference.
552. Some percentage greater than a simple majority must be selected because if, as is
typical, there are, as a practical matter, only two party choices, a majority of the group
would always be registered with one of them. I selected seventy-five percent because below
that percentage, the group's inability to elect candidates of its choice is just as attributable
to its failure to vote together as it is to the voting behavior of others.
553. For a summary of presidential elections showing black support for the Democratic
nominee ranging between eighty-three and ninety percent, see HAROLD W. STANLEY &
RICHARD G. NIEMI, VrIrAL STATISTICS ON AMERICAN POLITICS 2001-2002 122-24 tbl. 3-5
(2001). See generally STEPHAN THERNSTROM & ABIGAIL M. THERNSTROM, AMERICA IN
BLACK AND WHITE: ONE NATION INDIVISIBLE (1999).
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the same candidate in the Democratic Primary at least seventy-
five percent of the time, it is reasonable to conclude that group
members are cohesive as minorities, and not merely as a subset of
Democrats.
d. A Bloc-Voting White Majority That Defeats the Candidates of
Choice of the Group
In a contested section 2 lawsuit, it is the third precondition
that generally raises the most issues-particularly in those fed-
eral circuits that take the view that it is not satisfied if the
group's choices are defeated for political rather than racial rea-
sons.5 5 4 Because the state merely needs to be reasonable in its de-
termination of potential liability, its task is somewhat easier than
a court's. It probably will be sufficient to decide that this precon-
dition has been established if candidates supported by at least
seventy-five percent of the group have failed to secure the Democ-
ratic Party nomination for the offices at issue some high percent-
age of the time.5 If, in the Democratic Primary, the group has
routinely nominated its choices who are then routinely defeated
in the general election, the key inquiry is whether the Democratic
Party nominees who were the group's choices lost much more of-
ten than Democratic nominees generally. When white Democrats
win but black Democrats lose under comparable conditions in the
general election, it is reasonable for a jurisdiction that wishes to
create a minority district to conclude that the third precondition
is present. A jurisdiction that believes an additional minority dis-
trict will mean that other legitimate districting goals must be
abandoned can always just not create the district, and hope that
554. See, e.g., Vecinos de Barrio Uno v. City of Holyoke, 72 F.3d 973, 981 (1st Cir.
1995); Nipper v. Smith, 39 F.3d 1494, 1524-25 (11th Cir. 1994) (en banc); League of
United Latin Am. Citizens v. Clements, 999 F.2d 831, 850 (5th Cir. 1993) (en banc), cert.
denied, 510 U.S. 1071 (1994); Baird v. Consol. City of Indianapolis, 976 F.2d 357, 361 (7th
Cir. 1992).
555. The determination as to how often the group should expect to prevail is subjective,
but should be based on its cohesiveness and size. When the group is routinely ninety per-
cent or greater cohesive in support of candidates in the Democratic Primary contests ex-
amined and is also a substantial part of the electorate, say, perhaps, forty percent or
greater, it should be able to routinely elect its first choices. When it is less cohesive, or a
smaller segment of the electorate in the districts analyzed, expectations for success should
be adjusted downward.
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its decision is not subsequently challenged, or that the challeng-
ers will not carry their burden of proof.556
6. Present the proposed plan to the public, if required by state
law, or if deemed desirable. Make desirable, politically expedient
modifications based on feedback from this step. Document the
changes and reasons therefor.
7. Submit the plan to the legislature and take all remaining
steps necessary for the plan's adoption. Changes to the plan at
this stage should be discouraged. Those that are politically un-
avoidable should be carefully documented and should not be
made using racial data or some highly suspicious substitute for
race.
At this point, line drawers in jurisdictions not subject to section
5 can begin to relax. In section 5 jurisdictions, however, the bat-
tle, unfortunately, may be just beginning.
8. Submit the plan for preclearance. The Guidelines are clear
about the procedures for submission."' Thus, I address here
strategies for a plan's survival of the process.
First, decide whether to bypass the Justice Department by
submitting the plan directly to the district court of the District of
Columbia. In the past, this expensive and time consuming step
was seldom advisable unless a jurisdiction was unable to obtain
administrative preclearance. If, however, the Department has
sent strong informal signals to the jurisdiction that an objection
to its plan is likely, the court option may be a better choice. The
Supreme Court's section 5 decisions of the past decade should re-
sult in most preclearance decisions turning on legal issues, rather
than on genuinely disputed facts. Because of the vast increase in
the number of jurisdictions that adopted single-member districts
during the past decade, and consequently must redistrict, the
Department's Voting Section will be pushed to new limits to proc-
ess submissions and defend cases filed in the District of Columbia
court. Thus, the Department may be less inclined to look for
556. There is seldom unanimity among legislators on this issue. Legislators in favor of
more minority districts can of course take the analysis to yet another level in hopes of con-
vincing their colleagues that section 2 liability looms.
557. See Procedures for the Administration of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, 28
C.F.R. §§ 51.1-.67 (2001).
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factual disputes to avoid having the case decided on summary
judgment.
Second, if the jurisdiction elects to seek administrative pre-
clearance, one advisable strategic move is to supply absolutely
every shred of evidence called for by the Guidelines for section 5
submission, even if it is difficult to imagine how the evidence re-
quested could possibly aid the Department's deliberations." 8 This
will reduce the Department's opportunity to extend the statutory
sixty-day period it has to respond to a submission by requesting
additional information.559 It may be advisable to seek a confer-
ence with the Department's analyst at some point early in the
sixty-day period. The conference permits the jurisdiction to ad-
dress concerns early and also encourages the analyst to examine
the submission earlier than he might otherwise have done.560
Beyond the obviously good strategy of complying with the law
as defined by the courts and the Department, if consistent with
judicial precedent, a covered jurisdiction's best preclearance
strategy is to fully document its own districting standards, the
steps involved in the creation of its districting plan, and the
means by which it believes that it has complied with section 5's
non-retrogression standard. If the Department refuses preclear-
ance on any basis that appears inconsistent with the case law, in-
cluding a strained interpretation of retrogression, the jurisdic-
tion's chances for judicial preclearance should be good. If the
jurisdiction elects to acquiesce to the Department's position, it
should very carefully document every race-based change it makes
to its plan in order to obtain preclearance. If a Department moti-
vated race-based change is later successfully challenged, a court-
imposed remedy should do only minimal damage to the overall
plan. However, as noted earlier, limitations on the court's reme-
dial options introduce a significant element of uncertainty as to
how much of the jurisdiction's original plan can be retained.56'
558. See id. §§ 51.26-.28.
559. Id. § 51.1(a)(2).
560. The only conference specifically mentioned by the Procedures for the Administra-
tion of Section 5 is one following a covered jurisdiction's request that an objection be re-
considered. Id. § 51.47. However, I am aware that, at least in the past, informal confer-
ences could be arranged while a submission was pending. Note that if for any reason the
jurisdiction submits additional information it wishes to be considered in support of a sub-
mitted change, the sixty-day period for the Department's response begins anew. Id. §
51.39.
561 See discussion Part One, rLB.
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Thus, any jurisdiction with a strong case for preclearance may
conclude that it is better, and perhaps in the long run, less ex-
pensive, to seek judicial preclearance of its original plan.
CONCLUSION
The best protection against future challenges to a districting
plan is to follow traditional districting standards interpreted in a
manner likely to produce sensible, fair election districts that are
consistent with identified representational goals. Only rarely,
and perhaps never, does federal law require that jurisdictions vio-
late these standards. Even constitutionally permissible accom-
modations for minorities generally can be made within the con-
fines of these standards.
Redistricting is, of course, the quintessential political process,
and is carried out most everywhere by individuals who have a
vested interest in its outcome. Advice that fails to take account of
this fact falls on deaf ears. Moreover, modest accommodations to
keep an incumbent in a district with her prior constituents le-
gitimately furthers the electorate's interest in keeping a respon-
sive legislator in office, or alternatively, in "throwing the rascal
out." That said, excessive gerrymandering-blatant disregard of
traditional districting standards-to advance personal and parti-
san interests may become a political reality, but it will never be a
virtue or a "state interest" to be furthered in a redistricting plan.
It is not the self-interest of legislators, but rather the competing
representational concerns of the people that the Supreme Court
has in mind when it admonishes the federal courts to leave the
balancing of political interests to the legislature. Legislators have
a duty to select from competing interests that merit consideration
in the redistricting process-a duty they breach if they permit
their self-interests to be the only interests "balanced." Traditional
districting criteria exist in part to help legislators do their duty.
Moreover, legislators will be well advised to remember that,
while neutral standards prevent them from giving full vent to
their self-protective urges, these standards have a similar impact
on their opponents. The party controlling the redistricting process
this year may be out of power when the next plan is produced,
which in this litigation-prone era may be next year, rather than
next decade!
